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Articles




Whoever has the right to give, has the right to dispose of the same
as he pleases. Cujus est dare ejus est disponere, is the maxim which
governs in such case.1
It is against public policy to permit a man to tie up his own property




The last several years have witnessed the beginning of a
revolutionary and controversial trend in the law of trusts in the
United States: as a means of attracting business for its banks and
other professional fiduciaries, several states, most notably Alaska and
Delaware, have enacted legislation to facilitate the creation of so-
called asset protection trusts (APTs), which allow trust settlors to
shelter their assets from the claims of most creditors. This trend
follows a decades-long development that has allowed the creation of
such trusts offshore, and the changes in domestic law reverse a long-
standing American rule under which the asset-protection features of
* Assistant Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University. I thank Sharon C.
Wilson for her research assistance; Edward 0. Henneman, Margaret Howard, Lyman P.Q.
Johnson, Frederic L. Kirgis, Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., David Millon, Blake D. Morant,
Richard H. Seamon, Adam F. Scales, and W. Bradley Wendel for their advice,
suggestions, and comments; and the Frances Lewis Law Center, Washington and Lee
University, for its financial support.
1. Ashhurst v. Given, 5 Watts & Serg. 323, 330 (Pa. 1843) (declining to allow a
beneficiary's creditor to reach his interest in a trust).
2. 1 AUSTIN WAKEMAN ScoTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 156, at 782 (1st ed. 1939)
[hereinafter SCOTT ON TRUSTS (1st ed.)].
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such trusts generally have been viewed as ineffective. This new
development in American law also has generated a wealth of
academic commentary, all of it negative. The trend appears likely to
continue unabated, as other states compete for the investment funds
of settlors seeking to shelter their assets from creditors.
This article examines the theoretical underpinnings of the
traditional American rule concerning creditors' rights in trusts
established for the settlor's own benefit. Under the traditional rule, a
creditor of a settlor is entitled to reach the assets of a trust for the
settlor's own benefit even though, in the case of a discretionary trust
4
the settlor may himself or herself have no enforceable right to trust
distributions, and even though allowing creditor access to the trust
assets may compromise the otherwise enforceable interests of other
trust beneficiaries. The article concludes that the traditional
American rule is theoretically unsound. This conclusion is based on
the principles of law and practical considerations that guide the
behavior of trustees in determining the size and frequency of trust
distributions and in determining to whom those distributions should
be made. The article concludes that, as a general proposition, the
rights of a creditor in an APT should be no greater than the rights of
the settlor, and the rights of the settlor's creditors should not be
permitted to defeat the rights of other trust beneficiaries.
By calling the traditional American rule into question, the article
points to a provocative conclusion: APTs may and should be
effective under some circumstances. But the purpose of the article is
not to advocate for APT legislation. Nor is its purpose to answer all
outstanding policy questions about the circumstances under which
APTs should be respected. Rather, the article has some more modest
goals. First, the article seeks to refocus the debate about APTs, by
evaluating creditors' rights based on realistic assessments of the
nature of the settlor's interest in an APT and the nature of the
trustee's duties to the settlor and other trust beneficiaries. Second,
recognizing the perhaps inevitable tide of legislation permitting
APTs, the article seeks not to stem the tide, but rather to guide it to
produce a reasonable balance between the rights of creditors and the
interests of trust beneficiaries. At stake are the competing objectives
of property owners, whose goal is to impose limits on their own and
3. See Randall J. Gingiss, Putting a Stop to "Asset Protection" Trusts, 51 BAYLOR L.
REV. 987 (1999); Henry J. Lischer, Jr., Domestic Asset Protection Trusts: Pallbearers to
Liability?, 35 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 479 (2000); Stewart E. Sterk, Asset Protection
Trusts: Trust Law's Race to the Bottom?, 85 CORNELL L. REv. 1035 (2000); Karen E.
Boxx, Gray's Ghost-A Conversation About the Onshore Trust, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1195
(2000).
4. A discretionary trust is one in which the trustees have discretion concerning
distributions to beneficiaries.
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others' access to their property, and their creditors, who seek to
pierce those limits by raising public policy concerns.
Part I of the article provides an overview of the American law of
trusts in connection with the rights of creditors of trust beneficiaries.
Part I begins with an introduction to basic trust law concepts and
terminology. Part I next describes the law of creditors' rights
applicable to trusts of which the settlor is not a beneficiary. As Part I
explains, the law generally allows the assets of such trusts to be
sheltered from the claims of the beneficiaries' creditors. Part I then
describes the contrary rule that has applied traditionally to so-called
self-settled trusts, that is, trusts for the (exclusive or non-exclusive)
benefit of the settlor. Until the recent legislative developments
mentioned above, the firmly established American rule was that the
assets of a self-settled trust were, with limited exceptions, fully
accessible by the settlor's creditors. Part I considers the historical
roots of this rule, examines its theoretical basis, and concludes that
the rule is theoretically unsound.
Part II describes the legal developments that, beginning in the
mid-1980s, led to a substantial offshore trust industry, which caters to
the asset-protection objectives of Americans and others whose
domestic laws fail to afford such protection. Part II then describes
the legislative efforts in several American states to institute the self-
settled APT as a feature of American law. Part II also considers
briefly whether the creditor-protective features of these trusts will be
respected by courts in United States jurisdictions that continue to
follow the traditional rule. This discussion is followed by Part III,
which considers the law of fraudulent transfers and its significance in
evaluating creditors' rights in self-settled trusts.
Part IV of the article reexamines the law of creditors' rights in
trusts by analyzing those rights from the perspective of basic fiduciary
principles. Based on this reexamination, Part IV concludes that the
traditional American approach to creditors' rights in self-settled trusts
is based on a fundamental misunderstanding of the relationships
among settlors, other trust beneficiaries, and trustees. In considering
the use of APTs, Part IV also examines other creditor-protection
planning tools available under present law (such as limited
partnerships and tenancies by the entirety) and concludes that
allowing APTs under some circumstances would serve to extend
creditor protection to individuals for whom these other tools are not
practicably available. Part IV then considers the policy arguments for
and against the use of APTs and suggests some possible limitations
that should placed on their availability and effectiveness.
5. The article's opening quotations, see supra text accompanying notes 1-2, articulate
the standard supporting arguments.
I. Background
A. Basic Trust Law Concepts and Terminology
A trust is an asset-management device that divides the burdens
and benefits of ownership of property between a trustee, on the one
hand, and beneficiaries, on the other. This division of ownership
interests creates a fiduciary relationship between the trustee and the
beneficiaries. The trustee is said to hold the "legal interests" in the
trust property (i.e., the trustee holds legal title), while the
beneficiaries are said to hold the "equitable interests" in the property.
Thus, although the trustee is strictly speaking the "owner" of the trust
assets, the trustee owns those assets not for the trustee's own benefit,
but for the benefit of the beneficiaries, for whom the trustee is a
fiduciary. The rights and obligations of the trustee and the
beneficiaries are established by the terms of the trust instrument and
through a body of law that has developed principally through
decisions by courts of equity defining and enforcing the interests of
trust beneficiaries. Trust law from time to time may also be modified
by statute.
To create a trust, a property owner transfers assets to a trustee.
The transfer is usually accompanied by a written trust instrument that
sets forth the terms of the trust, including both the dispositive
provisions (i.e., the instructions for how the trustee is to dispose of
the assets) and the administrative provisions (which specify most
powers and duties of the trustee in managing the assets). The person
who creates the trust is known as the "settlor."6  The trustee is
usually, although need not be, someone other than the settlor. The
beneficiaries of the trust may or may not include the settlor,7
depending on the objectives for which the trust is established. A trust
will typically include "current beneficiaries," persons to whom the
trustee is authorized or required to make current distributions, and
"future beneficiaries," persons who will or may receive trust
distributions in the future.'
6. Or, alternatively, the "grantor." This article uses the term "settlor."
7. In fact, under some circumstances, the settlor will be the sole beneficiary of the
trust. Note, therefore, that one person can assume any number of the roles of settlor,
trustee, and beneficiary. In order to have a valid trust, however, the trustee must owe a
duty to someone other than only herself. Thus, although the trustee and the beneficiary
can be the same person, the sole trustee cannot also be the sole beneficiary, for under that
circumstance there would be no division between the legal and equitable interests.
8. Future beneficiaries often include both persons who may or shall receive periodic
distributions of income and principal, commencing at some point in the future, and
remainder beneficiaries, who may or shall receive outright distributions of principal at the
trust's termination.
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A trust typically establishes different dispositive schemes for
trust "income" and trust "principal." For example, the trust
instrument may authorize or direct the payment of income to one
beneficiary or group of beneficiaries and also authorize or direct the
payment of principal to the same or different beneficiaries. The
concepts of "income" and "principal" are defined under applicable
state law (sometimes with variations prescribed by the trust
instrument). In simple terms, "principal" includes the original trust
assets, proceeds from the sale of those assets, and any replacement
assets purchased with the proceeds, reduced by certain charges (as
prescribed by applicable law); "income" includes all trust barnings,
such as rents, dividends, and interest (but excluding realized capital
gains, which constitute principal), reduced by all charges not allocable
to principal.
B. General Rules Regarding Creditors' Rights in Trusts
Except as otherwise provided by law9 or by the governing
instrument, a beneficiary's interest in a trust is freely transferable.
Thus, a beneficiary entitled to all income of a trust for life can
transfer the income interest, either gratuitously or for consideration,
to some other person, who then holds a trust income interest pur
autre vie. By transferring the interest for consideration, the
beneficiary is able to anticipate the interest by receiving for it funds
worth approximately the present value of the income stream, as
measured by the beneficiary's life expectancy. The beneficiary's
income interest can also be transferred involuntarily, through
attachment by a judgment creditor of the beneficiary."
Both voluntary and involuntary transfers of trust interests can
disrupt a trust's dispositive plan. Consider, for example, a trust
created for the benefit of the settlor's child, who lacks the requisite
judgment and skill to handle outright ownership of property. If the
child could anticipate her interest by selling it or using it as collateral
for a loan, the trust would lose its effectiveness as a tool for managing
assets on the child's behalf. Similarly, if through improvidence the
child were to incur a debt which could then be satisfied from trust
assets, the trust would fail to serve its purpose of protecting against
such improvidence.
9. In New York interests in trusts are not transferrable unless the settlor expressly
provides otherwise. See N.Y. EST. POWERS & TR. LAW § 7.1-5 (McKinney 1992).
10. The judgment creditor will seek to satisfy the beneficiary's obligation in one of two
ways: (i) by obtaining a court order requiring the trustee to make the income payments to
the creditor, until the beneficiary's obligation is satisfied or (ii) by obtaining a court order
requiring the trustee to sell the income interest and pay the proceeds to the creditor. The
latter alternative is usually not available as a practical matter, due to the lack of a market
for trust income interests.
To guard against such disruptions, most trusts include a so-called
spendthrift provision, of which the following is typical:
To the extent permitted by law, the principal and income of this
trust shall not be liable for the debts of any beneficiary or subject to
alienation or anticipation by a beneficiary.
Almost all American jurisdictions give effect to such provisions under
most circumstances, although most jurisdictions also refuse to give
effect to spendthrift provisions for certain types of creditors, most
significantly persons seeking delinquent child support payments and
governments seeking collection of unpaid taxes.1'
A spendthrift provision is not the only means of providing
creditor protection for trust beneficiaries. Consider, for example, a
so-called discretionary trust for the benefit of the settlor's child,
under which the trustee is authorized to distribute income and
principal in such amounts and for such purposes as the trustee deems
appropriate. In the absence of a spendthrift provision (or if the
spendthrift provision were for any reason ineffective), the child's
interest in the trust could be attached by the child's creditors. Yet, as
a practical matter, attaching the child's interest would provide
creditors with little or nothing of value, because the creditors (in the
child's stead) could not compel the trustee to make (and thus the
trustee would be unlikely to make) any distributions. Thus, in the
case of a discretionary trust, it is the nature of the beneficiary's
interest rather than a provision prohibiting transfers of the interest
that protects the trust assets against creditors' claims. Because the
beneficiary could not compel trust distributions, neither can the
beneficiary's creditors.12
C. Traditional Rules Regarding Creditors' Rights in Self-Settled Trusts
Until recently, in the United States the asset protection attributes
of trusts described above were not available with respect to trusts for
the settlor's own benefit. 3 The apparent origin of this rule lies in a
fifteenth century English statute, which provided that "all deeds of
11. Moreover, as discussed below, virtually all jurisdictions refuse to give effect to
spendthrift provisions for the benefit of the settlor. See infra notes 13-16 and
accompanying text.
12. This is not to say, however, that the beneficiary of a discretionary trust can never
compel distributions. Under some circumstances a trustee's refusal to make distributions
under a wholly discretionary standard might be considered unreasonable and thus an
abuse of discretion. See infra notes 274-276 and accompanying text. As a practical matter,
however, a creditor in the beneficiary's stead would face an even greater challenge than
the beneficiary in compelling a trustee to make distributions from a wholly discretionary
trust.
13. For a discussion of recent domestic legislation allowing asset protection trusts, see
infra notes 89-119 and accompanying text.
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gift of goods and chattels made or to be made [in] trust, to the use of
that person or persons that made the same deed of gift, be void and of
none effect."' This statute has been enacted in a number of
American jurisdictions, though in most cases with the modification
that the transfer is void only "as against creditors" of the settlor."5 In
virtually every state in which the issue is not addressed by statute,
there is judicial authority to the same effect. 6 Thus, the traditional
rule in the United States, as reflected in section 156(1) of the
Restatement (Second) of Trusts, 7 is that a spendthrift provision for
the benefit of the settlor is not effective. For example, if a settlor
were to create a trust, reserving the right to income for life and
including a spendthrift provision, the settlor's creditors could reach
the income interest notwithstanding the spendthrift provision.
Can a settlor shelter trust assets from creditors' claims by
reserving a discretionary interest in the trust? In the United States,
the traditional answer to this question is "no." Although the settlor
of a discretionary trust cannot compel the trustee to distribute trust
income or principal to the settlor, the settlor's creditors are able to
compel such distributions. The standard formulation of this rule is set
forth in section 156(2) of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts as
follows:
Where a person creates for his own benefit a trust for support or a
discretionary trust, his transferee or creditors can reach the
maximum amount which the trustee under the terms of the trust
could pay to him or apply for his benefit."
Applying the Restatement rule, suppose a settlor creates a trust,
the terms of which authorize the trustee to distribute to the settlor
14. 3 Hen. 7, c. 4 (1487); see also 2A AUSTIN WAKE SCOTT & WILLIAM FRANKLIN
FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 156, at 168 n.4 (4th ed. 1987) [hereinafter SCOTr ON
TRUSTS (4th ed.)].
15. 2A SCOTT ON TRUSTS (4th ed.), supra note 14, § 156, at 169.
16. 2A SCOTT ON TRUSTS (4th ed.), supra note 14, § 156, at 165-67 n.1.
17. The Second Restatement describes the rule as follows:
Where a person creates for his own benefit a trust with a provision restraining
the voluntary or involuntary transfer of his interest, his transferee or creditors
can reach his interest.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 156(1) (1959); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF TRUSTS § 58(2) (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1999) (stating that "[a] restraint on the
voluntary and involuntary alienation of a beneficial interest retained by the settlor is
invalid"); UNIFORM TRUST CODE § 505(a) (2000) (creditors can reach settlor's interest
"[wjhether or not the terms of a trust contain a spendthrift provision").
18. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 156(2) (1959); see also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 60 cmt. f (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1999) (stating that the settlor's
creditors "can reach the maximum amount the trustee, in the proper exercise of fiduciary
discretion, could pay to or apply for the benefit of the settlor"); UNIFORM TRUST CODE §
505(a)(2) (2000) (stating that a "creditor... of the settlor may reach the maximum
amount that can be distributed to or for the settlor's benefit").
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
such amounts of income and principal as the trustee deems
appropriate for any purpose. A creditor of the settlor can reach all of
the trust assets, because the maximum amount that can be distributed
by the trustee is the entire trust. Suppose instead the settlor creates a
trust, the terms of which authorize the trustee to distribute to the
settlor (or for the settlor's benefit) such amounts of income and
principal of the trust as may be necessary for the settlor's support.
Under these circumstances, a creditor of the settlor is entitled to
reach the maximum amount that could be distributed for the settlor's
support, regardless of whether the creditor supplied goods or services
in connection with the settlor's support.9
The origin of and rationale for the Restatement rule is murky.
The rule appears in the original Restatement and also in the original
edition (and all subsequent editions) of the classic treatise on the law
of trusts written by the late Professor Austin Wakeman Scott,2 who
was also the Reporter and principal author of the First and Second
Restatements. Neither Restatement nor the Restatement Reporter's
Notes offer a rationale for the rule. The most recent edition of
Professor Scott's treatise provides only the following:
Clearly, the policy that prevents a person from creating a
spendthrift trust for his own benefit also prevents him from
depriving his creditors of a right to reach the trust property by
creating a discretionary trust.=
Thus, to understand Professor Scott's rationale for the rule, we must
also look to his discussion of the invalidity of spendthrift provisions in
self-settled trusts. Unfortunately, that discussion, too, offers little
elaboration or analysis. In that context, Professor Scott states simply
that "[ilt is against public policy to permit a man to tie up his own
property in such a way that he can still enjoy it but can prevent his
creditors from reaching it."' In discussing the distinction between
self-settled trusts and trusts established for persons other than the
settlor, Professor Scott states that "[i]t is against public policy to
permit the owner of property to create for his own benefit an interest
19. 2A SCOTT ON TRUSTS (4th ed.), supra note 14, § 156.2, at 176. This rule may be
contrasted with the rule applicable to support trusts for the benefit of persons other than
the settlor, which in general may not be reached by the beneficiaries' creditors. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTRUSTS § 154 (1959).
20. RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS § 156(2) (1935).
21. 1 SCOTT ON TRUSTS (1st ed.), supra note 2, § 156.2 at 784; 2 AUSTIN WAKEMAN
ScoTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 156.2 (2d ed. 1956); 2 AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT, THE
LAW OF TRUSTS § 156.2 (3d ed. 1967); 2A SCOTT ON TRUSTS (4th ed.), supra note 14, §
156.2.
22. 2A SCOTT ON TRUSTS (4th ed.), supra note 14, § 156.2, at 176.
23. 2A SCOTT ON TRUSTS (4th ed.), supra note 14, § 156, at 167; see also 1 SCOTT ON
TRUSTS (1st ed.), supra note 2, § 156, at 782.
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in that property that cannot be reached by his creditors." 24 Most
modem cases elaborate little on these rationales, simply citing the
Restatement or Professor Scott's treatise.
Note two essential components of the Restatement rule. First,
the rule grants to creditors greater rights than those retained by the
settlor himself or herself: the settlor cannot compel trust
distributions, but the settlor's creditors can. Second, the rule applies
notwithstanding that allowing the settlor's creditors to reach the
assets of the trust may defeat not just the settlor's interests, but also
the interests of other beneficiaries.
In connection with the latter point in particular, consider
Greenwich Trust Co. v. Tysons.2 In Greenwich Trust Co., the settlor
created a trust in which the trustee was authorized (but not required)
to pay income to or for the benefit of the settlor, his wife, and his
children for a period of 20 years, at which time the trust assets
reverted to the settlor; if the settlor died before the end of the 20-year
term, the trust continued for the benefit of the settlor's wife and
children. Relying in part on the original Restatement, the court held
that the settlor's creditor could reach the entire income interest of the
trust, despite the fact that the income could be distributed currently
to someone other than the settlor and despite the fact that any
accumulated income (in case of the settlor's death during the 20-year
term) would pass to persons other than the settlor. In responding to
the trustee's concern that paying the settlor's creditor would defeat
the interests of other trust beneficiaries, the court stated:
The outstanding factor in the situation is that, under a trust
where the trustee has absolute discretion to pay the income or
expend it for the settlor's benefit, the trustee could, even though he
had a like discretion to expend it for others, still pay it all to the
settlor. Such a trust opens the way to the evasion by the settlor of
his just debts, although he may still have the full enjoyment of the
income from his property. To subject it to the claims of the settlor's
creditors does not deprive others to whom the trustee might pay
the income of anything to which they are entitled of right; they
could not compel the trustee to use any of the income for them.
The public policy which subjects to the demands of a settlor's
creditors the income of a trust which the trustee in his discretion
may pay to the settlor applies no less to a case where the trustee
might in his discretion pay or use the income for others.
Thus, the court characterized the interests of the non-settlor
beneficiaries as merely a device to permit "evasion of the settlor of
24. 2A ScoTr ON TRUsTS (4th ed.), supra note 14, § 156, at 168.
25. 27 A.2d 166 (Conn. 1942).
26. Id. at 173.
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his just debts,"' not worthy of protection in face of the right of the
settlor's creditor to be paid.
Two elements of the quoted passage are particularly noteworthy.
First, the court observes that, under the terms of the trust, the settlor
"may still have the full enjoyment of the income from his property. '
Second, the court states that satisfying the claim of the settlor's
creditor "does not deprive others to whom the trustee might pay the
income of anything to which they are entitled of right; they could not
compel the trustee to use any of the income for them., 21 Each
statement reflects a misunderstanding of basic fiduciary principles,
topics on which the article elaborates in Part IV, but which bear
emphasis here as well. The court's first observation-that the settlor
may still have "full enjoyment" of trust income-suggests, without
directly saying, that the settlor gave up no rights to income when he
included his wife and children as beneficiaries, i.e., that he might be
entitled to receive all the income, notwithstanding that other
beneficiaries were potential income recipients. This statement
ignores the fact that the trustee would be required to consider the
interests of the wife and children in making income distributions and
would be exposed to potential liability to the wife and children if it
distributed all of the trust income to the settlor. The second
statement-that the wife and children could not compel the trustee to
distribute income to them-ignores the fact that a trustee, even one
operating under a wholly discretionary standard, can be held liable
for unreasonably withholding distributions to a beneficiary. The
corollary of this proposition, of course, is that the trustee could be
compelled to make distributions to the wife and children under
certain circumstances. Thus, allowing the settlor's creditor to reach
the income stream may very well have compromised enforceable
interests of non-settlor beneficiaries.
As noted earlier," the principal sources of the traditional rule-
the Restatements and Professor Scott's treatise-offer little guidance
on its rationale. Most cases that postdate the Restatement simply cite
the Restatement or Professor Scott's treatise, with little or no analysis
or elaboration of why the rule is being adopted." Moreover, as
observed in connection with Greenwich Trust Co., the traditional rule
may be based on misunderstandings of fiduciary principles governing
the relative rights and interests of multiple trust beneficiaries. These
27. Id.
28. Id (emphasis added).
29. Id. (emphasis added).
30. See supra notes 19-24 and accompanying text.
31. See Ware v. Gulda, 117 N.E.2d 137, 138 (Mass. 1954); In re Robbins, 826 F.2d 293,
295 (4th Cir. 1987) (applying Maryland law); In re Hertsberg Inter Vivos Trust, 578
N.W.2d 289,291 (Mich. 1998); Hanson v. Minette, 461 N.W.2d 592,596 (Iowa 1990).
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observations prompt the question whether Professor Scott, in writing
his treatise and in drafting the Restatement,3 2 properly analyzed the
available precedent. The materials immediately following consider
this question by reviewing the principal cases cited by Professor Scott
in the first edition of his treatise.3
32. The first Restatement predates the treatise by several years, but the American
Law Institute did not publish Reporter's Notes for the First Restatement. See Herbert F.
Goodrich, Introduction to RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS viii (1959) (noting that
the Second Restatement, unlike the first, includes published Reporter's Notes); see also
http://wwv.ali.org (same) (last visited June 7, 2001). Because the first edition of the
treatise postdates the Restatement by only a few years, it is likely that the same precedents
served as authority for both works.
33. In support of his assertion that the creditor of a settlor can reach the maximum
amount that could be distributed by the trustee, Professor Scott in the first edition of his
treatise cites the following cases: De Rousse v. Williams, 164 N.W. 896 (Iowa 1917);
Warner v. Rice, 8 A. 84 (Md. 1887); Bryan v. Knickerbacker, 1 Barb. Ch. 409 (N.Y. Ch.
1846); McLean v. Button, 19 Barb. 450, 1854 WL 5847 (N.Y. 1854); Sloan v. Birdsall, 11
N.Y.S. 814 (Sup. Ct. 1890); Nolan v. Nolan, 67 A. 52 (Pa. 1907); Hay v. Price, 15 Pa. D. 144
(Ct. Com. P1. 1906); J.S. Menken Co. v. Brinkley, 31 S.W. 92 (Tenn. 1895); Petty v. Moores
Brook Sanitarium, 67 S.E. 355, 356 (Va. 1910); Crane v. Illinois Merchants Trust Co., 238
Ill. App. 257 (1925). See 1 Scorr ON TRUSTS (1st ed.), supra note 2, §§ 156.1 n.2 & 156.2
n.2. Warner v. Rice, Hay v. Price, Bryan v. Knickerbacker, and J.S. Menken Co. v.
Brinkley are discussed in greater detail below. See infra notes 34-52 and accompanying
text. This footnote briefly considers the other cases. As this footnote suggests, most of
the cases cited by Professor Scott provide, at best, marginal support for his statement of
the general American rule.
Consider, for example, Petty, 67 S.E. 355. In Petty, the settlor was the sole beneficiary
of the trust during his lifetime, and the settlor retained a testamentary power of
appointment over the trust assets. Id. Thus, any distributions made by the trustee would
necessarily benefit the settlor only, and the disposition of any amounts not distributed by
the trustee was subject to the settlor's control at his death. Id. at 355-56. The case
therefore does not support a rule in which the rights of the settlor's creditors are allowed
to defeat the interests of non-settlor beneficiaries. Similarly, in Nolan, the settlor was the
sole beneficiary for life and held a testamentary power of appointment over the
remainder. See 67 A. at 54.
Sloan is ambiguous concerning the extent to which a settlor's creditors can defeat the
interests of other trust beneficiaries. 11 N.Y.S. 814. Sloan involved a trust that permitted
income distributions for the support of the settlor, but which also permitted distributions
to the settlor's wife and daughter under certain circumstances. Id. After reviewing the
law concerning the rights of the settlor's creditors to reach the assets of the trust, the court
stated:
[T]he trust-deed given by the [settlor] was valid as between the parties, and as to
all the world except his creditors, and ... it was also valid as to his creditors, so
far as the trusts for the benefit of his wife and daughter were concerned. The
trusts that were valid did not fail because the instrument creating them also
contained one that became invalid when the superior rights of creditors were
involved.
11 N.Y.S. at 816-17. This portion of the opinion is confusing, because the case did not
involve multiple trusts; it involved a single trust, with the settlor as principal beneficiary
during his and his wife's joint lifetimes, the daughter as beneficiary with respect to
periodic distributions of principal, and both the wife and the daughter as remainder
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A review of the precedents on which Professor Scott relied
suggests that he read them somewhat generously in support of his
position. Consider, for example, Warner v. Rice, cited by Professor
Scott in support of what has now become the traditional American
rule. In Warner, the settlor created a trust "for the use and benefit of
[the settlor] and his immediate family," the trustee being granted the
authority to apply the income of the trust "to the support and
maintenance of [the settlor] and his said family, during [the settlor's]
life."35  The settlor also retained a testamentary power of
appointment, which allowed him to direct to whom the trust assets
would be distributed following his death. 6 The court ruled that the
settlor's creditors were entitled to recover from the trust assets,
beneficiaries. The above quoted passage suggests, therefore, that the settlor's creditors
would not be able to defeat the interests of the wife and daughter (and thus that the
creditor was not, in fact, entitled to the maximum amount that could be distributed to the
settlor by the trustee).
McLean involved not a discretionary trust at all, but a non-gratuitous transfer, for
which the consideration was the transferee's agreement to support the transferor, his -wife,
and his children. 1854 WL at 5847, at *1-*2. Although the court subjected the transfer to
the claims of the transferor's creditors (treating the transfer, for this purpose, as if it were
a transfer in trust), the opinion nowhere supports Professor Scott's view that the
transferor's creditors are entitled to receive the maximum amount that could be
distributed to the transferor.
DeRousse involved an ex-wife's claim for alimony against a trust for the benefit of the
ex-husband. 164 N.W. at 897. The opinion principally concerns whether the ex-husband
should be deemed the settlor of his interest in the trust, which he acquired in a transaction
for consideration. No portion of the opinion describes the terms of the trust (it describes
it simply as a "spendthrift" trust, with no elaboration); the case, therefore, provides no
support for Professor Scott's rule concerning the rights of creditors in self-settled
discretionary trusts.
Crane does generally support Professor Scott's position, although its facts suggest that
the case should apply under limited circumstances. 238 Ill. App. 257. Crane held that the
settlor's creditors could reach the assets of a self-settled discretionary trust,
notwithstanding that the settlor himself could not have compelled distributions. The
transfer of assets to the trust occurred after the settlor had incurred the debts, and the
transfer apparently rendered the settlor insolvent. See id at 261, 267. In reaching its
conclusion, the court specifically considered whether it was appropriate to grant the
settlor's creditors greater rights than those held by the settlor himself. Referring to "[t]he
general rule that a judgment creditor in a proceeding by garnishment acquires no greater
rights against the garnishee than the judgment debtor has," the court observed that this
general rule "is subject to [exceptions] in cases of fraud affecting the rights of judgment
creditors.., and in cases where ... property of a debtor has been transferred ... for the
purpose of defrauding creditors." Id. at 268. Under these circumstances, the court
allowed the settlor's creditors to reach the assets of the trust. The court does not state that
it would permit creditors to reach self-settled discretionary trusts only under these
circumstances; nevertheless, the facts of the case and the quoted discussion suggest that
less egregious circumstances might have prompted a different conclusion.
34. 8 A. 84 (Md. 1887).
35. Id. at 85.
36. See id.; see also infra note 258 (explaining power of appointment terminology).
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despite the fact that the settlor's interest was a discretionary one and
thus the settlor himself could not have compelled distributions to
himself. In this respect the decision is consistent with the rule
Professor Scott advocated. The court, however, goes to great lengths
to describe the trust as being for the sole benefit of the settlor-
although distributions could have been made for the benefit of the
settlor's "immediate family," the court interpreted this as allowing
distributions only for the purpose of discharging the settlor's support
obligations to those persons." Moreover, as the court also
emphasized, the settlor retained complete control over the disposition
of the property following his death, through exercise of his
testamentary power of appointment." In sum, therefore, the trust was
established for the sole benefit of the settlor, and any amounts not
distributed to the settlor during his lifetime would be subject to
disposition by him at death. The case thus provides little support for
Scott's rule concerning discretionary interests in trusts, under which
the settlor's creditors are allowed to defeat the interests of non-settlor
trust beneficiaries. Moreover, a trust in which the settlor both is the
sole beneficiary and holds a testamentary power of appointment does
not implicate the fiduciary duty questions raised above in connection
with Greenwich Trust Co. A trustee of such a trust will be less
constrained in making lifetime distributions to the settlor, because no
future beneficiary has an enforceable interest that could be
compromised by such distributions.
Consider also J.S. Menken Co. v. Brinkley,39 which Professor
Scott also cites in support of the traditional American rule. Like
Warner, Brinkley involved a discretionary trust for the sole benefit of
the settlor during his lifetime, with respect to which the settlor
retained a testamentary power of appointment.0 In holding that the
settlor's creditors could reach the assets of the trust, the court
expended significant effort in distinguishing a case cited by the
trustee' (in support of sheltering the trusts assets from creditors'
claims), the most important distinction being that the trust in the
other case was for the collective benefit of the settlor and certain
family members, not solely for the benefit of the settlor.'
Accordingly, Brinkley offers only weak support for Scott's position
37. See 8 A. at 87 (noting that the trust authorized distributions for the benefit of
"those bearing the relation to him of dependents for support" and that no family member
otherwise held an enforceable interest in the trust).
38. See id at 86.
39. 31 S.W. 92 (Tenn. 1895).
40. See id at 93.
41. Mills v. Mills, 40 Tenn. (3 Head) 705 (1859).
42. Brinkley, 31 S.W. at 95.
and it offers no support for allowing a settlor's creditors to defeat the
interests of non-settlor beneficiaries.
Another case cited by Professor Scott directly contradicts his
position. Bryan v. Knickerbacker involved a self-settled trust, the
terms of which authorized the trustee to distribute to or for the
benefit of the settlor as much of the income of the trust as the trustee
determined to be necessary for the settlor's support.'3 Any income
not distributed to the settlor was to be accumulated by the trustee for
eventual distribution to the remainder beneficiaries, the settlor's heirs
at law. Although the trustee's authority to distribute income to the
settlor was phrased in discretionary terms, the Chancellor interpreted
the settlor's retained interest as giving the settlor an enforceable right
to receive reasonable amounts of income from the trust for his
support." Based on this interpretation, the Chancellor held that the
settlor's creditors could reach the settlor's interest, i.e., the amounts
that the trustee would otherwise have distributed to the settlor for his
support.' The Chancellor's opinion includes an extensive discussion
of Snowden v. Dales,6 which involved a self-settled trust in which the
settlor retained a discretionary interest in the trust income, and in
which the settlor expressly retained no right to compel distributions
to himself. Any income not distributed to the settlor was to be
accumulated by the trustee for distribution to the remainder
beneficiaries. The Vice Chancellor in Snowden held that the entire
income interest could be reached by the settlor's creditors. 7 The
Chancellor in Bryan indicated that it would have come to a different
conclusion on the facts of Snowden." Because the settlor in Snowden
had no right to compel trust distributions, the Chancellor reasoned,
he would have ruled that the settlor's creditors "were only entitled to
so much of the interest of the trust fund as the trustees should not, in
their discretion, think proper to retain and accumulate for the benefit
of the ultimate remaindermen.
49
Bryan thus directly contradicts Professor Scott's statement of the
general American rule. Under Professor Scott's formulation of the
rule, a settlor's creditor has greater rights than the settlor himself or
herself; the creditor can compel the trustee to distribute to the
creditor the maximum amount that could be distributed by the
trustee, notwithstanding that the settlor could not compel such
distributions. Moreover, under the traditional formulation of the
43. See 1 Barb. Ch. 409,410,426 (N.Y. Ch. 1846).
44. See id. at 428.
45. See id. at 430-31.
46. 6 Sim. Rep. 524 (Ch. 1834).
47. Id.
48. 1 Barb Ch. at 409
49. Id. at 430.
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rule, the rights of creditors are allowed to defeat the interests of non-
settlor trust beneficiaries. Bryan states that a creditor should be
permitted to reach only those assets with respect to which the settlor
could compel distributions and with respect to which the trustee has
not in its discretion decided to retain in trust for the benefit of the
non-settlor beneficiaries.
Another case cited by Professor Scott similarly does not fully
support his position, but may offer a clue as to why Professor Scott's
statement of the rule has been followed. In Hay v. Price,0 which
involved a discretionary trust for the sole benefit of the settlor during
his lifetime, the court held, as in Brinkley and Warner, that the
settlor's creditor could reach the assets of the trust. Thus, as in both
Brinkley and Warner, allowing the settlor's creditor to reach the trust
assets did not serve to defeat the interests of other trust
beneficiaries 1 and the case accordingly does not support this aspect
of the traditional rule. In reaching its conclusion that the assets
should be subject to the creditor's claim, the court stated:
It is true that the trustee, under the terms of the [trust], has a wide
discretion as to the use of the property for the benefit of the
[settlor]. Nevertheless, whatever use shall be made of it must be for
the benefit of the [settlor] and of no one else. The mere giving of
such discretion to the trustee does not, as we conceive, alter the fact
that it was the settlor who attempted to put his property beyond the
reach of the creditors and at the same time enjoy the benefits of it.
We do not think that there is any reason for holding that the rule
laid down in Mackason's Appeal and other cases [which held
invalid spendthrift provisions in favor of trust settlors] should not
be given full and controlling application to this case [involving not a
spendthrift provision, but a discretionary trust for the settlor's
benefit]. To hold otherwise would enable improvident persons, by
adoption of the device of conferring discretion on trustees as to the
disposition of property or properties, to have a secret understanding
with such trustee that all the income of the trust property, or all the
corpus of it, should be used for the benefit of the settlor, and thus
entirely to avoid the effect of the salutary principle laid down in the
cases [concerning spendthrift provisions].'
50. 15 Pa. D. 144 (Ct. Com. P1. 1906).
51. The opinion does not clearly identify the remainder beneficiaries of the trust (in
this case, the persons who would receive the trust assets at the settlor's death). The
opinion indicates that, at the settlor's death, the trust assets would pass "to such person or
persons and in such proportions or shares as may be directed under [Pennsylvania law]."
Id at 145. This language likely means either that the property would pass pursuant to a
testamentary power of appointment held by the settlor or that the property would pass to
the settlor's estate, to be distributed under the terms of his will or by intestacy. In either
case, no person other than the settlor would have an enforceable interest in the trust
during the settlor's lifetime. Thus, in this respect, too, the case fails to support the general
rule articulated by Professor Scott.
52. ML at 146 (emphasis added).
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Although this point is nowhere discussed by Professor Scott, the
quoted passage suggests that the real concern behind the traditional
rule is that, with a discretionary trust for the benefit of the settlor
(whether or not others are also beneficiaries), the settlor and the
trustee could have a collusive arrangement, under which the trustee
will make all trust assets available to the settlor Elaborating on this
typically unstated concern, a court applying the traditional rule would
reason as follows. If the settlor and the trustee are in a collusive
relationship, it is appropriate to treat the settlor as if he or she is the
outright owner of the property held in trust-if the trustee will do the
settlor's bidding, then the trust is a sham, because the settlor at any
time could revest all legal and equitable interests in the assets in
himself or herself. Thus, allowing creditors access to the trust gives
creditors no more powers over the property than are held by the
settlor. Moreover, under these circumstances, the court has no
concern that allowing creditors access to trust assets will defeat the
interests of other beneficiaries-in practical effect, the non-settlor
beneficiaries have no interests to defeat, because whether they
receive any distributions is subject to the absolute veto power of the
settlor. In sum, it is appropriate to allow creditors to recover from
the assets of the trust, because the trust is the settlor's alter ego.
The foregoing discussion suggests that, in writing his treatise and
in drafting the Restatement, Professor Scott either misread the
applicable precedent or simply focused on those aspects of the
precedent that supported the position that he advocated, while
ignoring those aspects that contradicted his position. More
importantly, for several reasons, the discussion suggests that the
Restatement rule stands on shaky theoretical ground. First, the rule
fails to take into account the interests of non-settlor beneficiaries that
may be defeated by subjecting trust assets to creditors' claims. Most
of the cases cited by Professor Scott involved trusts for the exclusive
benefit of the settlor and over which the settlor held a testamentary
power of appointment; as previously demonstrated, these cases do
not support a rule that subjects assets to the claims of the settlor's
creditors even if the settlor is not the sole beneficiary and does not
retain control of trust distributions. Second, the rule is based on an
53. This concern was also a factor in at least two other cases cited by Professor Scott.
See J.S. Menken Co. v. Brinkley, 31 S.W. 92, 94 (Tenn. 1895) (observing that the settlor
"need only select, as trustee, a near kinsman or tried friend, on whom he may rely for
liberality [in making distributions to the settlor], and thus indirectly accomplish what he
cannot do directly [i.e., shelter the settlor's assets from his creditors]"); Petty v. Moores
Brook Sanitarium, 67 S.E. 355, 356 (Va. 1910) (quoting Brinkley, 31 S.W. at 94). For a
more recent case expressing the same concern, see Greenwich Trust Co. v. Tyson, 27 A.2d
166, 171 (Conn. 1942) (also quoting Brinkley, 31 S.W. at 94), discussed supra notes 25-29
and accompanying text.
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erroneous presumption-that the settlor and the trustee are in a
collusive relationship, in which the trust is merely an alter ego of the
settlor. Although such a collusive relationship may under some
circumstances exist, the Restatement apparently presumes that to be
true. As discussed in greater detail in Part IV, such a presumption
ignores both legal and practical considerations about the behavior of
fiduciaries.
Only a few cases that postdate the first Restatement adopt a
position contrary to the Restatement and Professor Scott.- Of these,
the most well-reasoned is Herzog v. Commissioner.5  In Herzog, the
settlor transferred property to a trust, the terms of which authorized
the trustees to distribute income to the settlor, the settlor's wife, and
(after the death of the wife) the settlor's children, at such times and in
such shares as the trustees deemed appropriate.56 Following the
settlor's death, the trust continued for the benefit of the wife if she
survived the settlor and otherwise terminated in favor of the settlor's
descendants. At issue was to what extent the settlor's transfer to the
trust constituted a completed gift for purposes of the gift tax. The
question whether the settlor's creditors could reach the income
interest of the trust was relevant to the completed gift question,
because, if under state law the settlor's creditors could reach the
entire income interest, then the settlor would be deemed to have
made a completed taxable gift only with respect to the remainder
interests.57
In an opinion by Judge Augustus Hand, the court decided that
the settlor's creditors could not reach the income of the trust; thus,
the settlor's transfer to the trust was properly characterized as a
completed gift of both the income interest and the remainder interest.
In reaching this conclusion, the court expressly rejected the
Restatement view that the settlor's creditors could compel the
trustees to distribute the entire income interest to them. The court
saw the Restatement rule as inapposite when the settlor is not the
sole beneficiary and when the settlor has not retained a power of
appointment over the assets not distributed to him."' Thus, in the
court's view, the settlor's creditors would have no right to reach his
54. Tax cases admittedly involve concerns-the interplay between federal tax law and
state trust and property laws, the policies underlying the tax law, etc.-that limit their
value as precedent for creditors' rights and other trust law questions. Nevertheless,
Herzog, Uhl, and the other tax cases discussed in this section, see infra notes 55-65 and
accompanying text, are at least instructive in their analysis of state law creditors' rights
questions.
55. 116 F.2d 591 (2d Cir. 1941).
56. Id
57. See id. at 594.
58. See id
wholly discretionary interest in the trust. Note that, unlike the
Restatement's approach to this question, the court's opinion grants
the settlor's creditors no more rights than those retained by the
settlor himself. Moreover, the opinion recognizes that allowing the
settlor's creditors to reach the entire income interest would impair
interests held by non-settlor beneficiaries. Finally, the opinion
recognizes that, while the Restatement rule may make sense if the
settlor has retained a power of disposition over trust assets remaining
at the settlor's death, the rule makes no sense if, as a result of the
transfer, the settlor has given up all such powers of disposition.
The court in Estate of Uhl v. Commissioner 9 reached a similar
conclusion concerning a closely analogous issue-whether a settlor's
retained discretionary interest in a trust triggers inclusion of the trust
assets in the settlor's estate for estate tax purposes.6 The settlor in
Uhl transferred assets to a trust, the terms of which directed the
trustee to distribute to the settlor at least $100 monthly from the
income of the trust and which authorized the trustee to distribute a
sum greater than $100 per month "if it shall deem advisable., 6' At
issue was to what extent the settlor had retained a right to income
from the trust within the meaning of section 811 of the 1939 Internal
Revenue Code (the predecessor to present section 2036 of the Code),
59. 241 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1957).
60. Without discussing the creditors' rights issue, the court in at least one other case
reached the same conclusion as the court in Uhl. In Helvering v. St. Louis Union Trust
Co., 75 F.2d 416, 417 (8th Cir.), affd, 296 U.S. 39 (1935), the settlor transferred property
to a trust for the principal benefit of his daughter and the daughter's family, the terms of
which authorized the trustee to distribute all of the trust assets back to the settlor if the
trustee should "deem it wise" to do so. The Court of Appeals held that the settlor's
discretionary retained interest in the trust did not cause the trust assets to be includible in
his estate under section 302(c) of the 1924 Internal Revenue Code (the predecessor to
sections 2036 and 2038 of the present Code under which, in simple terms, with respect to
transferred property, either a retained right to income or a retained right to revoke will
trigger inclusion in the transferor's estate, see I.R.C. §§ 2036, 2038 (1994)). Although the
court did not address the creditors' rights issue, implicit in the court's decision is that the
settlor's creditors could not reach his retained discretionary interest in the trust; if the
settlor's creditors could reach the trust assets, the settlor could indirectly revoke the trust
by incurring debt and then relegating his creditors to the trust to satisfy their claims. The
Supreme Court affirmed, again without discussing the creditors' rights issue, but stating
that the settlor "left in himself no power to resume ownership, possession, or enjoyment."
St. Louis Union Trust Co., 296 U.S. at 43. The St. Louis Union Trust Co. approach was
followed in a later Eighth Circuit decision concerning the same issue that arose in
Herzog-whether the settlor's retained discretionary interest in a trust rendered a transfer
partially incomplete for gift tax purposes. Rheinstrom v. Commissioner, 105 F.2d 642 (8th
Cir. 1939). Citing St. Louis Union Trust Co. and without discussing the creditors' rights
question, the Court of Appeals ruled that the possibility that the settlor would receive
distributions from a portion of a trust did not render the settlor's transfers to the trust
incomplete for gift tax purposes. Id at 648.
61. 241 F.2d at 868.
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which triggered estate tax inclusion of assets transferred by a
decedent with a retained right to income.62 Both the government and
the settlor's estate agreed that the settlor had retained a right to $100
monthly; thus, the trust was includible under section 811 to the extent
necessary to generate that income stream. The government also
asserted, however, that the settlor should be deemed to have retained
a right to all of the income of the trust. Under the government's
theory, the settlor could have indirectly obtained the benefit of the
entire income stream by incurring debt and then relegating his
creditors to the trust for reimbursement;63 this theory, of course,
depended on a finding that the settlor's creditors could have reached
his entire discretionary interest in the trusts. The Court of Appeals
rejected the government's argument. Looking at Indiana law, the
court concluded that the settlor's creditors could not have reached the
discretionary component of the income interest-because the settlor
himself could not have compelled distribution of that portion of the
income, his creditors similarly should be unable to compel
distribution.6' In this connection, the court refused to apply an
Indiana statute-making self-settled trusts void with respect to
creditors' claims-to the transaction; the court concluded that the
statute applied only to trusts for the sole benefit of the settlor and not
to trusts in which non-settlors have beneficial interests.
65
To summarize the observations in this portion of the article, the
traditional rule concerning creditors' rights in self-settled
discretionary trusts-as articulated by Professor Scott and the
Restatement-is flawed in two significant respects. First, the rule
grants creditors greater rights than the rights retained by the settlor;
in so doing, the rule also fails to safeguard the rights of non-settlor
beneficiaries. Second, the rule fails to distinguish between self-settled
trusts in which the settlor retains a power of disposition and those in
which the settlor does not; that failure is apparently based on an
assumption that self-settled trusts are collusive arrangements in which
the trustee will do the settlor's bidding. As more fully developed in
Part IV, a better-reasoned approach to this subject would take proper
account of both the fiduciary duties of the trustee and the relative
rights and powers of the settlor and other trust beneficiaries. At least
in those cases in which the settlor is not the sole beneficiary and
retains no powers of disposition, the traditional rule is both
62. Id at 868-69.
63. Id at 868 (discussing the Tax Court decision from which the settlor's estate
appealed).
64. See id at 870.
65. See id
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theoretically unsound and based on an inaccurate reading of
precedent.
This is not to say, however, that all multi-beneficiary, self-settled
trusts in which the settlor retains no power of disposition should be
entitled to creditor protection. Whether the law should extend
creditor protection to such trusts should depend on the nature and
extent of the settlor's retained interest and the interests of other trust
beneficiaries, the identity of the trustee and the relationship between
the trustee and the beneficiaries, and the identity of the creditor and
the facts giving rise to his or her claim. Nor do these observations
about the traditional rule mean that all self-settled trusts in which the
settlor retains a power of disposition or in which the settlor is the sole
or primary beneficiary should be subject to creditors' claims.
Whether the law should allow creditors to reach such trusts should
depend on those factors described above, as well as on the nature and
extent of the power of disposition. In all cases, the extent of
creditors' rights should form a continuum, with the greatest rights
existing in those trusts over which the settlor has reserved substantial
interest and control and the least rights existing in those trusts for
which the opposite is true.
H. Offshore Developments and the Domestic Response
As described in Part I of the article, trust laws in the United
States have traditionally held invalid spendthrift provisions in favor of
trust settlors, and the traditional American rule concerning
discretionary interests in trusts has prohibited settlors from sheltering
trust assets from the claims of their creditors. Largely in response to
the limitations of American trust law, a number of foreign
jurisdictions have developed laws favorable to settlors seeking to
establish APTs.6' In recent years, several American jurisdictions have
followed suit. This part of the article describes and analyzes the
significance of these developments.
A. Offshore Asset Protection Trusts
Beginning in the mid-1980s, a number of small, mostly island
jurisdictions67 envisioned and ultimately realized an extraordinary
66. See generally Sterk, supra note 3, at 1047-51; Elena Marty-Nelson, Offshore Asset
Protection Trusts: Having Your Cake and Eating it Too, 47 RUTGERS L. REv. 11, 56-71
(1994).
67. The jurisdictions commonly used as havens for offshore APTs include Bahamas,
Barbados, Belize, Bermuda, Cayman Islands, Cook Islands, Cyprus, Gibraltar, Mauritius,
Nevis, Neue, and Turks and Caicos Islands. See Gideon Rothschild, Establishing and
Drafting Offshore Asset Protection Trusts, EST. PLAN., Feb. 1996, at 65, 66 n.1; Marty-
Nelson, supra note 66, at 62; Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 1,
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business opportunity: the development of an offshore trust industry,
designed to satisfy the appetites of Americans and others for
protecting their assets from the claims of creditors. Most offshore
APT legislative schemes are structured around three discrete, but
related objectives-validating spendthrift and discretionary trust
protection for trust settlors, limiting fraudulent transfer claims, and
making it difficult or impossible to enforce foreign judgments. In
these respects, the law in the Cook Islands is typical and is described
in the paragraphs that follow.
The Cook Islands commenced its offshore APT business venture
with the enactment of the International Trusts Act of 1984. The Act,
which applies only to trusts established by non-resident settlors,
accomplishes its asset protection objectives through several key
provisions. First, the Act establishes comprehensive spendthrift
protection for international trusts. 9 These rules apply regardless of
32-33 & n.143 (1996).
Professor Jeffrey A. Schoenblum describes five principal "hubs" for offshore asset
protection planning:
The first is in the Caribbean and largely serves the asset protection needs of a
United States clientele with respect to creditor's claims and a Latin American as
well as European clientele with respect to forced heirship claims and taxes. A
second hub is the Channel Islands off the coast of France, serving European and
Middle Eastern creditor, tax, and forced heirship claims, as well as a shelter from
domestic or third country expropriatory efforts. A third hub is in the
Mediterranean and essentially serves the same clientele as the second hub, but
with the addition of a sizable Russian clientele. A fourth hub consists of island
states in the Indian Ocean. These offshore centers, such as Mauritius and the
Seychelles, tend to serve a clientele that is largely Middle Eastern, and Southern
and Southeastern Asian. The fifth hub consists of certain island states of the
Pacific. Here, United States grantors and those from Latin America, Australia,
and the Far East tend to converge.
1 JEFFREY A. SCHOENBLUM, MULTISTATE AND MULTINATIONAL ESTATE PLANNING §
18.23[C][1] (2d ed. 1999) (footnotes omitted).
68. International Trusts Act of 1984 § 22 (1996) (Cook Islands) [hereinafter Cook
Islands International Trusts Act] (reprinted in PETER SPERO, ASSET PROTECTION app. D
(1994 & Supp. 1999)). As one commentator has observed, limiting the legislation only to
international trusts demonstrates that it was designed to attract foreign capital. See Sterk,
supra note 3, at 1048.
69. Section 13F of the Act provides in relevant part as follows:
Spendthrift beneficiary-
(1) For the purposes of this Act, and notwithstanding any rule of law or
equity to the contrary, it shall be lawful for an instrument or disposition to
provide that any estate or interest in any property given or to be given to
any beneficiary shall not during the life of that beneficiary or such lesser
period as may be specified in the instrument or disposition be alienated or
pass by bankruptcy, insolvency or liquidation or be liable to be seized, sold,
attached, or taken in execution by process of law and where so provided
such provision shall take effect accordingly.
(2) Where property is given subject to any of the restrictions contained in
whether the settlor is a beneficiary, and they apply even if the settlor
retains extensive controls over the trust.0
Second, the Act substantially narrows the categories of transfers
to international trusts that can be attacked by creditors under
fraudulent transfer rules.7' Under the Act, assets transferred to an
international trust are subject to a creditor's claim only if the creditor
can prove "beyond a reasonable doubt" that the settlor made the
transfer "with the principal intent to defraud the creditor" and that
the transfer rendered the settlor "insolvent or without property bX
which that creditor's claim (if successful) could have been satisfied."
Moreover, section 13B(4) of the Act provides that a transfer to an
international trust shall not be considered fraudulent if the transfer
occurred "before that creditor's cause of action against the settlor
accrued." 73 Thus, unlike in the United States, ' in the Cook Islands,
transfers to APTs are never fraudulent with respect to future
creditors. The Act also imposes a short statute of limitations on
subsection (1), the right to derive income from such property by a
beneficiary and any income derived therefrom shall not pass by bankruptcy,
insolvency or liquidation or be liable to be seized, attached or taken in
execution by process of law.
(3) Where property is given subject to a restriction against alienation then
the right to derive income from that property shall not be alienated for as
long as that restriction remains in force.
Cook Islands International Trusts Act § 13F.
70. Section 13C of the Act provides:
Retention of control and benefits by settlor-An international trust and a
registered instrument shall not be declared invalid or a disposition declared void
or be affected in any way by reason of the fact that the settlor, and if more than
one, any of them, either-
(a) Retains possesses or acquires a power to revoke the trust or
instrument;
(b) Retains possesses or acquires a power of disposition over property of
the trust or the subject of the instrument;
(c) Retains possesses or acquires a power to amend the trust or
instrument;
(d) Retains possesses or acquires any benefit interest or property from the
trust or any disposition or pursuant to the instrument;
(e) Retains possesses or acquires the power to remove or appoint a trustee
or protector;
(f) Retains possesses or acquires the power to direct a trustee or protector
on any matter;
(g) Is a beneficiary trustee or protector of the trust or instrument either
solely or together with others.
Cook Islands International Trusts Act § 13C.
71. For a discussion of fraudulent transfer laws in the United States, see infra notes
160-202 and accompanying text.
72. Cook Islands International Trusts Act § 13B(1).
73. Cook Islands International Trusts Act § 13B(4).
74. See infra notes 161-165 and accompanying text.
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fraudulent transfer claims; under the Act, no transfer to an
international trust shall be deemed fraudulent if the creditor fails to
bring its action within one year of the transfer.75
Third, the Act expressly provides that the Cook Islands courts
shall not enforce or recognize a foreign judgment against an
international trust, if the judgment is based on the application of any
law inconsistent with the Act. 6 The practical effect of this rule is that
a creditor who obtains a judgment outside of the Cook Islands against
the settlor of an international trust not only will be unsuccessful in its
attempt to levy upon the trust assets, but will also be forced to
relitigate the substance of its claim in a Cook Islands court.'
Several other features of offshore APTs further insulate trust
assets from creditors' claims. First, if the APT is properly established
in a foreign country, in most cases a court in the United States will
lack personal jurisdiction over the trustee. Consequently, regardless
of whether the United States court is inclined to respect the asset
protection features of the APT, the court will be unable to exert any
powers over the foreign trustee. Second, many offshore jurisdictions
recognize the role of a trust "protector," a person granted special
non-fiduciary powers to control the administration of the trust, with
respect to such matters as removal and replacement of trustees,
control over discretionary actions of the trustees, etc.78 By use of the
trust protector mechanism, a settlor is able to vest in some trusted
person substantial control over trust administration, while at the same
being able to resist the claim that the settlor himself or herself (whose
actions will be subject to the authority of a United States court)
retains such control. 9 If the trust protector is a United States person
(and thus subject to the authority of a United States court), the trust
instrument will typically give the protector no affirmative powers, but
only veto powers, with the consequence that a United States court
will be unable to compel the protector to force administration of the
trust in a certain manner. Third, many offshore APTs include a so-
called duress clause, under which the trustee is directed to ignore any
directions received from a settlor or trust protector who is under
75. Cook Islands International Trusts Act § 13B(3)(b).
76. Cook Islands International Trusts Act § 13D.
77. LoPucki, supra note 67, at 36.
78. See Howard D. Rosen, The How's and Why's of Offshore Trusts in Asset
Protection Planning, 21 EST., GIFTS & TR. J. 115, 119-120 (1996).
79. Cf Federal Trade Commission v. Affordable Media, LLC, 179 F.3d 1228, 1241-43
(9th Cir. 1999) (holding trust settlors, who also served as trust protectors, in civil contempt
for failing to exercise their powers as protectors to force a repatriation of assets held in a
Cook Islands trust).
80. See Rosen, supra note 78, at 120 (observing that "[a] court cannot order someone
to exercise a veto power until the person over whom the veto power is exercisable (e.g.,
the offshore trustee) proposes to take action").
duress.8' Thus, for example, under a duress clause, the trustee of an
APT would be required to disregard a direction from the settlor or
protector to repatriate trust assets, if the settlor's direction was
compelled by a United States court's order. Finally, most offshore
APTs also include a "flight" clause, under which the trustee is
authorized to change the situs of the trust, change the applicable law,
and move the trust assets to a new jurisdiction, if a claim against the
trust threatens to be successfulY. Flight provisions virtually guarantee
that an offshore APT will never be subjected to a creditor's claim.
By all accounts, the efforts of offshore jurisdictions to attract
foreign capital have been wildly successful. The British Home
Secretary has estimated that offshore APTs may hold as much as $6
trillion.' Although most other estimates are more modest,' it is clear
that the offshore trust business has grown to become a substantial and
thriving industry.
For American property owners, there are at least several
potential disadvantages associated with offshore APTs. First, the use
of an offshore APT may expose the settlor to the risk of economic
and political instability in the offshore jurisdiction,8 although the so-
called flight clause may afford some protection against this risk. 6 A
second disadvantage is the substantial and onerous reporting
requirements imposed on foreign trusts by the Internal Revenue
CodeY Third, the death of the settlor may be treated as a sale or
exchange of the assets held in the trust, thus triggering capital gains."
81. See id.
82. HOWARD D. ROSEN, ASSET PROTEcTION PLANNING A-12 to A-13 (1994)
(setting forth an example of a flight provision).
83. David Leigh, Billions Hidden Offshore: Jersey Faces Clampdown, GUARDIAN
(LONDON), Sept. 26, 1998, at 1 (indicating, probably erroneously, that this figure
represents a third of the wealth of the world's most wealthy persons).
84. See Lischer, supra note 3, at 502 & nn.83-89 (summarizing numerous recent
estimates).
85. See Marty-Nelson, supra note 66, at 67; see also Paul M. Roder, American Asset
Protection Trusts: Alaska and Delaware Move "Offshore" Trusts Onto the Mainland, 49
SYRACUSE L. REV. 1253 (1999) (noting the modest risk of military coups in the Caribbean
region; also discussing concerns about the business and economic reputation of the trust
company). But see 1 SCHOENBLUM, supra note 67, § 18.23[G][2] (discounting the
significance of these risks).
86. See I SCHOENBLUM, supra note 67, § 18.23[G][2].
87. See 2 SCHOENBLUM, supra note 67, § 22.04[F]. As described by Professor
Schoenblum, there are three principal reporting requirements, mandated by I.R.C. § 6048.
First, within 90 days of the creation of or transfer of property to a foreign trust, the settlor
must notify the Internal Revenue Service. See id. § 22.04[F], at 484-85. Second, the
person treated as the owner of the trust-which will typically be the settlor, see I.R.C. §
679 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)-must ensure that the trust files a return that includes a
complete accounting, the name of the United States "agent" for the trust, and other
information required by the Secretary of Treasury. The United States agent must furnish
the Secretary with information pertaining to the amounts that should be reported on the
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B. Domestic Asset Protection Developments
The last several years have signaled the beginning of a revolution
in the American law of trusts. Largely as a measure to attract
business for their professional fiduciaries and beginning with Alaska
in 1997,'o several states have enacted comprehensive trust law
legislation designed to permit self-settled APTs. This portion of the
article describes these domestic legislative developments and
discusses certain questions concerning their effectiveness in achieving
their stated objectives.
settlor's income tax return under the grantor trust rules. See 2 SCHOENBLUM, supra note
67, § 22.04[F], at 485. Third, beneficiaries of foreign trusts are required to file returns
reporting distributions from the trusts. See id. § 22.04[F], at 485-86. Failing to comply
-with these reporting requirement can subject the taxpayer to severe penalties. See id. §
22.04[F], at 486 (discussing I.R.C. § 6677).
88. See 2 SCHOENBLUM, supra note 67, § 22.04[B][2] (discussing I.R.C. § 684 but
acknowledging, at p. 466, that there are persuasive arguments that section 684 should not
apply at the settlor's death).
89. The last several years have also witnessed two other state law developments
designed to attract trust business. First, many states recently have abolished the rule
against perpetuities, thus permitting settlors to create perpetual trusts, the principal
purpose of which is to avoid estate, gift, and generation-skipping transfer taxation as
enjoyment of the trust property passes through successive family generations. Marc S.
Beckerman & Gerry W. Beyer, Trusts and Estates Practice into the Next Millennium,
PROB. & PROP., Jan.-Feb. 1999, at 7, 9-10. Second, many states have abolished their state
income tax as it applies to trusts (or, in some cases, as it applies to trusts established by
non-resident setflors). See Lischer, supra note 3, at 515. All four states that now allow the
creation of self-settled APTs-Alaska, Delaware, Nevada, and Rhode Island-also
exempt such trusts from their state income tax. See id. Of these, Alaska, Delaware, and
Rhode Island have also repealed their rule against perpetuities. See id. at 514. Thus, in
these three states it is possible to establish a trust, the assets of which will be sheltered
from the claims of creditors of both the settlor and multiple generations of the settlor's
family, the income of which will be exempt from state income tax, and the assets of which
will avoid estate, gift, and generation-skipping transfer taxation, subject to certain
limitations. See I.R.C. §§ 2010(c) (West 2001), 2631 (1994 & Supp IV. 1998) (limiting the
amount that can be sheltered from generation-skipping transfer tax to $1,000,000 per
transferor as of 2001; the exemption increases to $3,500,000 as of 2009).
90. Followed thus far by Delaware, Nevada, and Rhode Island. See Richard G. Bacon
& John A. Terrill, II, Domestic Asset Protection Trusts Work-Should They?, 26 EST.,
GIFTS & TR. J. 123, 125-28 (2001); Boxx, supra note 3, at 1204-08. In 1986, the Missouri
legislature passed legislation apparently designed to permit self-settled APTs under
limited circumstances. See Mo. Rev. Stat. § 456.080(2)(a)-(b) (West 1999 & Supp. 2000).
The Missouri scheme has gone largely unnoticed, however, due in part to some
unfavorable case law, see In re Enfield, 133 B.R. 515, 521 (W.D. Mo. 1991) (stating that the
Missouri statute codifies the traditional rule against self-settled spendthrift trusts), and in
part to fewer promotional efforts by the Missouri estate and financial planning industries,
see Lischer, supra note 3, at 516 n.149.
(1) Domestic Legislative Developments
As of 2001, four states-Alaska, Delaware, Nevada, and Rhode
Island-have enacted legislation permitting the use of self-settled
APTs." The legislation in two of those states-Alaska and
Delaware-has been the most heavily promoted and is the most
discussed in the literature;' the article accordingly focuses primarily
on the legislation in those two states.
Under the 1997 Alaska legislation,93 if a trust includes a
spendthrift provision, the creditors of a trust beneficiary (even if the
beneficiary is the trust settlor) cannot reach the beneficiary's interest,
as long as the following conditions are satisfied: (1) the transfer to
the trust was not intended to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors; (2)
the settlor reserves no power to revoke or terminate the trust without
the consent of a person with a substantial adverse beneficial interest
in the trust;94 (3) the trust instrument does not require distributions of
income or principal to the settlor; and (4) at the time the trust was
established, the settlor was not 30 days or more in default of a child
91. For an excellent tabular summary of the legislation in all four states, see Lischer,
supra note 3, app. at 592-600.
92. See, e.g., Lischer, supra note 3; Sterk, supra note 3; Boxx, supra note 3; Gingiss,
supra note 3; Roder, supra note 85; Bacon & Terrill, supra note 90; Douglas J. Blattmachr
& Richard W. Hompesch II, Heavyweight Competition in New Trust Laws, PROB. &
PROP., Jan.-Feb. 1998, at 30; John E. Sullivan III, Gutting the Rule Against Self-Settled
Trusts: How the New Delaware Trust Law Competes With Offshore Trusts, 23 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 423 (1998); John Paul Parks, Evaluating the Alaska Trust's Ability to Shield
Assets From the Claims of Creditors, ARIZ. AIr'Y, Nov. 1998, at 28; Ritchie W. Taylor,
Domestic Asset Protection Trusts: The "Estate Planning Tool of the Decade" or a
Charlatan?, 13 B.Y.U. J. PUB. L. 163 (1998); Douglas J. Blattmachr & Jonathan G.
Blattmachr, A New Direction in Estate Planning: North to Alaska, TR. & EST., Sept. 1997,
at 48; Richard W. Nenno, Delaware Law Offers Asset Protection and Estate Planning
Benefits, EST. PLAN., Jan 1999, at 3; Jonathan G. Blattmachr et al., New Alaska Trust Act
Provides Many Estate Planning Opportunities, EST. PLAN., Oct. 1997, at 347; Richard W.
Hompesch et al., Does the New Alaska Trusts Act Provide an Alternative to the Foreign
Trust?, J. ASSET PROTECrION, July-Aug. 1997, at 9; Leslie C. Giordani & Duncan E.
Osborne, Will the Alaska Trusts Work?, J. ASSET PROTECTION, Sept.-Oct. 1997, at 7;
Howard D. Rosen & Patricia A. Donlevy-Rosen, Domestic Asset Protection Trusts: Do
They Work?, 23 EST., GiFTs & TR. J. 211 (1998); John K. Eason, Home From the Islands:
Domestic Asset Protection Trust Alternatives Impact Traditional Estate and Gift Tax
Planning Considerations, 52 FLA. L. REV. 41 (2000).
93. Before 1997, Alaska followed the traditional American rule. See ALASKA STAT. §
34.40.110 (Michie 1962) (repealed 1997). Former section 34.40.110 provided, "[a] deed of
gift, a conveyance or a transfer or assignment, verbal or written, of goods and chattels or
things in action made in trust for the person making the deed, conveyance, transfer, or
assignment is void as against the creditors, existing or subsequent, of the person."
94. The statute does, however, permit the settlor to retain a power to veto
distributions or a non-general testamentary power of appointment. See ALASKA STAT. §
34.40.110(b)(2) (Lexis 2000).
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support obligation.' Thus, under the Alaska statute, the assets of a
self-settled trust that includes a spendthrift provision, and under
which the trustee has absolute discretion to distribute income and
principal to the settlor, will be sheltered from the claims of the
settlor's creditors, unless the settlor's transfer to the trust was
fraudulent."
The Alaska legislation also modified its fraudulent transfer rules
for purposes of transfers to Alaska APTs. Under the new legislation,
a transfer to an APT will be considered fraudulent only if the
claimant can prove actual fraud; the statute apparently contemplates
no forms of constructive fraud,' a concept recognized under
95. ALASKA STAT. § 34A0.110(a)-(b) (Lexis 2000). Section 34.40.110 provides in
pertinent part as follows:
(a) A person who in writing transfers property in trust may provide that the
interest of a beneficiary of the trust may not be either voluntarily or involuntarily
transferred before payment or delivery of the interest to the beneficiary by the
trustee. In this subsection,
(1) "property" includes real property, personal property, and interests in
real or personal property;
(2) "transfer" means any form of transfer, including deed, conveyance, or
assignment.
(b) If a trust contains a transfer restriction allowed under (a) of this section, the
transfer restriction prevents a creditor existing when the trust is created, a person
who subsequently becomes a creditor, or another person from satisfying a claim
out of the beneficiary's interest in the trust, unless the
(1) transfer was intended in whole or in part to hinder, delay, or defraud
creditors or other persons under AS 34.40.010;
(2) trust provides that the settlor may revoke or terminate all or part of the
trust without the consent of a person who has a substantial beneficial
interest in the trust and the interest would be adversely affected by the
exercise of the power held by the settlor to revoke or terminate all or part of
the trust; in this paragraph, "revoke or terminate" does not include a power
to veto a distribution from the trust, a testamentary special power of
appointment or similar power, or the right to receive a distribution of
income, corpus, or both in the discretion of a person, including a trustee,
other than the settlor;
(3) trust requires that all or a part of the trust's income or principal, or
both, must be distributed to the settlor; or
(4) at the time of the transfer, the settlor is in default by 30 or more days of
making a payment due under a child support judgment or order.
96. An Alaska APT is not effective, however, to shelter assets from an elective share
claim by a surviving spouse. Under the Alaska statutes, the assets of an Alaska APT
created during the marriage are included in calculating the augmented estate, for purposes
of determining the size of the surviving spouse's elective share. See ALASKA STAT. §
13.12.205(2)(A) (Lexis 2000). The spouse's elective share may be satisfied from the
Alaska APT only to the extent other assets passing to the surviving spouse are inadequate.
Boxx, supra note 3, at 1206. For an overview of the augmented estate concept and the
operation of elective share statutes, see Robert T. Danforth, Estate Planning Implications
of a Surviving Spouse's Elective Share Rights, 22 EST., GIFTS & TR. J. 235, 235-37 (1997).
97. See Sterk, supra note 3, at 1052.
traditional fraudulent transfer rules."8 Moreover, in most cases a
fraudulent transfer claim against an Alaska APT will be unsuccessful
if brought more than four years after the settlor's transfer to the
trust.?
Alaska also modified its jurisdictional and choice of law rules to
facilitate the creation of Alaska APTs and to ensure their ability to
withstand court challenges. Under section 13.36.035(c) of the Alaska
statutes, a provision in a trust specifying the application of Alaska law
and subjecting the trust to the jurisdiction of Alaska courts is "valid,
effective, and conclusive" if (1) some or all of the trust assets are in
Alaska, (2) one of the trustees is an Alaska resident, (3) the Alaska
trustee has the power to maintain trust records and prepare trust
income tax returns, and (4) at least a portion of the administration of
the trust occurs in Alaska." Under section 13.36.035(d), a trust that
includes a valid Alaska choice of law and jurisdictional provision is
governed by Alaska law with respect to all matters concernin
administration of the trust and construction of the trust instrument.
Under section 13.36.310(a) of the Alaska statutes, a trust satisfying
the choice of law and jurisdictional requirements of section
13.36.035(c) is immune from attack under most circumstances:
Except as provided in AS 34.40.110 [allowing claims based on
actual fraud or delinquent child support payments], a trust that is
governed by AS 13.36.035(c) or that is otherwise governed by the
98. See infra note 173 and accompanying text.
99. See ALASKA STAT. § 34.40.110(d) (Lexis 2000). Section 34.40.110(d) provides as
follows:
A cause of action or claim for relief with respect to a fraudulent transfer under
(b)(1) of this section, or under other law, is extinguished unless the action is
brought as to a person who
(1) is a creditor when the trust is created, with the later of (A) four years
after the transfer is made; or (B) one year after the transfer is or reasonably
could have been discovered by the person; or
(2) becomes a creditor subsequent to the transfer into trust, within four
years after the transfer is made.
100. ALASKA STAT. § 13.36.035(c) (Lexis 2000).
101. ALASKA STAT. § 13.36.035(d) (Lexis 2000). Section 13.36.035(d) provides as
follows:
The validity, construction, and administration of a trust with a state jurisdiction
provision are determined by the laws of this state, including the
(1) capacity of the settlor;
(2) powers, obligations, liabilities, and rights of the trustees and the
appointment and removal of the trustees; and
(3) existence and extent of powers, conferred or retained, including a
trustee's discretionary powers, the powers retained by a beneficiary of the
trust, and the validity of the exercise of a power.
For purposes of this section, the term "state jurisdictional provision" refers to an Alaska
choice of law and jurisdiction provision, as described in section 13.36.035(c). See Boxx,
supra note 3, at 1205 n.48.
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 53
January 2002] RETHINKING THE LAW OF CREDITORS' RIGHTS 315
laws of this state... is not void, voidable, liable to be set aside,
defective in any fashion, or questionable as to the settlor's capacity,
on the grounds that the trust or transfer avoids or defeats a right,
claim, or interest conferred by law on a person by reason of a
personal or business relationship with the settlor or by way of a
marital or a similar right.'"
Moreover, to the extent that a claim falls within one of the exceptions
to the statute (that is, if the claim is based on actual fraud or
delinquent child support payments), the trust is set aside only to the
extent necessary to satisfy the claim.' °3
The Delaware legislation-also passed in 1997-is substantially
similar to the Alaska legislation; it was enacted in the hope that the
law would allow Delaware to compete with Alaska for the creation of
self-settled APTs." 4 The Delaware statute provides that "no action of
any kind, including, without limitation, an action to enforce a
judgment... , shall be brought at law or in equity for an attachment
or other provisional remedy against property that is the subject of a
qualified disposition or for avoidance of a qualified disposition."'05 A
"qualified disposition" is an irrevocable transfer to a spendthrift °6
trust that (1) limits principal distributions to the settlor to only those
made in the discretion of the trustee, (2) includes a provision
specifying the application of Delaware law, and (3) has at least one
resident trustee (either an individual resident or a bank or trust
company authorized to do business in Delaware), who maintains trust
records, has custody of trust property, prepares trust income tax
returns, or otherwise materially participates in the administration of
the trust. 'c The settlor may also retain both a special testamentary
power of appointment over the trust'oS and a power to veto trust
102. ALASKA STAT. § 13.36.310(a) (Lexis 2000).
103. ALASKA STAT. § 13.36.310(b) (Lexis 2000).
104. Blattmachr & Hompesch, supra note 92, at 32.
105. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3572(a) (Michie 2000 Supp.).
106. To constitute a qualified disposition, the trust instrument must:
[p]rovide[] that the interest of the transferor or other beneficiary in the trust
property or the income therefrom may not be transferred, assigned, pledged or
mortgaged, whether voluntarily or involuntarily, before the qualified trustee or
qualified trustees actually distribute the property or income therefrom to the
beneficiary, and such provision of the trust instrument shall be deemed to be a
restriction on the transfer of the transferor's beneficial interest in the trust that is
enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law within the meaning of §
541(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code... or any successor provision thereto.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3570(10)(c) (Michie 2000 Supp.). Section 541(c)(2) of the
Bankruptcy Code states that "[a] restriction on the transfer of a beneficial interest of the
debtor in a trust that is enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law is enforceable in
a case under this title."
107. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, §§ 3570(6), (9), (10) (Michie 2000 Supp.).
108. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3570(10)(b)(2) (Michie 2000 Supp.) (providing that
the trust will be considered irrevocable notwithstanding that the settlor retains such a
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distributions."°  Unlike the Alaska statute, the Delaware statute
grants spendthrift protection to the settlor even if the settlor retains
an absolute right to receive income distributions."'
Like the Alaska statute, the Delaware statute permits creditors
to reach the assets of an APT if the settlor's transfer to the trust was
fraudulent."' Unlike the Alaska statute, the Delaware statute
recognizes claims for both actual fraud and constructive fraud;. in
this regard, the Delaware legislation may be considered slightly more
creditor friendly than the Alaska legislation. The statute of
limitations period is similar to that in the Alaska legislation-in
general, a fraudulent transfer claim must be brought within four years
after the settlor's transfer to the trust. 4 Thus, transfers to the trust
cannot be challenged as fraudulent with respect to claims arising
more than four years after the trust was established.
Unlike the Alaska statute, the Delaware APT statute expressly
exempts from its operation certain types of claims, with respect to
which creditors can recover from the APT regardless of when the
trust was created and regardless of whether the settlor's transfer was
fraudulent. Thus, the statute does not permit settlors to shelter their
power). The statute uses the term "special power of appointment," which presumably
refers to a non-general power, that is, a power exercisable in favor of persons other than
the settlor, the settlor's creditors, the settlor's estate, and the creditors of the settlor's
estate. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY, DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 11.4
(1984) (using the term "non-general" rather than "special").
109. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3570(10)(b)(1) (Michie 2000 Supp.).
110. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3570(10)(b)(3) (Michie 2000 Supp.) (providing that
the trust instrument will be considered irrevocable notwithstanding that the settlor retains
a right to income from the trust). Cf. id. § 3570(10)(b)(6) (providing that the trust
instrument will be considered irrevocable notwithstanding that the settlor may receive
discretionary distributions of principal). Under most circumstances, a settlor would be
disinclined to retain an absolute right to income, because the retained right would trigger
inclusion of the trust assets in the settlor's estate. See I.R.C. § 2036(a)(1) (1994).
111. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3572(a) (Michie 2000 Supp.) (providing that a claim
against a qualified disposition will be recognized only if successfully asserted under the
Delaware version of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfers Act, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§
1304, 1305).
112. Compare ALASKA STAT. § 34.40.110 (Lexis 2000), discussed supra at note 95 and
accompanying text, with DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 1304 (Michie 2000 Supp.). See also
infra note 174 and accompanying text (discussing distinction between actual and
constructive fraud).
113. See Sterk, supra note 3, at 1055. But see Sullivan, supra note 92, at 445-46 n.83
(arguing that the distinction between actual and constructive fraud is more theoretical
than practical).
114. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3572(b)(1) (Michie 2000 Supp.)(with respect to claims
arising before the trust was funded, incorporating by reference the limitations periods
established by Delaware's fraudulent transfer statute, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 1309);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3572(b)(2) (Michie 2000 Supp.) (with respect to claims arising
concurrent with or after the trust was funded).
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assets from claims for alimony or child support, claims for division or
distribution of property incident to divorce, or claims for "death,
personal injury or property damage," although with respect to the last
category of claims the exemption applies only to claims arising before
or at the time of the qualified disposition."
Nevada and Rhode Island both passed APT legislation in 1999.
The Rhode Island statute is modeled after the Delaware statute and
is similar in all essential respects. 1 6  Like the Alaska statute, the
Nevada statute affords creditor protection only to self-settled trusts
with respect to which all distributions to the settlor are
discretionary! 7 To qualify as a Nevada APT, at least one trustee
must be a Nevada resident or a bank or trust company authorized to
do business in Nevada, and any one of the following must be true: (1)
the settlor has his or her domicile in Nevada, (2) all or a portion of
the trust property is located in Nevada, (3) the trust was created in
Nevada, or (4) the Nevada trustee is authorized to maintain records
and prepare income tax returns and all or a portion of the
administration is performed in the state."' Nevada establishes a
relatively short statute of limitations for actions "with respect to a
transfer of property to a [Nevada APT]": for persons who are
creditors at the time of the transfer, within two years of the transfer
or (if later) within six months after the creditor discovers or
115. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3573 (Michie 2000 Supp.). In its original form, the
statute also exempted claims by creditors who extended credit to the settlor in reliance on
the settlor's representations that the assets of the trust would be available to satisfy the
settlor's debt; the statute provided in its original form that the asset-protective features of
a qualified disposition
shall not apply in any respect... to any creditor who became a creditor in
reliance upon an express written statement of the transferor that any property
that was the subject of the qualified disposition thereafter remained the property
of the transferor and was available to satisfy any debt to such creditor incurred
by the transferor.
71 Del. Laws 159, § 1 (1997), amended by 71 Del. Laws 254, § 39 (1997); see also 71 Del.
Laws 254, § 36 (1997) (deleting subsection (2) of title 12, section 3573, and renumbering
subsection (3) as subsection (2)). The provision was removed in response to criticism that
it granted the settlor a retained power that would trigger inclusion of the trust assets in the
settlor's estate. See, e.g., Blattmachr & Hompesch, supra note 92, at 37.
116. The statute refers to APTs as "qualified dispositions," see R.I. GEN. LAWS § 18-
9.2-2 (1999), generally allovs for a four-year statute of limitations, see id. § 18-9.2-4(b),
and exempts claims for alimony and child support, marital property distributions, and tort
claims arising before the trust was funded, see id. § 18-9.2-5.
117. See NEV. REV. STAT. § 166.040(1)(b) (1999) (the terms of the trust must not
"require that any part of the income or principal of the trust be distributed to the settlor");
id. § 166.040(2)(b) (stating that a distribution to the settlor is not "required" if the settlor
may receive the distribution "only in the discretion of another person"). Cf supra note
110 and accompany text (describing the Delaware legislation, which permits the settlor to
retain a mandatory income interest).
118. NEv. REv. STAT. § 166.015 (1999).
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
reasonably should have discovered the transfer; for persons who
become creditors after the transfer, within two years of the transfer.'1 9
(2) Effectiveness of Domestic Legislation?
In the years following enactment of the Alaska and Delaware
APT legislation, commentators have raised questions about whether
courts will enforce domestic self-settled APT arrangements.20
Although this article is principally concerned with whether APTs
should be respected, the importance of that question depends
necessarily on whether APTs will be respected. Thus, this section of
the article summarizes briefly the principal legal questions concerning
the effectiveness of domestic APTs. This section of the article also
briefly considers some limited information about the extent to which
and for what purposes Alaska and Delaware APTs are being
implemented.
To place into context the questions concerning the effectiveness
of domestic APTs, consider the following hypothetical scenario. A
New York settlor creates an Alaska APT with an Alaska trust
company as sole trustee. The terms of the trust allow discretionary
distributions of income and principal to the settlor and specify Alaska
as the governing law. The settlor transfers to the trustee a substantial
portion of his assets, primarily marketable securities, and the trustee
takes custody of the assets in Alaska. Five years after the settlor's
transfer to the trust, the settlor, still a New York resident, negligently
injures a fellow New Yorker in a New York automobile accident.
The injured person brings a tort action in a New York court and
obtains a judgment for money damages against the settlor. The
amount of the judgment exceeds the combined value of the settlor's
liability insurance coverage and the assets owned by the settlor that
were not placed in the trust. Assume that the injured New Yorker-
now a judgment creditor-is unsuccessful in asserting that the
settlor's transfer to the trust is voidable under the applicable
fraudulent transfer statute, either because the transfer was not
fraudulent within the meaning of the fraudulent transfer statute or
because a fraudulent transfer claim is barred by the statute of
limitations.'2 ' May the judgment creditor nevertheless reach the
assets of the Alaska APT?
Suppose the creditor brings an enforcement action in New York,
claiming that the assets of the APT should be made available to
119. NEv. REv. STAT. § 166.170 (1999).
120. See Sterk, supra note 3, at 1074-1114; Boxx, supra note 3, at 1208-41; Duncan E.
Osborne et al., Asset Protection and Jurisdiction Selection, 33 INST. ON EST. PLAN. 1404
(1999).
121. See infra notes 160-202 and accompanying text.
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satisfy the judgment. Would a New York court (or other non-Alaska
court) rule on the effectiveness of the Alaska APT? In ruling on the
effectiveness of the APT, would a non-Alaska court apply Alaska law
or local law? If a non-Alaska court rules that the creditor can reach
the trusts assets, must this ruling be respected in a subsequent
enforcement action brought in Alaska?
Consider first whether a non-Alaska court would be willing to
rule on the effectiveness of the APT, i.e., whether the court would
undertake deciding whether the trust assets were available to satisfy
the judgment. The resolution of this question would turn on two
subsidiary issues-first, does the non-Alaska court view the trustee as
a necessary party to this stage of the litigation; second, assuming the
court decides that the trustee is a necessary party, is the non-Alaska
court willing to conclude that it has jurisdiction over the trustee.
With respect to the first issue, most courts would likely conclude that
the trustee is a necessary party." Moreover, even if a court
concluded that the trustee is not a necessary party, the court's ruling
on the effectiveness of the APT would likely not be binding on the
trustee in a subsequent enforcement action. 3 With respect to the
second issue, a non-Alaska court that properly takes into account
constitutional limits on the exercise of personal jurisdiction would
likely conclude that it does not have jurisdiction over an Alaska
trustee, assuming that the trustee has confined its activities to
Alaska."4 For several reasons, however, the resolution of this
question in a particular case will not be without doubt. First, an
Alaska trustee that pursues non-Alaska customers may be deemed to
have conducted activities in the forum state, thus subjecting it to
personal jurisdiction there.1" Second, a court that is particularly
outraged by the use of an Alaska trust to evade creditors may be
122. See Boxx, supra note 3, at 1216-21 (discussing authority both for and against this
proposition and concluding that, under most circumstances, a court would decide that the
trustee is a necessary party). But see Parks, supra note 92, at 29 (observing that an
Arizona court may decide an issue pertaining to a non-Arizona trust "if the interests of
justice [otherwise] would be seriously impaired" and thus may view the presence of the
trustee as not necessary (quoting Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 14-7205(2))); Osborne et al., supra note
120, 1404.2 n.28 (describing the trend in state and federal courts away from
characterizing any party not present as "necessary" or "indispensable").
123. See Boxx, supra note 3, at 1220-21.
124. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) (holding that exercise of personal
jurisdiction over a foreign trustee must be based on some act by which the trustee
"purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State");
Boxx, supra note 3, at 1210-11 (discussing Hanson); Sterk, supra note 3, at 1089-93 (same);
see also World-Wide Volkswagon Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286,297 (1980) (reaffirming
the "purposeful availment" requirement).
125. See Boxx, supra note 3, at 1211-12 (noting the extent to which some corporate
trustees engage in national marketing).
willing liberally to construe its jurisdictional authority in favor of
finding that it has personal jurisdiction over the trustee. 6 Finally, a
court might be influenced by criticisms of traditional constitutional
analysis of personal jurisdiction questions and thus willing to exercise
personal jurisdiction in situations not contemplated under traditional
doctrine. 7
Consider next the choice of law question: in ruling on the
effectiveness of an Alaska APT, would a non-Alaska court apply
Alaska trust law or the trust law of the forum? As a general rule,
questions concerning the validity and construction of an inter vivos
trust are based on the law of the trust situs, not the law of the settlor's
domicile, and not the law of the forum." Moreover, as a general
proposition, the law designated in a trust instrument will be
controlling with respect to most validity and construction questions. 9
Thus, both general principles point to applying Alaska law. Both
principles are subject, however, to a widely followed exception, under
which a court will apply its own law if otherwise applicable foreign
law violates its public policy."' Thus, assuming that the action is
brought in a jurisdiction that follows the traditional rule concerning
creditors' rights in self-settled trusts, the court would likely apply its
own law and not Alaska law."'
126. See Boxx, supra note 3, at 1212 (noting that the due process analysis under
Denckla is "fluid").
127. See Sterk, supra note 3, at 1091-1092 (discussing contemporary criticisms of
Denckla and World-Wide Volkswagon and suggesting that a state court might be willing to
exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-resident trustee for the limited purpose of
deciding a dispute over creditors' rights to trust assets, even if it would not be willing to
exercise personal jurisdiction for all purposes).
128. See Sterk, supra note 3, at 1082-83 (discussing Hutchinson v. Ross, 187 N.E. 65
(N.Y. 1933)).
129. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 268(1) (1971); see also
Boxx, supra note 3, at 1221.
130. See Sterk, supra note 3, at 1086-89 (citing various cases to that effect).
Traditionally, the public policy exception has been applied only to bar claims, not to bar
defenses. See EUGENE F. SCOLES ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS § 3.15 (4th ed. 2001)
(discussing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 90 (1971) and other
authorities). If our hypothetical case were to arise in New York, however, the court would
likely apply forum law through application of its basic choice-of-law rules, without relying
on the public policy exception. See, e.g., Hemingway v. McGehee, 228 N.E.2d 799, 804-06
(N.Y. 1967) (applying New York law to reject a surviving spouse's argument that her
rights to property located in Louisiana should be determined under Louisiana community
property law, noting that both spouses were domiciled in New York).
131. As with all choice of law issues, the outcome suggested here is far from certain.
One source of uncertainty is the question whether the forum court must give full faith and
credit to Alaska's legislation authorizing APTs. Respectable authority states that the Full
Faith and Credit clause, U.S. CONST. art IV, § 1, limits a court's ability to decline to apply
another jurisdiction's laws on public policy grounds. See Bradford Electric Light Co. v.
Clapper, 286 U.S. 145, 154-63 (1932) (ruling that a federal district court sitting in New
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Finally, consider to what extent a ruling by a non-Alaska court
would be given effect in an enforcement action brought in Alaska
against the Alaska trustee. In this connection, assume first that the
non-Alaska court determined that, notwithstanding that the court did
not have personal jurisdiction over the trustee," it nevertheless had
the authority to decide whether the trust assets were available to the
settlor's creditor (ruling in favor of the creditor on that issue). In a
subsequent enforcement action brought in Alaska, the non-Alaska
court's ruling would not be binding on the Alaska trustee, because the
non-Alaska court would have lacked personal jurisdiction over the
trustee. 33
Next, assume that the non-Alaska court ruled both that it had
personal jurisdiction over the trustee and that the trust assets could
be used to satisfy the creditor's judgment. Would the jurisdictional
ruling (and thus the underlying substantive ruling) be binding on the
trustee in a subsequent enforcement action brought in Alaska? If the
Alaska trustee appeared in the non-Alaska litigation, the non-Alaska
court's rulings would be binding in a subsequent enforcement action
Hampshire must give effect to Vermont's workmen's compensation law, which purported
to provide an exclusive remedy for a Vermont employee injured while working on a
project in New Hampshire; the Court stated that the district court, at least in the context
of that case, could not on public policy grounds "refuse to give effect to a substantive
defense [to an action] under the applicable law of another state"); see also Frederic L.
Kirgis, Jr., The Roles of Due Process and Full Faith and Credit in Choice of Law, 62
CORNELL L. REv. 94, 119-20 (1976) (articulating standards for applying full faith and
credit principles to choice of law questions). A good illustration of this point is Order of
United Commercial Travelers v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586 (1947). Wolfe involved a fraternal
benefit society incorporated and having its principal office located in Ohio. Id. at 588. A
significant feature of membership in the society was a death benefit payable to a person
designated by the member. IL at 591. The constitution of the society included a
provision, valid under Ohio law, that prohibited any action on a death benefit claim
brought more than six months after the claim had been disallowed by the society. L at
588. The case involved a death benefit claim with respect to a member domiciled in South
Dakota. Id. at 597. After the claim was denied by the society, the claimant waited more
than six months before bringing an action to challenge the denial in a South Dakota court.
Id. at 598. The South Dakota court applied a South Dakota statute invalidating the six
month limitations provision contained in the society's constitution. Id at 600. The United
States Supreme Court reversed, holding that South Dakota had failed to give full faith and
credit to the Ohio law permitting the six month limitations period. Il at 625. Although
the situation presented in Wolfe is only modestly analogous to the circumstances
presented by a claim against an APT, see Kirgis, supra, at 116-17 (explaining the Court's
rationale), the decision nevertheless raises doubt about whether a court in a non-APT
jurisdiction-whose law would allow creditors' claims against self-settled trusts-would be
free, on public policy grounds, to ignore a sister state's law prohibiting such claims, at least
in those circumstances in which one of the litigants is not domiciled in the forum state. On
the other hand, if both litigants were domiciled in the forum state, full faith and credit
would likely not preclude the forum state from applying its own law.
132. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
133. See Boxx, supra note 3, at 1220-21.
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brought in Alaska, regardless of whether the non-Alaska court
properly resolved the personal jurisdiction question."M Under the Full
Faith and Credit clause of the United States Constitutions an Alaska
court would be bound to give effect to the non-Alaska court's
judgment, even if the personal jurisdictional decision by the non-
Alaska court were erroneous.J6 The trustee could not avoid
enforcement of the non-Alaska court decision by claiming that the
decision violates Alaska's public policy allowing the use of APTs.'
On the other hand, if the trustee did not appear in the non-Alaska
court litigation, an Alaska court would not be bound by the non-
Alaska court's decision."S Because the personal jurisdiction issue
would not have been litigated against the trustee, the Alaska court
would not be precluded from reconsidering the jurisdictional question
if the trustee challenged the constitutionality of the non-Alaska
court's assertion of personal jurisdiction over the trustee.139 If the
Alaska court decided that the non-Alaska court could not assert
jurisdiction over the trustee, the Alaska court likely would not be
bound to give full faith and credit to its sister court's ruling
concerning the effectiveness of the APT. On the other hand, if the
Alaska court determined that the non-Alaska court did properly
assert jurisdiction over the trustee, under those circumstances it
would be bound to enforce the foreign judgment.
The obligation of American state courts to give full faith and
credit to the judgments of other state courts creates a significant
obstacle to the effectiveness of domestic APTs. As described in the
immediately preceding paragraphs, a creditor may be able to bring an
action in a jurisdiction that does not respect APTs and, assuming that
the court can be persuaded to assert personal jurisdiction over the
trustee, the court will likely rule that the creditor can reach the assets
of the APT. Under many circumstances, the ruling of the court will
be entitled to full faith and credit in the home jurisdiction of the
trustee.41 In this respect, offshore jurisdictions authorizing APTs
134. See id. at 1215 (suggesting that the trustee's best strategy is to refuse to participate
in the non-Alaska court litigation).
135. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (providing that "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in
each State to the ... judicial Proceedings of every other State").
136. See Boxx, supra note 3, at 1213 n.104 (citing various cases to this effect).
137. Id. at 1213-14.
138. Id.at 1214.
139. See id. at 1215 (discussing Baker v. General Motors, 522 U.S. 222 (1998)).
140. Note, however, that whether full faith and credit would bind the Alaska court may
depend on whether the trustee was a necessary party to the non-Alaska litigation and
whether the trustee might nonetheless be bound by a prior judgment against the settlor
based on notions of privity.
141. As described above, factors raising doubt about this outcome include: (i) the court
may be unwilling to exercise personal jurisdiction over the trustee and, in the absence of
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have a significant advantage-those jurisdictions are not bound by
full faith and credit; moreover, most offshore APT legislative schemes
specifically provide that the local courts need not recognize the
judgments of courts in foreign jurisdictions. Using the Cook Islands
legislation as an example, if a United States court ruled that the assets
of a Cook Islands trust could be used to satisfy the claim of a United
States creditor against a United States debtor, a Cook Islands court
would be under no obligation to give effect to that ruling, regardless
of whether the United States court asserted personal jurisdiction over
the trustee.
Moreover, in the United States, creditor claims may be decided
through bankruptcy proceedings, in which a creditor seeking to
recover from a domestic APT is afforded several significant
advantages. Most importantly, a bankruptcy court has jurisdiction
over all of the property of the debtor, wherever located,' 2 and it also
has jurisdiction to determine whether particular assets (including
assets transferred to an APT) constitute property of the debtor.1 '
Furthermore, the district court has national jurisdiction in bankruptcy
cases144 and thus will have personal jurisdiction over any domestic
trustee of an APT.14  With respect to questions concerning the
effectiveness of the APT, a bankruptcy court will apply the choice of
law rules of the forum state.'4 As suggested earlier, in most
circumstances this will result in the court applying the substantive law
of the forum state concerning creditors' rights in self-settled APTs.
Thus, assuming that the bankruptcy proceeding occurs in a state that
does not recognize self-settled APTs, the bankruptcy court will likely
declare that the APT assets are part of the bankruptcy estate and that
that jurisdiction, may be unwilling to decide the substantive issue concerning the validity
of the APT; (ii) the court may be willing to decide the substantive issue notwithstanding
that it lacks personal jurisdiction, but the ruling would then not be entitled to full faith and
credit; and (iii) the trustee may decline to participate in the litigation and later succeed in
persuading a court in its home jurisdiction that the first court lacked personal jurisdiction.
142. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(d) (1994).
143. See, e.g., DiBerto v. The Meadows at Madbury, Inc., 171 B.R. 461, 475 (Bankr.
D.N.H. 1994) (stating that "the Court clearly has jurisdiction to determine what is and
what is not property of the estate"); see also Eric Henzy, Offshore and "Other" Shore
Asset Protection Trusts, 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 739, 746 & n.35 (1999) (citing
DiBerto and other cases).
144. See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(e) (1994); see also FED. R. BANKR. P. 7004(d).
145. See Henzy, supra note 143, at 746 & n.36 (citing cases for the proposition that the
constitutional constraints on exercises of personal jurisdiction by state courts do not apply
to bankruptcy courts); see also Sterk, supra note 3, at 1105-06 (stating that the bankruptcy
court will have personal jurisdiction over a defendant as long as the defendant "has the
requisite contacts with the United States as a whole, even if the defendant has no contacts
with the state in which the bankruptcy court sits").
146. See Boxx, supra note 3, at 1227.
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the assets are subject to the claims of the debtor's creditors;...
moreover, the court will have the authority to compel the APT
trustee to comply with any of the court's remedial orders.
To what extent is bankruptcy court a practical alternative for the
judgment creditor in our example? If the trust settlor voluntarily
petitions a court for relief under the Bankruptcy Code,"4 unless the
settlor brings the petition in Alaska or another jurisdiction that
respects APTs,"4 as noted above the court will likely apply forum law
and thus rule that the trust assets are available to satisfy creditors'
claims. But a voluntary petition is just that, so commencing a
bankruptcy case in this manner is not something over which a creditor
can exercise any control. A bankruptcy proceeding, however, may
also be commenced through an involuntary petition. Under section
303 of the Bankruptcy Code, a single creditor may commence an
involuntary bankruptcy proceeding only if fewer than twelve creditors
hold claims against the debtor; if more than twelve creditors hold
claims, at least three of the creditors must join in the petition.5 ' The
primary basis for granting an involuntary petition is that "the debtor
is generally not paying [his or her] debts as such debts come due.' 52
Many courts are reluctant to grant an involuntary petition in the case
of a single creditor, because the debtor's failure to pay a single
creditor seems incongruous with the debtor not "generally...
paying... debts as [they] come due."'53 On the other hand, a court
may be more willing to grant a single creditor's petition if the creditor
147. But see Bacon & Terrill, supra note 90, at 130 (arguing that Bankruptcy Code
section 541(c)(2), which excludes from the bankruptcy estate beneficial interests subject to
state law transferability restrictions, requires bankruptcy courts to give effect to state APT
legislation).
148. See generally MICHAEL J. HERBERT, UNDERSTANDING BANKRUPTCY § 6.02
(1995).
149. The debtor may file the petition in any district in which is located the debtor's
"domicile, residence, principal place of business in the United States, or principal assets in
the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1408(1) (1994). Venue in a particular district is proper if
any one of the four grounds exists during the 180-day period prior to filing, or if during the
same period one of the four grounds is satisfied for that district for a longer portion of the
time period than for any other district. See HERBERT, supra note 148, § 6.04, at 93. As a
practical matter, the assets held in an APT presumably could not serve as the basis for
venue in an APT state, because a debtor taking that position would likely forfeit the
opportunity to argue that those assets did not form part of the bankruptcy estate. Thus,
for the debtor to bring a voluntary petition in a jurisdiction whose local trust law would
respect APTs, the debtor would need to have established some other substantial
connection with the jurisdiction (i.e., domicile, residence, or the debtor's "principal assets"
not held in the APT).
150. See 11 U.S.C. § 303(b) (2000). See generally HERBERT, supra note 148, § 6.03.
151. See 11 U.S.C. § 303(b) (2000); HERBERT, supra note 148, § 6.03[D][1], at 86.
152. 11 U.S.C. § 303(h)(1) (2000); see HERBERT, supra note 148, § 6.03[E], at 88-89.
153. Boxx, supra note 3, at 1229; HERBERT, supra note 148, § 6.03[E], at 89.
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has no other adequate remedy, as may very well be true in the case of
a creditor seeking to recover from an APT.'-' An involuntary petition
is not without risk for a creditor-dismissal of the petition may result
in the creditor being liable for the debtor's costs and attorneys' fees.
Moreover, if the creditor acted in bad faith, the court can award the
debtor damages, including punitive damages.15
The foregoing discussion suggests that, notwithstanding APT
legislation, creditors may have several avenues of attack to recover
self-settled trust assets. Note, however, that a creditor's success will
depend on resolving two critical issues in its favor. First, in state
court proceedings, the creditor must obtain a judgment from a court
having personal jurisdiction over the trustee. Savvy trustees, seeking
to protect the assets of their APT clients, will undoubtedly structure
their affairs to minimize the risk of subjecting themselves to personal
jurisdiction in states that do not recognize APTs. Second, in both
state court and federal bankruptcy proceedings, the creditor must
persuade the court not to apply the substantive trust law of the APT
jurisdiction, but instead to apply the more creditor-friendly law of the
forum state. As more states adopt APT and other debtor-friendly
legislation, courts in those jurisdictions will become less inclined to
find that the foreign state's APT law violates their public policy.
Moreover, even in states without APT legislation, courts in those
states may recognize the myriad ways in which their own state laws
allow non-APT devices (such as limited partnerships and tenancies by
the entirety. 6) for protecting against creditors' claims and thus be
disinclined to find that the foreign APT legislation violates its public
policy. In these two significant respects, we can anticipate that
recovering from APTs will become increasingly more difficult.
Moreover, regardless of the theoretical possibility that courts will not
respect APTs, placing assets in APTs will also afford settlors a
practical advantage-the risk that the creditors will fail altogether to
recover APT assets will create an incentive for creditors to settle
claims on a basis favorable to APT trust settlors.
The limited information available to date suggests that many
settlors have availed themselves of Alaska and Delaware APTs,
despite any concerns about their effectiveness.' In Delaware, for
154. See Boxx, supra note 3, at 1229-30.
155. 11 U.S.C. § 303(b) (2000); HERBERT, supra note 148, § 6.03[F].
156. See infra notes 203-268 and accompanying text.
157. Settlors apparently recognize the uncertainties associated with domestic APTs, but
they are willing to tolerate that uncertainty, in part because they believe that placing their
assets in an APT will enhance their ability to obtain favorable settlements. Telephone
Interview with Douglas J. Blattmachr, President and CEO, Alaska Trust Company (July
12, 2001); Telephone Interview with Richard W. Nenno, Vice President and Trust
Counsel, Wilmington Trust Company (July 12,2001).
example, as of April 2001 over 100 APTs had been established,
having an aggregate market value in excess of $2 billion.15 In many
cases, settlors create a double layer of protection, by first transferring
assets to a limited partnership and then placing the partnership assets
in an APT 59
M. The Role of Fraudulent Transfer Laws
Understanding the rights of creditors in self-settled APTs
requires an understanding of not only the trust law concepts discussed
in Parts I and II, but also the law of fraudulent transfers. Fraudulent
transfer laws afford creditors an alternative means of satisfying a
judgment from assets transferred to an APT: even if a self-settled
APT is respected as an effective device for sheltering assets from a
creditor's claim, the creditor can always argue that the settlor's
transfer to the APT was fraudulent, and thus voidable, under the
fraudulent transfer laws. With a fraudulent transfer claim, the
effectiveness of a self-settled APT is essentially irrelevant; if a debtor
makes a fraudulent transfer within the meaning of the fraudulent
transfer laws, the transfer can be set aside and the transferred assets
recovered by a creditor, without regard to the identity of the
transferee.' 6 If a fraudulent transfer claim is successful, the usual
remedy is an order setting the transfer aside.'61
Fraudulent transfer laws have existed in some form in England
and the United States for centuries. They developed initially through
case law and eventually were codified in the 16th century Statute of
Elizabeth, which defined fraudulent transfers as those made by
debtors with the "purpose and intent.., to delay, hinder, or defraud
creditors."' 62 In the United States, most states initially adopted the
Statute of Elizabeth.' 63  In 1918, the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) approved the
158. Telephone Interview with Richard W. Nenno, Vice President and Trust Counsel,
Wilmington Trust Company (July 12,2001).
159. Telephone Interview with Douglas J. Blattmachr, President and CEO, Alaska
Trust Company (July 12, 2001); see also infra notes 231-241 and accompanying text
(explaining how limited partnerships can be used to shelter assets from the claims of
creditors).
160. Thus, in the context of a fraudulent transfer claim, whether the assets were
transferred to an effective APT is irrelevant; if the claim is successful, the transferred
assets can be recovered even if the assets were transferred not to a self-settled APT, but to
trust for the benefit of persons other than the settlor or outright to a person other than the
settlor.
161. See infra notes 179-181 and accompanying text.
162. 13 Eliz. ch. 5 (1570), reprinted in 1 DUNCAN E. OSBORNE & ELIZABETH
MORGAN SCHURIG, ASSET PROTECTION: DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL LAWS
TACTICS app. 2A, at 2-42 (2001); see also SPERO, supra note 68, 3.02[1] (1994).
163. 1 OSBORNE & SCHURIG, supra note 162, app. 2B.
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Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act (UFCA), modeled after the
Statute of Elizabeth and embodying the case law thereunder."f In
1984, NCCUSL modernized the UFCA by adopting the Uniform
Fraudulent Transfers Act (UFTA).'65 Most states have adopted the
UFTA;' 6 a few states continue to use the UFCA or their own version
of the Statute of Elizabeth.'67 The federal Bankruptcy Code has its
own fraudulent transfer provisions, which are substantially similar to
the state fraudulent transfer laws.'6
Because most states have adopted some version of the UFTA,
that statute forms the basis for the discussion in this part of the
article. For present and future creditors,'6 9 the UFTA treats a transfer
as fraudulent (and thus voidable by the creditor) under two distinct
circumstances. First, the transfer is fraudulent if, under section
4(a)(1), the debtor made the transfer "with actual intent to hinder,
delay, or defraud any creditor of the debtor."'"7  Because actual
fraudulent intent is often difficult to prove, UFTA section 4(b) allows
creditors to establish fraudulent intent indirectly by proving the
existence of one or more "badges of fraud,"'71 which are simply
164. UNIF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES Acr, 7A-2 U.L.A. 2 (1918).
165. UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFERS ACT, 7A-2 U.L.A. 274 (1984) [hereinafter
UFTA].
166. As of 2000, 39 states and the District of Columbia had adopted the UFrA. See
7A-2 U.L.A. 16 (Supp 2001).
167. As of 2000, four states and the Virgin Islands had adopted the UFCA. See 7A-2
U.L.A. 1 (Supp 2001). As of 2000, seven states had adopted variations of the Statute of
Elizabeth. See 1 OSBORNE & SCHURIG, supra note 162, app. 2B.
168. The fraudulent transfer provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, set forth in 11 U.S.C. §
548 (2000), are modeled after the same uniform legislation that forms the basis for most
states' laws. See HERBERT, supra note 148, § 15.02[A]. Section 548 varies significantly
from the state fraudulent transfer laws only with respect to the limitations period; whereas
state fraudulent transfer laws generally include a four-year statute of limitations, section
548 applies only to transfers made or obligations incurred within one year before the date
of the filing of the bankruptcy petition. 11 U.S.C. § 548 (a)(1). But in a bankruptcy
proceeding, the authority of the trustee or debtor in possession to set aside a transfer as
fraudulent is not limited to that granted by section 548; under section 544(b), the trustee
or debtor in possession may also avoid a transfer that is fraudulent under applicable state
law, as long as the transfer could have been set aside by someone who is a creditor in the
bankruptcy proceeding. See HERBERT, supra note 148, § 15.03.
169. A "future" creditor is one whose claim arose after the fraudulent transfer; a
"present" creditor is one whose claim arose before the fraudulent transfer. See UFTA §
4(a).
170. Id. § 4(a)(1).
171. UFTA § 4 cmt. 5 (using the term "badges of fraud" and explaining its origin).
Section 4(b) provides as follows:
In determining actual intent under subsection (a)(1), consideration may be given,
among other factors, to whether:
(1) the transfer ... was to an insider;
(2) the debtor retained possession or control of the property transferred
after the transfer;
circumstances recognized by courts as likely indicia of fraudulent
intent. The Comments to the UFTA state that proving the existence
of one or more badges of fraud is relevant evidence of actual fraud,
"but does not create a presumption that the debtor has made a
fraudulent transfer.'7
Second, the transfer is fraudulent if, under UFTA section
4(a)(2)-the so called "constructive fraud" provision'"3 the debtor
made the transfer
without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the
transfer..., and the debtor:
(i) was engaged or was about to engage in a business or a
transaction for which the remaining assets of the debtor were
unreasonably small in relation to the business or transaction;
or
(ii) intended to incur, or believed or reasonably should have
believed that he [or she] would incur, debts beyond his [or her]
ability to pay as they became due.
The constructive fraud provisions of section 4(a)(2) allow courts to
infer fraud under circumstances in which there may be no evidence
that the debtor had fraudulent intent but that would appear
fraudulent to an objective observer. 4
For present creditors (but not future creditors), 75 UFTA section
5 also treats a transfer as fraudulent under two additional
circumstances. First, under section 5(a), a transfer is fraudulent if the
debtor, at the time of the transfer, received inadequate consideration
(3) the transfer ... was disclosed or concealed;
(4) before the transfer was made.., the debtor had been sued or
threatened with suit;
(5) the transfer was of substantially all the debtor's assets;
(6) the debtor absconded;
(7) the debtor removed or concealed assets;
(8) the value of the consideration received by the debtor was reasonably
equivalent to the value of the asset transferred... ;
(9) the debtor was insolvent or became insolvent shortly after the transfer
was made... ;
(10) the transfer occurred shortly before or shortly after a substantial debt
was incurred; and
(11) the debtor transferred the essential assets of the business to a lienor
who transferred the assets to an insider of the debtor.
UFIA § 4(b). Of the eleven factors, courts tend to regard insolvency as the most
significant in deciding whether property was transferred with fraudulent intent. See
SPERO, supra note 68, 3.04[1][c]. Note that some of the factors militate against a finding
of fraudulent intent. Id. I 3.04[1][b], at 3-20.
172. UFTA § 4 cmt. 5.
173. 1 OSBORNE & SCHURIG, supra note 162, § 2:19 & n.1.
174. Id.
175. See supra note 169 (explaining the distinction).
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and either was insolvent or became insolvent as a result of the
transfer.176 Second, under section 5(b), a transfer is fraudulent if the
debtor made the transfer to an insider" in response to an antecedent
debt, the debtor was insolvent as of the time of the transfer, and the
insider should have known of the debtor's insolvency.73 Because
relatively few transfers to APTs are likely to render settlors insolvent,
it is unlikely that a creditor could successfully bring a UFTA section 5
claim with respect to such a transfer. For this reason, the article
considers principally claims arising under section 4(a).
The usual remedy for a fraudulent transfer claim is either to set
aside the transfer or to order an attachment of the transferred
property."' If the creditor has already obtained a judgment against
the transferor on the creditor's underlying claim, the creditor may
also levy execution on the transferred asset."°  The UFTA also
authorizes courts to grant other equitable remedies as warranted by
the circumstances. 1 In short, a successful fraudulent transfer claim
affords the creditor access to the transferred property for purposes of
satisfying the creditor's underlying action.
Section 9 of the UFTA sets forth the relevant limitations periods.
For claims asserted under section 4(a)(1), the claim must be brought
within four years after the transfer was made or within four years
after the transfer was or could reasonably have been discovered by
the creditor. 2 For claims asserted under sections 4(a)(2) and 5(a),
the claim must be brought within four years after the transfer was
made." The limitations period for claims brought under section 5(b)
is only one year after the transfer was made." Although, as noted
earlier, 85 most states have adopted the UFTA, a number of
jurisdictions have modified the UFTA limitations periods, most
commonly by suspending the limitations period indefinitely in actions
based on actual fraud under section 4(a)(1)."
For persons using APTs to shelter their assets from creditors'
claims, the statutes of limitation for fraudulent transfer actions afford
substantial protection. In most cases, as long as a fraudulent transfer
claim arises four years or more after the transfer of assets to an APT,
176. UFTA § 5(a).
177. Section 1 of the UFTA defines "insider" as a relative or close business associate of
the debtor. See UFTA § 1(7).
178. UFTA § 5(b).
179. See UFTA § 7(a)(1), (2); see also Boxx, supra note 3, at 1224 & n.168.
180. UFIA § 7(b).
181. See UFTA § 7(a)(3)(iii).
182. UFTA § 9(a).
183. UFTA § 9(b).
184. UFrA § 9(c).
185. See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
186. SPERO, supra note 68, 3.02[5].
the claim will be barred by the statute of limitations. Only in those
cases in which the creditor successfully asserts actual fraud under
section 4(a)(1) will a different limitations period potentially apply,1"
but, as discussed below, a future creditor (as opposed to a present
creditor) in general will have a difficult burden in establishing actual
fraud. Thus, as long as a settlor is planning with respect to future
creditors only, with the passage of time the statute of limitations will
bar most fraudulent transfer claims.
Under what circumstances will transfers to APTs be deemed
fraudulent under the fraudulent transfer laws? More particularly, if a
settlor transfers assets to an APT not with a specific creditor in mind,
but rather with the general goal of shielding assets from potential
future creditors, will the transfer be deemed fraudulent and thus
voidable under the UFrA or similar laws? Although the answer to
this question is not without doubt, it appears that most courts are
unwilling to void transfers whose purpose and effect is to shelter
assets from creditors that were unknown at the time of the transfer.
Furthermore, the more remote in time the claim of a future creditor,
the less likely a court will be to find that an earlier transfer was
fraudulent with respect to that creditor. Thus, as long as a person
creating an APT does so well in advance of a creditor's claim, and
especially if the creditor was unknown and unforeseeable at the time
of the transfer to the trust, it is likely that the transfer will not be
deemed fraudulent. 18s
In an action brought under UFTA section 4(a)(1)-in which the
creditor must prove "actual intent to ... defraud"-a future creditor
must typically establish that, as of the time of the transfer, the
creditor held "contingent, unliquidated, or unmatured claims," or that
the creditor held "a claim that [could] reasonably [be] foreseen by the
transferor. ' 18s9 Professor Peter A. Alces states that, in an action based
on actual intent to defraud, a future creditor must "establish a causal
link between the fraudulent disposition and the injury suffered.""19
Regarding this same question Professor Alces further states that
"[the] focus on causality provides a means to distinguish between the
actions that operate directly to prejudice a particular creditor and
those actions that in some remote, not foreseeable way, have after the
187. See supra notes 182-184 and accompanying text.
188. See generally PETER A. ALCES, THE LAW OF FRAUDULENT TRANSACTIONS
5.04 (1989 & Supp. 2000) (discussing which creditors have "standing" to bring fraudulent
transfer claims); LoPucki, supra note 67, at 35 & n.155 (explaining that a transfer by a
debtor who lacks the intent to defraud specific creditors, present or future, will not be
deemed fraudulent); SPERO, supra note 68, 3.04[1], 3.04[2].
189. SPERO, supra note 68, 3.04[1], at 3-16 & nn.86-87 (citing cases in support).
190. ALCES, supra note 188, 5.04[1][d] (discussing section 7 of the UFCA, which
contains the same "actual intent" requirement as section 4(a)(1) of the UFrA).
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passage of considerable time or the occurrence of an intervening
cause, compromised a creditor's financial interest....'
Concerning a similar issue,'" in an often-cited passage the court
in Oberst v. Oberst" stated:
While the Court finds it very difficult to locate the exact line
between bankruptcy planning and hindering creditors, Congress
has decided that the key is the intent of the debtor. If the debtor
has a particular creditor or series of creditors in mind and is trying
to remove his assets from their reach, this would be grounds to
deny the discharge. If the debtor is merely looking to his future
wellbeing, the discharge will be granted. This is an uncomfortable
test and does not seem equitable; but it is the law."9'
Thus, the concept of "reasonable foreseeability," the requirement
that future creditors establish a "causal link" between the transfer
and their claims, and the notion that one may permissibly plan for
one's general "future wellbeing" all serve to limit those future
creditors who can successfully claim that a transfer was intended to
defraud them.9'
What about claims by future creditors brought under UFTA
section 4(a)(2), the so-called constructive fraud provision? Under
section 4(a)(2), a creditor need not show that the transferor intended
to defraud creditors; rather, a creditor need only show that the
transferor made a transfer for less than consideration of equivalent
value and
(i) was engaged or was about to engage in a business or a
transaction for which the remaining assets of the debtor were
unreasonably small in relation to the business or transaction; or
(ii) intended to incur, or believed or reasonably should have
believed that he [or she] would incur, debts beyond his [or her]
ability to pay as they became due.96
The first of these provisions literally seems not to apply to future
creditors whose claims arise well after the transfer in question; the
191. L 5.04, at 5-112.
192. In this case, whether a person should be denied a bankruptcy discharge because
she had transferred property "with intent to... defraud a creditor" within the meaning of
11 U.S.C. section 727(a)(2) (2000).
193. 91 B.R. 97 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1988); see, e.g., LoPucki, supra note 67, at 35 n.155
(citing Oberst).
194. 91 B.R. at 101 (emphasis added).
195. See also John E. Sullivan III, Future Creditors and Fraudulent Transfers: When a
Claimant Doesn't Have a Claim, When a Transfer Isn't a Transfer, When Fraud Doesn't
Stay Fraudulent, and Other Important Limits to Fraudulent Transfers Law for the Asset
Protection Planner, 22 DEL. J. CORP. L. 955, 971-75, 981-88 (1997) (refuting the
proposition that planning one's affairs to shelter assets from creditors' claims is
"inherently fraudulent").
196. UFTA § 4(a)(2).
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reference to the debtor being "engage[d] or... about to engage"'' in
a business or transaction suggests that the covered transfers are only
those that disadvantage creditors whose claims are reasonably
proximate in -ome. Although the second provision is not, on its face,
as easily susceptible to the same interpretation, that, in fact, is how
courts have traditionally interpreted both constructive fraud
provisions. As is true with a claim based on actual fraud, a claim
brought by a future creditor based on constructive fraud typically
must show a causal connection between the transfer and the
transferor's failure to satisfy the claim.9 As one commentator
explains:
The requisite causal connection cannot be established merely by
showing a chronological relation between the suspect transfer and
the debtor's insolvency. Moreover, creditors are not given the
benefit of hindsight in establishing this causal connection. Thus,
unforeseen intervening acts that cause or contribute to insolvency
break the causal connection between the allegedly fraudulent
transfer and the debtor's subsequent insolvency.'
Moreover, as the same commentator explains, "the longer the period
between the transfer and the claim, the weaker the causal
connection.""
The constructive fraud provisions require a showing that the
challenged transfer placed the transferor at an unreasonable risk of
being unable to satisfy his or her obligations. Thus, resolving this
question in large part depends on whether the transfer rendered the
transferor insolvent or nearly so. As a corollary, resolving the
question also depends on whether the transferor retained sufficient
assets to satisfy creditors whose claims were reasonably foreseeable.
If a settlor who transfers assets to an APT reserves sufficient assets to
preserve the settlor's solvency and to ensure that reasonably
foreseeable claims can be paid, then a challenge to the transfer based
on constructive fraud will be unlikely to succeed.2 1 The adequacy of
the transferor's liability insurance is an important factor in
determining whether a transferor has adequately provided for
foreseeable future claims.2m
197. UFTA § 4(a)(2)(i) (emphasis added).
198. ALCES, supra note 188, 5.04[1][c].
199. SPERO, supra note 68, 3.04[2], at 3-32; see also ALCES, supra note 188,
5.04[1][c] (discussing similar concepts under the constructive fraud provisions of the
UFCA).
200. SPERO, supra note 68, 3.04[2], at 3-33.
201. See Sullivan, supra note 195, at 988-1014 (developing a "rule of reason" for
evaluating whether a challenged transfer is constructively fraudulent, based on the degree
to which the transferor has preserved his or her long-term solvency).
202. See id. at 995-1001; see also Sterk, supra note 3, at 1047 (suggesting that a settlor
who transfers assets to an APT can negate a constructive fraud claim by establishing that
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To summarize the conclusions of this part, a settlor who transfers
property to an APT will likely succeed in defending fraudulent
transfer claims to the extent those claims are brought by future
creditors, at least if the obligations to those creditors were not
reasonably foreseeable at the time of creating the trust. The settlor
will increase the likelihood of success if the transfer to the APT does
not leave the settlor unable to satisfy foreseeable obligations.
Moreover, the statutes of limitation under most fraudulent transfer
statues provide substantial protection against fraudulent transfer
claims that arise more than four years after the APT was created.
IV. Rethinking the Traditional Rule
A. Introduction
This part of the article develops a new approach to evaluating
self-settled APTs. It rejects the assumptions on which the traditional
rule is based and advocates an approach based on a realistic
assessment of the rights and duties of settlors, non-settlor
beneficiaries, and trustees. To place the discussion of creditors' rights
into perspective, the part begins with an overview of non-APT
property management and ownership vehicles that allow persons to
shelter property from the claims of creditors.
Throughout the discussion in this part, the article assumes that
the transfer of property to an APT cannot be set aside under the
relevant fraudulent transfer statute. Thus, the discussion focuses on
what remedies a creditor should have based on trust law concerning
creditors' rights, without reference to fraudulent transfer laws.
B. Creditor Protection Alternatives
In considering whether and under what circumstances the law
should respect APTs, it is helpful to examine the extent to which the
law permits property owners to shelter their assets from creditors
through non-APT arrangements.
(1) Tenancies By The Entirety
A tenancy by the entirety is a form of concurrent ownership of
property, between a husband and wife exclusively, in which both
concurrent owners hold a right of survivorship 03 -that is, upon the
death of the first spouse to die, the surviving spouse becomes the sole
owner of the property. The concept arose at common law, under
which husbands and wives were deemed to constitute a single person
he or she has obtained adequate liability insurance).
203. ROBERT T. DANFORTH, TAXATION OF JOINTLY OWNED PROPERTY A-2 (1998).
or entity." Thus, unlike other concurrent owners of property, tenants
by the entirety own the property as a single marital unit, and the
individual tenants are deemed not to own any individual share of the
whole. The practical consequence of this principle is that, in general,
a tenancy by the entirety cannot be severed unilaterally; to sever the
tenancy requires the voluntary act of both owners.205 Thus, a tenant
by the entirety has no right to convey his or her interest to a third
party without the consent of the co-owner. As discussed further
below, this characteristic of tenancies by the entirety has the collateral
effect of sheltering property held in this form from the claims of one
spouse's creditors.
At common law, a tenancy by the entirety was the only
concurrent ownership arrangement that could be created between
husbands and wives. Although other forms of marital property are
now permissible, the tenancy by the entirety continues to be
recognized in most jurisdictions. 7 Thus, for many married couples
throughout the United States, the tenancy by the entirety provides a
means of sheltering assets from the claims of each spouse's creditors.
In a majority of the jurisdictions that still recognize the tenancy
by the entirety, the interest of one spouse in the tenancy is not subject
to the claims of his or her creditors during the spouses' joint lives.2
This general rule applies both to encumbrances that could arise
voluntarily (e.g., one spouse's attempt to grant a mortgage on real
property) and to those that could arise involuntarily as a result of a
judgment against one spouse. In most jurisdictions that continue to
recognize tenancies by the entirety, the arrangement can be used to
own both real and personal property-' moreover, unlike exempt-
property laws,211 laws authorizing tenancies by the entirety place no
limitations on the value of property that may be held in this form."'
204. ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 5.5, at 203 (2d ed.
1993).
205. DANFORTH, supra note 203, at A-2.
206. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 204, § 5.5, at 203.
207. See RICHARD R. POWELL, 7 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 52.01[3], at 52-11 to
52-12 (2000) (indicating that the tenancy by the entirety continues to be recognized in 25
states and the District of Columbia). But see JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER,
PROPERTY 323 (4th ed. 1998) (indicating that the tenancy by the entirety exist today in
"somewhat less than half the states").
208. See generally DANFORTH, supra note 203, at A-6 to A-7 (discussing the particulars
and variations of the general rule). Note this important limitation: the assets are
sheltered from individual creditors only. Tenants by the entirety may join in encumbering
their property, and a tenancy by the entirety is subject to the claims of creditors to whom
the spouses are jointly liable. See CUNNINGHAM, supra note 204, § 5.5, at 206.
209. See CUNNINGHAM, supra note 204, § 5.5, at 208.
210. See infra notes 242-254 and accompanying text.
211. For the relatively wealthy, the federal estate tax constitutes a disincentive to
holding a substantial portion of a husband and wife's property as tenants by the entirety.
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Also, unlike at common law, under modem law whether property is
held as tenants by the entirety is wholly within the control of the
spouses. Thus, the tenancy by the entirety is a flexible device for
sheltering substantial assets from creditors not available to single
Oversimplifying somewhat, as of 2001 the federal estate tax is imposed on estates worth
more than $675,000. See I.R.C. § 2010(c) (West 2001) (granting a credit against the tax in
an amount sufficient to shelter the first $675,000 worth of property). Property left to a
surviving spouse, however, qualifies for the estate tax marital deduction and thus is not
subject to estate tax. See I.R.C. § 2056(a) (1994). Married couples who own most of their
assets as tenants by the entirety risk subjecting their assets to tax unnecessarily. The point
is illustrated by the following example:
Husband (H) and Wife (W) own assets worth $1,350,000, all of which are held as
tenants by the entirety. Each spouse's will leaves all of his or her property to
their children. H dies in January 2001, and W dies in December 2001. At H's
death all of the assets pass by right of survivorship to W (H's will does not
control the disposition of the property). At W's death, her estate is worth
$1,350,000 and is subject to an estate tax of approximately $270,000. See I.R.C.
§§ 2001(c) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998), 2010(c). All of W's assets, less estate tax,
pass to H and W's children. If, instead of holding their assets as tenants by the
entirety, H and W had held their assets as tenants in common, H's interest would
have passed directly to the children estate tax free (an estate worth no more than
$675,000 is not subject to estate tax), as would W's interest; thus, H and W's
children would have ended up $270,000 richer. See I.R.C. §§ 2001(c), 2010(c).
Several years ago, this tax planning problem associated with tenancies by the entirety
was alleviated somewhat by the liberalization of the estate tax disclaimer rules, see
DANFORTH, supra note 203, at A-42 to A-47, under which in most circumstances a
surviving tenant by the entirety is authorized to disclaim that tenant's survivorship
interest, thereby causing the deceased tenant's interest to pass as if the property were held
as tenants in common. Thus, the tax rules now create less of a disincentive to holding
property as tenants by the entirety.
A further disincentive to holding substantial portions of a couple's property as tenants
by the entirety is that each spouse gives up some of the estate planning benefits of being
able to transfer his or her property interests to a revocable trust. See generally JESSE
DUKEMINIER & STANLEY M. JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 386-96 (6th ed.
2000) (discussing the use of revocable trusts in estate planning). As discussed above,
common law principles restrict tenancies by the entirety exclusively to married persons;
property owned by a revocable trust is not the same as property owned by the settlor and,
thus, transferring property to a revocable trust is inconsistent with holding the property as
tenants by the entirety. In an effort to afford the creditor protection attributes of
tenancies by the entirety to married persons who also seek the estate planning benefits of
revocable trusts, the Virginia legislature has considered a bill that would expressly allow
tenancy by the entirety property to be held in both separate and joint revocable trusts.
This proposal follows on the heels of recent Virginia legislation designed (i) to clarify that
Virginia allows tenancies by the entirety in personal property, not just real property, see J.
Rodney Johnson, Wills, Trusts, and Estates, Annual Survey of Virginia Law, 33 U. RICH.
L. REV. 1075, 1081-82 (1999) (discussing 1999 enactment of section 55-20.1 of the Virginia
Code), and (ii) to permit spouses to transfer a tenants-by-the-entirety principal residence
to their separate or joint revocable or irrevocable trusts, while retaining "the same
immunity from the claims of their separate creditors as [the residence] would if it had
remained a tenancy by the entirety," VA. CODE § 55-20.1 (Michie Supp. 2000).
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persons nor to spouses residing in jurisdictions that do not recognize
that form of ownership.
Moreover, in jurisdictions that recognize the tenancy by the
entirety, spouses are afforded a means of creating self-settled trusts,
the assets of which will be sheltered from their creditors, thus
avoiding the traditional rule rendering such trusts ineffective.
Consider, for example, Bolton Roofing Company Co. v. Hedrick, 212 in
which a husband and wife transferred property held as tenants by the
entirety to a trust for the benefit of themselves and their children. A
creditor of the husband sought to satisfy a judgment from the assets
of the trust.213 After acknowledging the traditional rule against self-
settled spendthrift trusts, the court nevertheless held that the creditor
could not reach the trust assets.214 Because the property would not
have been available to the creditor prior to its transfer to the trust,
the court found the usual public policy prohibition against self-settled
spendthrift trusts to be inapposite.1 The court in Security Pacific
Bank Washington v. Chang'6 reached the same conclusion with
respect to property held as tenants by the entirety transferred in
equal shares to separate spendthrift trusts created by a husband and
wife. Thus, notwithstanding that the trusts held the property as
tenants in common, the court ruled that the husband's creditor could
not reach the assets of his separate trust."' To rule otherwise, the
court reasoned, "would not give the.., creditor justice, it would
simply give it a windfall," because a decision adverse to the creditor
would not deprive the creditor of an asset that it could have reached
before the trust was created. 8
Tenancy by the entirety rules allow an additional means of
avoiding the prohibition against self-settled spendthrift trusts.
Consider the following transaction: shortly before the death of his
212. 701 S.W.2d 183 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
213. kL
214. Id. at 184-85.
215. The court reasoned as follows:
[The creditor's] claim would be valid if the judgment it relies on were against [the
spouses], jointly and severally, but it is not. The judgment is against [the
husband] as an individual. [The creditor] would not have had any legal right to
levy against the real estate owned jointly by [the spouses] prior to the time they
conveyed it under the trust agreement. It stands to reason, therefore, that [the
creditor] could not have the same real estate, after it had been conveyed to the
trustee by [the spouses], as tenants by the entireties, sold to satisfy an individual
debt of [the husband's] .... The spendthrift clause used here in the trust
agreement offends neither statute nor public policy, because it does not deprive
[the creditor] of any rights it had before the conveyance in question was made.
Id.
216. 818 F. Supp. 1343 (D. Haw. 1993).
217. Id. at 1346.
218. Id. at 1346.
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wife, an insolvent husband transfers to his wife all of his interest in
property held by them as tenants by the entirety. The wife dies,
leaving all of the property to a spendthrift trust for the benefit of the
husband. May the husband's creditors reach the trust assets in
satisfaction of his debts? In Watterson v. Edgerly, the court held that
they could not.2"9 The court reasoned that, because the trust assets
constituted property formerly held as tenants by the entirety, the
husband's creditors were not disadvantaged by the creation of the
spendthrift trust.' Without expressly stating so, a significant factor in
the court's decision appears to be that, because the tenancy by the
entirety property was not subject to the claims of the husband's
creditors, the husband's transfer of the property to his wife,
anticipating that the property would soon return to the husband in
the form of a spendthrift trust, should not be deemed a fraudulent
transfer within the meaning of the fraudulent transfer laws."
(2) Retirement Savings
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(ERISA) requires all retirement plans to include a provision
prohibiting alienation of the plan benefits.tm As interpreted by the
United States Supreme Court, the anti-alienation provision in
ERISA-qualifled plans provides an exclusion'm for purposes of
section 541(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code, which excludes from the
debtor's estate a beneficial interest in a trust that is subject to a
transfer restriction enforceable under "applicable nonbankruptcy
law." 4  ERISA's anti-alienation provisions also protect retirement
219. 388 A.2d 934 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1978).
220. Id.at 938-39.
221. See id. at 938-39.
222. ERISA § 206(d), 29 U.S.C. 1056(d)(1) (2001) (directing that "[e]ach pension plan
shall provide that benefits provided under the plan may not be assigned or alienated").
The Internal Revenue Code and Treasury Regulations include a similar requirement for
the plan to qualify for tax-exempt status. See I.R.C. § 401(a)(13) (West 2001); Treas. Reg.
§ 401(a)-13(b)(1).
223. Property excluded from the bankruptcy estate under Bankruptcy Code section
541(c)(2) may be distinguished from property that is included in the estate for which either
state law or the Bankruptcy Code provides an exemption. The exclusion under section
541(c)(2) applies regardless of whether the debtor elects the state or federal exemption
scheme. See infra note 243 (noting the interplay of state and federal exemption rules in
the bankruptcy context). Moreover, the exclusion is not limited in amount, as is true with
some state and federal exemption rules. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(E) (2000)
(limiting the federal exemption for retirement plans to an amount "reasonably necessary
for the support of the debtor and any dependent of the debtor").
224. 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) (2000); see Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753,757-66 (1992).
Note, however, that a plan for the benefit of a sole shareholder may not qualify for the
section 541(c)(2) exclusion, because a plan without a "participant" cannot be an ERISA-
qualified plan; the plan may nevertheless be exempt under state law or excludible under
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savings from creditors in state court proceedings?2 At least one court
has held that a creditor may not reach a participant's interest in an
ERISA-qualified retirement plan even if the participant has the
power to demand a lump-sum distribution.6 State exemption rules
may also protect retirement savings in circumstances for which the
anti-alienation provisions do not afford protection. For example, in
some states retirement savings are excluded from the claims of
creditors even after distributions occur, as long as the distributed
funds are segregated from other assets of the debtor. 7 In addition,
state exemption statutes may protect individual retirement accounts
(IRAs), which are not covered by ERISA's anti-alienation rules.2
IRAs are also protected under the bankruptcy exemption statute,
although only to the extent "reasonably necessary" for the support of
the debtor and the debtor's dependents.230
(3) Family Limited Partnerships
For approximately the last decade,2' many wealthy individuals
have availed themselves of the numerous estate planning advantages
some other principle. See In re Witwer, 148 B.R. 930, 934-41 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1992)
(holding plan not excluded under the Patterson ruling because the plan was not subject to
ERISA; holding plan nevertheless excluded under the law of the Ninth Circuit, in which
retirement accounts with anti-alienation provisions qualify for an exception to the usual
rule rendering ineffective self-settled spendthrift trusts).
225. See SPERO, supra note 68, S 10.04[1][b]; KATHERINE G. HENKEL, ESTATE
PLANNING AND WEALTH PRESERVATION S 53.10[3][d][i] (1997).
226. Tenneco Inc. v. First Virginia Bank of Tidewater, 698 F.2d 688, 690 (4th Cir. 1983).
227. See SPERO, supra note 68, 10.04[2][a].
228. See SPERO, supra note 68, 1 10.04[3]; HENKEL, supra note 225, 53.10[3][e]. The
laws of many of the most populous states include exemptions for IRAs. See SPERO, supra,
10.04[3], at 10-72 & nn.426-27 (citing authority in California, Florida, Illinois, New York,
and Texas).
229. See Patterson, 504 U.S. at 763 n.6 (citing cases for the proposition that the federal
bankruptcy exemption, 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10(E) (2000), applies to both ERISA plans and
non-ERISA plans).
230. See supra note 223 and accompanying text.
231. As described below, see infra note 232, a substantial incentive for creating family
limited partnerships is the valuation discounts that apply to partnership interests for
purposes of the estate, gift, and generation-skipping transfer taxes. Although family
limited partnerships have long served other estate planning and asset management
objectives, a 1993 ruling by the Department of Treasury opened the floodgates to the use
of family limited partnerships for so-called valuation discount planning. See Rev. Rul. 93-
12, 1993-1 C.B. 202. Before 1993, the government applied a family attribution rule in
valuing closely held business interests for transfer tax purposes. In Rev. Rul. 93-12, the
government reversed its earlier position, ruling that it would no longer "assum[e] that all
voting power held by family members may be aggregated" in valuing transferred interests
in the transfer tax context. "Consequently, a minority discount will not be disallowed
solely because a transferred interest, when aggregated with interests held by family
members, would be a part of a controlling interest." Rev. Rul. 93-12,1993-1 C.B. 202.
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of placing their assets in family limited partnerships.22 Among those
advantages are the limited rights granted by law to the creditors of
individual partners. To place this discussion into context, consider
the following, fairly typical transaction. A property owner, concerned
about potential creditors' claims, forms a limited partnership, to
which he transfers investment real estate and marketable securities,
and to which her son transfers a relatively small amount of cash.
Following the transaction, the mother holds a 98% limited
partnership interest and a 1% general partnership interest, and the
son holds a 1% general partnership interest. Under the terms of the
partnership agreement, distributions of partnership earnings are
controlled by the two general partners acting together. Any
partnership distributions that do occur must be made to the limited
and general partners proportionally.
Some years later the mother is sued and the judgment creditor
seeks to satisfy its claim from the mother's partnership interests.
Assuming that the mother's transfer to the partnership was not
fraudulent within the meaning of the fraudulent transfer laws, to what
extent will the creditor be able to satisfy its claim?
232. Perhaps the most significant of these advantages is that the partnership interests
qualify for substantial valuation discounts for estate, gift, and generation-skipping transfer
tax purposes. See generally BORIS I. BrITKER ET AL., FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT
TAXATION 662-64, 673-82 (8th ed. 2000) (describing general transfer tax valuation
principles and further explaining rationale for discounts attributable to lack of
marketability and lack of control). Consider the following example:
A husband and wife own as tenants in common a $1 million farm, which they
transfer to a limited partnership. Each spouse retains a 1% general partnership
interest and a 49% limited partnership interest. The spouses intend to make gifts
of their limited partnership interests to their children and other descendants in an
amount each year that qualifies for the annual gift tax exclusion (as of 2001, up to
$10,000 per donee per calendar year, see I.R.C. § 2503(b) (Supp. IV 1998)). A
1% interest as a tenant in common in the farm would be worth approximately
$10,000. A 1% limited partnership interest, however, should be entitled to a
substantial discount for lack of marketability and lack of control. Assume that
the taxpayers take a 40% combined discount for lack of marketability and lack of
control. See HENKEL, supra note 225, 16.03[1] (describing commonly utilized
valuation discounts). If the husband and wife had not created the partnership,
each would have been able to transfer only a 1% interest in the farm per donee
per year. As a result of creating the limited partnership, however, each spouse
can make annual exclusion gifts of a 1.67% interest in the limited partnership
[$16,667 - 40% = $10,000]. The spouses thus achieve greater transfer tax
efficiency in transferring their interests in the farm to their descendants.
Another significant advantage of limited partnership arrangements is that only the
general partner has a voice in management decisions. See REVISED UNIFORM LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP ACt § 403(a), 6A U.L.A. 177 (1995). Thus, in our example, the husband
and wife will continue to control the management of the farm even as they transfer their
equity interests to their descendants.
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Under the Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act (RULPA),
adopted with slight variations by nearly every state,' 3 the exclusive
remedy available to the creditor of an individual partner is a
"charging order" against the debtor's partnership interest.2 In
general, a charging order causes a creditor to be treated as an
assignee of the partnership interest and thus entitles the creditor to
receive the partner's share of partnership distributions until the
creditor's claim is satisfied.'3 5 An assignee is not a partner and thus
holds none of the rights exclusive to partners, such as the right to
force a dissolution of the partnership under certain circumstances."
For several reasons, the right to receive partnership distributions is of
limited value to the creditor. First, with many closely held businesses,
most profits are simply reinvested in the business; moreover, within
certain limitations, the general partners have exclusive control over
the timing and amounts of partnership distributions. Thus,
distributions to the creditor are likely to occur infrequently, at best.
Second, the partnership income tax rules, under which holders of
partnership interests are taxed directly on partnership income," may
cause the creditor to owe taxes on partnership income that the
creditor never receives-so-called phantom taxable income."S
Although, in general, a charging order entitles the creditor only
to receive distributions if and when they occur, under certain
circumstances the creditor may also be allowed to "foreclose" the
charging order.39 Foreclosure entitles the creditor to sell the
233. See ROSEN, supra note 82, at A-4.
234. See ALAN R. BROMBERG & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, 4 BROMBERG AND RIBSTEIN
ON PARTNERSHIP § 13.07(e) (1998) (describing remedies available under the RULPA).
235. See generally SPERO, supra note 68, I 8.02; Kathryn G. Henkel, How Family
Limited Partnerships Can Protect Assets, EST. PLAN., Feb. 1993, at 3, 3-4.
236. See SPERO, supra note 68, 8.02[1][b], at 8-18.
237. See I.R.C. § 701 (1994).
238. See Rev. Rul. 77-137,1977-1 C.B. 178; see also ROSEN, supra note 82, at A-6 to A-7
(discussing arguments for and against this result); HENKEL, supra note 225, T 53.08[9][b]
(same).
239. There is some uncertainty concerning the availability of foreclosure as a remedy
for the creditor of a limited partner. This uncertainty arises from the fact that the
remedial provisions of both the Uniform Partnership Act and the Revised Uniform
Partnership Act, which apply to general partnerships as well as to limited partnership to
the extent not inconsistent with RULPA, both expressly authorize foreclosure of the
debtor partner's interest, see 1 BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 234, § 3.05(d)(3)(v),
while the provisions of the RULPA say nothing about foreclosure. See SPERO, supra note
68, 8.02[1], at 8-12, 8.02[1][b] (discussing the arguments for and against allowing
foreclosure of a charging order). Several courts have ruled that a creditor is entitled to
receive partnership distributions only and that foreclosure is not available. ROSEN, supra
note 82, at A-4 to A-5 (discussing cases). On the other hand, other courts have held that a
charging order may be foreclosed if partnership distributions are unlikely to pay off the
debt within a reasonable time. See 4 BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 234, §
13.07(e)(2), at 13:55 & n.50 (citing cases). For the purpose of making their limited
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partnership interest and thus immediately realize on the value of the
interest, rather than waiting for the value that might be realized from
partnership distributions. For several reasons, however, foreclosure
is likely to yield little value to the creditor. First, in the context of a
family limited partnership, the market for selling the interest will
generally be only the family members themselves. Second, under the
RULPA, the purchaser at a foreclosure sale becomes not a partner,
but a mere assignee and consequently has rights no greater than the
creditor holding the charging order.2" These factors will depress the
value of the foreclosed interest and likely force the creditor to sell to
a family member at a bargain price. A purchaser at a foreclosure sale
has no right to force a dissolution of the partnership and thus is
unable to recover against the partnership assets.
241
(4) Homestead and Other Exemptions
The laws in virtually every jurisdiction in the United States
exempt certain categories of assets from the claims of creditors. The
monetary value of the exemptions varies considerably from state to
state, ranging from paltry to extraordinarily generous. State
exemption laws apply both in state court enforcement actions and in
federal bankruptcy proceedings.243  The most important of the state
law exemptions are the homestead exemption and the exemption for
life insurance.
partnership laws more attractive for protection against creditors' claims, a few states have
expressly modified their limited partnership laws to make clear that the foreclosure
remedy is not available. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 32.11.340(b) (Lexis 2000) (providing
that the charging order is the "exclusive remedy" and that "foreclosure on the...
partner's partnership interest... [is] not available to the judgment creditor.., and may
not be ordered by a court"). In the bankruptcy context, the bankruptcy trustee is not
limited to the remedies available under state law. The Bankruptcy Code expressly
authorizes the trustee to sell the property of the estate, notwithstanding any state law or
partnership provision to the contrary. 11 U.S.C. §§ 363(b)(1), () (1994); see also SPERO,
supra note 68, 8.03[1][b], at 8-24.
240. See SPERO, supra note 68, 8.02[1][b], at 8-17 to 8-18.
241. See 4 BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 234, § 13.07(d)(1), at 13:47 (explaining
that the purchaser has no right of dissolution in the case of term partnerships, which most
limited partnerships are).
242. See, e.g., OSBORNE & SCHURIG, supra note 162, §§ 7:01 to 7:53 (summarizing
homestead exemption laws of all 50 states and the District of Columbia). Compare W.
VA. CODE ANN. § 38-9-1 (Michie 1997) (limiting homestead exemption to a value of
$5,000) with TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 41.001, 41.002 (Vernon 2000) (establishing no
monetary limitation, and allowing up to 200 acres for a rural homestead and 10 acres for
an urban homestead).
243. See HERBERT, supra note 148, § 11.02 (explaining that, under the Bankruptcy
Code, states may "opt out" of the federal exemption rules and allow their residents the
state exemptions only; alternatively, states may give their residents a choice between the
state exemptions and the federal exemptions).
The homestead exemption is based on a public policy
recognizing that even the most impecunious debtor should be able to
retain the means to house himself and his family.2 4 In many states,
the size of the homestead exemption is so small that it cannot possibly
be effective in achieving its objective-an exemption of only $5,000,
for example, would not permit a debtor to retain his home; instead, it
would permit the debtor merely to retain $5,000 of the sales
proceeds.245  Ironically, some homestead exemption laws allow
debtors to shelter assets from creditors greatly in excess of that which
is needed for maintaining the debtor and the debtor's family. The
most notable-or, arguably, notorious246-of those are in Florida and
Texas, which exempt homesteads of unlimited value.247
The laws of virtually every state also exempt all or a portion of
the cash value of unmatured life insurance policies from the claims of
creditors of the owner-insured.M In most states, there is no
restriction on the amount of cash value that can be sheltered in life
insurance policies. 9 Moreover, many states specifically exempt the
cash value of life insurance endowment contracts, the proceeds of
which are payable to the insured if he or she survives for the term
specified in the contract.' Thus, it is possible to shelter cash value
under life insurance policies even if the proceeds are unlikely to
become payable to the insured's dependents." 1 As is true with other
244. See OSBORNE & SCHURIG, supra note 162, § 7:02.
245. See HERBERT, supra note 148, § 2.09, at 42.
246. See, e.g., Larry Rohter, Rich Debtors Finding Shelter Under a Populist Florida
Law, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 1993, § 1, at 1 (discussing purchases of multimillion dollar
homes in Florida); Protecting Rich Bankrupts, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 1999, at A20
(discussing Florida and Texas homestead laws); HERBERT, supra note 148, § 11.02, at 186
(stating that critics consider Florida and Texas "as virtual havens for deadbeats"); Laura
Jereski, Home Free, FORBES, Oct. 27, 1986, at 340 (describing how the Houston real estate
developer Melvin Lane Powers protected from creditors his 21-story $67.5 million duplex
penthouse).
247. See FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4 (establishing no monetary limitation, and allowing up
to 160 acres for a homestead located outside a municipality and 0.5 acre for a homestead
located within a municipality); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 41.001, 41.002 (Vernon 2000)
(establishing no monetary limitation, and allowing up to 200 acres for a rural homestead
and 10 acres for an urban homestead).
248. See generally BUIST M. ANDERSON, ANDERSON ON LIFE INSURANCE § 21.4
(1991); see also William A. Brackney, Creditors' Rights in Life Insurance, PROB. & PROP.,
Mar.-Apr. 1993, at 52, 55-58 (summarizing the law in all 50 states and the District of
Columbia).
249. See ANDERSON, supra note 248, § 21.4, at 606-07 (noting that a few states exempt
only a cash value of a certain amount or an amount that can be purchased with annual
premiums of a stated amount).
250. Id. § 21.4, at 607.
251. In this respect, laws exempting endowment policies at best only marginally further
the principal purpose of life insurance exemption laws-to secure the well-being of the
insured's dependents. See STUART SCHWARZSCHILD, RIGHTS OF CREDITORS IN LIFE
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exemption laws, state laws exempting life insurance policies apply
both in state court and federal bankruptcy proceedings.f2 Thus,
following a debtor's discharge in bankruptcy, it is possible for the cash
value of the exempt life insurance to be available for use by the
debtor for non-insurance purposes.f3 Many states' laws also exempt
annuity contracts and the income therefrom.4
(5) Trusts and Non-Trust Transfers for the Benefit of the Settlor's Family
All property owners, regardless of whether their home
jurisdiction recognizes self-settled APTs, have available to them a
variety of informal means of implementing arrangements roughly
equivalent to APTs. For example, an owner of property for whom
asset protection is a paramount concern can transfer the property to a
trusted family member, subject to an unenforceable understanding
that the property would be used for the benefit of the transferor.
Assuming that the transfer could not be captured by applicable
fraudulent transfer law, the transferred property would be immune
INSURANCE POLICIES 147-52 (1963) (discussing the purposes of insurance exemption
laws).
252. See supra note 243 and accompanying text.
253. Although there is no statutory prohibition on debtors acquiring exempt assets in
anticipation of bankruptcy, an attempt to abuse exemption laws by purchasing exempt
property with the intent of selling the property shortly after discharge could prompt a
court to deny the exemption or deny the discharge. See ANDERSON, supra note 248, §
11.07[C]; SPERO, supra note 68, 10.03[2], at 10-34 & n.202 (citing cases).
For an example of a debtor who was whipsawed by the interplay between state
exemption laws and federal bankruptcy law, consider the story of Omar A. Tveten. In
anticipation of filing a petition under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, Dr. Tveten
liquidated almost all of his non-exempt assets and invested the proceeds in life insurance
and annuity contracts issued by a fraternal benefit association, protected from creditors'
claims under a Minnesota exemption statute. In the bankruptcy proceedings, the court
denied a discharge on the grounds that Dr. Tveten's conversion of non-exempt assets into
exempt assets constituted a fraudulent transfer. See Norwest Bank Nebraska, N.A. v.
Tveten, 848 F.2d 871 (8th Cir. 1988) (affirming district court order affirming bankruptcy
court's denial of discharge). Ironically, in a related proceeding, the Supreme Court of
Minnesota held that the Minnesota statute on which Dr. Tveten relied-which granted an
unlimited exemption for the life insurance and annuity contracts purchased by Dr.
Tveten-violated the Minnesota constitution, under which only a "reasonable amount" of
property may be protected from creditors' claims. In re Tveten, 402 N.W.2d 551, 556-60
(Minn. 1987). Thus, Dr. Tveten both lost his exemption and failed to received a discharge.
254. See ANDERSON, supra note 248, § 21.7; see also SPERO, supra note 68, 10.09, at
10-100 n.611 (briefly summarizing states' annuity exemption laws).
255. This technique is relatively common with respect to transfers for the benefit of a
family member for whom a trust established by the transferor might cause the family
member to lose Medicaid eligibility. See, e.g., Sanford J. Schlesinger et al., Medicaid
Planning Ideas: What Works and What Doesn't, 20 EST. PLAN. 331, 335 (1993). In typical
circumstances, the transferor leaves property to one family member, with precatory
language that the property is to be used for the benefit of the person for whom outright
ownership of the property would disqualify that person for Medicaid benefits.
from the claims of the transferor's creditors.' 6  This technique is
especially effective-and likely most commonly utilized-through
transfers from one spouse to another; interspousal transfers are not
subject to gift tax, and spouses can generally be relied upon to
manage and disburse the transferred assets in a manner consistent
with the objectives of the transferor.
For the property owner who might be uncomfortable with such
an arrangement, other, more formal options are available. The
property owner could transfer property to a trust for the benefit of
family members, granting a non-general power of appointment' to a
trusted family member, such as a spouse or a child. The power of
appointment would grant the trusted family member the power to
direct that trust assets be distributed to the settlor. As the donee of a
power of appointment, the trusted family member would be free (but
could not be compelled) to direct the trustee to distribute trust assets
to the settlor as the donee deemed appropriate. No statutory or case
law subjects to the settlor's creditors assets with respect to which the
settlor is a permissible appointee of a power of appointment. This
arrangement has at least one advantage over APTs established in
jurisdictions such as Alaska or Delaware: the settlor is unrestricted in
his or her choice of trustee.' 9 The arrangement is also superior to the
informal arrangement described in the immediately preceding
paragraph, because, unlike assets held outright by a trusted family
member, assets held in trust over which a family member holds a non-
general power of appointment cannot be reached by the power
256. The risks to the transferor include: (i) the transferee may breach his or her
understanding with the transferor and divert the asset to the transferee or others, (ii) the
transferee's payment of funds back to the transferor may trigger the imposition of gift
taxes, and (iii) the transferred assets may be claimed by the creditors of the transferee. See
Adam J. Hirsch, Spendthrift Trusts and Public Policy: Economic and Cognitive
Perspectives, 73 Wash. U. L.Q. 1, 70-71 & n.262 (1995) (discussing transfers to trusted
family members for the benefit of persons other than the transferor; also noting the risk
that the trusted family member might die unexpectedly).
257. See I.R.C. § 2523 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (providing an unlimited gift tax
deduction for transfers to a spouse).
258. A power of appointment is a power granted by one person (the "donor" of the
power) to another person (the "donee," who is often the beneficiary of a trust), to direct
the distribution of assets to persons designated by the donee. A "general" power is a
power to direct the distribution of assets to a group of persons that includes the donee, the
donee's creditors, the donee's estate, or the creditors of the donee's estate. A "non-
general" power is a power to direct the distribution of assets to any person other than the
donee, the donee's creditors, the donee's estate, or the creditors of the donee's estate. See
DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 211, at 701-02.
259. Unlike APTs established in Alaska or Delaware, the trust arrangements described
in these paragraphs need not have an Alaska or Delaware resident as trustee. See supra
notes 100-107 and accompanying text.
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holder's creditors.26 Thus, the risk that the transferred assets might
unintentionally be dissipated is somewhat alleviated. Moreover, the
donee of a non-general power cannot appoint the assets to or for the
donee's own benefit; thus, this arrangement lessens the risk of the
family member diverting the funds in a manner inconsistent with the
desires of the settlor. A disadvantage of this arrangement is that,
unlike a trustee, a person who holds a power of appointment is not a
fiduciary; thus, the donee's decision whether and in what manner to
exercise the power is essentially unreviewable.26'
The risk that the donee of the power will exercise (or fail to
exercise) the power in a manner inconsistent with the desires of the
settlor can be alleviated somewhat by having the settlor retain control
over the ultimate disposition of the trust assets. Consider the
following transaction. A property owner transfers assets to a trust for
the benefit of his children. The terms of the trust authorize the
260. Under well-established authority, assets subject to a non-general power of
appointment cannot be reached by the creditors of the donee of the power. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 13.1 (1986); WILLIAM M.
MCGOVERN, JR. & SHELDON F. KURTz, WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES § 10.4, at 403 (2d
ed. 2001).
261. The law recognizes a distinction between a power of appointment held by a
trustee, whose exercise of the power is subject to the ordinary constraints imposed by the
law governing fiduciaries, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE
TRANSFERS § 11.1 cmt. d (1986), and a power held by a non-fiduciary, who exercise of the
power is subject to no such constraints, see id. § 11.1 cmt. a, illus. 1. The donee of a power
who is not also a trustee has no duty to exercise the power, and the power, if exercised,
may be exercised in a wholly arbitrary manner, excluding certain potential appointees in
favor of others. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 46 cmt. c (donee of power
under no duty to exercise power) (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1999); id. § 50 cmt. a ("A
trustee's discretionary power with respect to trust benefits is to be distinguished from a
power of appointment. The latter is not subject to fiduciary obligations and may be
exercised arbitrarily within the scope of the power."). Professors Eugene F. Scoles and
Edward C. Halbach Jr. illustrate the distinction as follows:
A leaves his estate to B Bank in trust to pay the income to C (who is likely to be
A's spouse or adult child) for life; on C's death B is to distribute the principal to
such of C's issue as C may appoint by will, remainder in default of appointment
to C's then living issue by right of representation. C (as "donee") has a
testamentary special [non-general] power of appointment. Incidentally, in
addition to its managerial powers, B Bank too may have a power over the
beneficial interests, most frequently in the form of power to invade principal for
C's needs but sometimes in other forms, such as a power to divert income from C
and distribute it among other beneficiaries. The power in B is a fiduciary power,
and B must behave in a "fiduciary manner" with regard to it, as distinct from C's
power of appointment that may be exercised arbitrarily, or it may be left
unexercised, as long as none but permissible appointees are benefited.
EUGENE F. SCOLES & EDWARD C. HALBACH, JR., PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON
DECEDENT'S ESTATES AND TRUSTS 330 (5th ed. 1993). See also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 21.1 cmt. a, illus. 1 (1986) (illustrating that
donee of power may exclude one or more permissible appointees in favor of others).
trustee to distribute as much income and principal of the trust as the
trustee deems necessary for the children's health, education, and
support. The settlor grants to his eldest child a non-general power of
appointment, with respect to which the settlor is a permissible
appointee. The trust lasts until the settlor's death, at which time the
trustee is directed to distribute the remaining assets in equal shares to
the settlor's living children and to the descendants of any deceased
child, subject, however, to a non-general power of appointment
retained by the settlor. The settlor's retained power of appointment
allows him, both during his lifetime and at death, to direct the trustee
to distribute the trust assets to his children and their descendants in
such amounts and shares as the settlor designates. If the settlor fails
to exercise his retained power, the trustee will distribute income and
principal of the trust according to its terms, which include a direction
to distribute the trust assets equally to the settlor's children at the
settlor's death. If, however, the settlor exercises his retained power,
the trustee will be obliged to distribute the trust assets as the settlor
directs. Notice how the settlor's retained power might influence the
actions of the settlor's eldest child-if the child fails to exercise the
power of appointment in a manner consistent with the settlor's
desires, the child risks having the trust assets diverted to her siblings
and their descendants at the settlor's death.
The non-general power retained by the settlor in this example
will not cause the trust assets to be subject to the claims of the
settlor's creditors. Under universally accepted principles, a non-
general power retained by the settlor of a trust is not an asset of the
settlor for purposes of creditors' claims.262 Moreover, as indicated
earlier, the settlor's creditors would have no claim to the trust assets
by virtue of the settlor being a permissible appointee of the non-
general power granted to the settlor's child.28 Nor would the child's
creditors be able to reach the assets subject to the child's power. And
finally, the children's beneficial interests in the trust (that is, their
right to receive distributions as determined to be necessary by the
trustee) can be sheltered from the claims of their creditors by use of a
standard spendthrift provision.2"
Is there a justification for treating this transaction differently
from the manner in which most states would treat APTs? The
theoretical distinction between a transaction such as this-in which
the donee of a power can appoint trust assets to the settlor-and an
262. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY: DONATIvE TRANSFERS § 13.1 cmt.
b (1986) (indicating that assets subject to a non-general power with respect to which the
donor is also the donee cannot be reached by the donee's creditors, unless the transfer
creating the power was a fraudulent conveyance).
263. See supra notes 258-259 and accompanying text.
264. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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APT-in which the trustee has the discretion to distribute trust assets
to the settlor-is that, with the latter, the person holding the power is
a fiduciary and is thus accountable for his actions both to the settlor
and to other trust beneficiaries. Thus, at least theoretically, the
settlor of a trust could sue the trustee of a self-settled trust for the
trustee's unreasonable failure to make adequate distributions to the
settlor. But, as a practical matter, such law suits are unlikely to be
successful. Moreover, as we have seen, the theoretical accountability
of the trustee may be no more significant than the practical
accountability of a child who wishes to conform to the settlor's
wishes.
Finally, consider the fact that, in every jurisdiction in the United
States, the recipient of a gratuitous transfer of property can, if the
transferee wishes, request that the transferor place the property in a
spendthrift, discretionary trust for the transferee's benefit. Because
the trust would not be self-settled, the assets in the trust would
benefit from virtually absolute protection from the transferee's
creditors.25 As a practical matter, of course, this option is available
only to the relatively wealthy-most persons of moderate means
would prefer, if given the choice, to receive gratuitous transfers
outright and thus to have absolute control over the transferred
assets.2 Anecdotal evidence suggests that transferees make such
requests relatively frequently, and the requests are often motivated
by a desire to protect the assets from the claims of creditors.267
Consider also that, with proper planning, substantial assets can be left
indefinitely in trust, thus protecting the trust assets from the claims of
both the life beneficiary's creditors and the creditors of subsequent
generations.2"
265. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text (describing the general American
rules regarding creditors' rights in spendthrift and discretionary trusts).
266. The wealthy, on the other hand, are more likely to be willing to defer enjoyment of
the transferred property or to allow it to be preserved for future generations.
267. Perhaps the most common situation prompting such a request is when an adult
child contemplates divorce or remarriage. Although it may be unseemly to characterize
spouses and former spouses as "creditors," in the context of divorce claims that is precisely
what they are. Having assets in a spendthrift discretionary trust can help to shield
inherited assets from such claims.
Another motivation for requesting that inherited or gifted assets be placed in trust is
that the trust can be structured to be excluded from the transferee's estate for purposes of
the estate tax. As a general rule, if a trust for the transferee's benefit lasts for at least the
transferee's lifetime, and if the transferee is granted only limited control over trust
distributions, the trust assets will not be included in the transferee's taxable estate. See
DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 211, at 1032-34 (explaining that assets held in
trust for life of beneficiary will not be taxed at the beneficiary's death, as long as
beneficiary's powers over trust distributions is limited to a non-general power of
appointment).
268. See supra note 89 (discussing state legislatures' repeal of the rule against
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C. Rethinking the Traditional Rule
Bearing in mind the numerous means of sheltering assets from
creditors' claims available throughout the United States, how should
we approach the topic of APTs? As discussed earlier, the traditional
approach to this subject is analytically flawed, because it fails to take
into account the relative rights and duties of the trust settlor,
beneficiaries other than the settlor, and the trustee. This section of
Part IV develops a new conceptual approach to understanding APTs
and deciding whether and in what circumstances they should be
respected.
To place this discussion into context, consider the follow
prototypical APT transaction. A settlor, in a transfer not subject to
being set aside under the relevant fraudulent transfer statute, places
property into an irrevocable trust. The terms of the trust authorize
the trustee to distribute income and principal to the settlor and the
settlor's descendants in such amounts and in such shares as the
trustee deems appropriate for any purpose. The settlor retains no
powers of disposition, whether in the form of a veto power over trust
distributions or a non-general power of appointment.*6 9  At the
settlor's death, the trust assets pass outright to the settlor's then living
descendants, per stirpes. The settlor names an independent corporate
fiduciary as trustee.
To what extent should the assets of this trust be subject to the
claims of the settlor's creditors? Two subsidiary questions bear on
the primary question. First, under general principles of trust law, or
as a practical matter, is the settlor in this example able to compel
distributions to himself? If so, then it seems appropriate that the trust
assets would be subject to the claims of his creditors, at least to the
extent that such distributions could be compelled. If not, then
subjecting the assets to creditors' claims seems less appropriate.
Second (and as a corollary to the first question), under general
principles of trust law, or as a practical matter, are the settlor's
descendants in this example able to limit or prevent distributions to
the settlor? If not, then subjecting the trust assets to the claims of the
settlors' creditors seems sensible, because no watchdog exists to
prevent the trust from serving as the settlor's alter ego. If yes, then
subjecting the trust assets to creditors' claims seems less appropriate,
because it suggests that the settlor has no control over trust
distributions or, at least, that the settlor's access to trust funds is
limited by enforceable criteria. As the questions themselves suggest,
the proper answers are to be found both in trust law governing the
perpetuities).
269. See supra notes 94 and 108-109 and accompanying text (describing how the Alaska
and Delaware APT statutes permit settlors to retain such powers).
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rights and duties of fiduciaries and their beneficiaries and in the
standards of practice to which most fiduciaries adhere.
Determining the proper answer to these questions requires first
an examination of the general legal principles governing the
discretion of fiduciaries. The first and perhaps most important
principle is that a trustee's exercise of discretion is always subject to
judicial review, no matter how broadly the trustee's discretion may be
described.' Thus, for example, even if the trust instrument describes
the trustee's discretion as "absolute," "unlimited," or "uncontrolled,"
those terms will not be interpreted so as to relieve the trustee from an
obligation to account for its discretionary judgments!' Because a
trustee is a fiduciary, it would be inconsistent with the concept of a
trust to insulate a trustee's exercise of discretion from all judicial
review.'
The second and next most important principle is that, as a
fiduciary, a trustee owes a duty of impartiality to the beneficiaries 3
Thus, the trustee of our prototypical APT would be bound to treat
the settlor and the other beneficiaries impartially, and could be
subject to liability for favoring the settlor over either the other
current beneficiaries or the future beneficiaries.
Finally and no less important, a trustee's exercise of discretion is
subject to a general standard of reasonableness. 4  Among other
270. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 50 cmt. c (Tentative Draft No. 2 1999);
RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) TRUSTS § 187 cmt. k (1959); GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT &
GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 560, at 211-12 (rev.
2d ed. 1980).
271. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 50 cmt. c (Tentative Draft No. 2 1999); 3
SCOTT ON TRUSTS (4th ed.), supra note 13, § 187, at 15.
272. See McGOvERN & KURTz, supra note 260, § 9.5, at 340 (observing that a
"trustee" who is not subject to account makes no sense, because a trust connotes some
control over the trustee); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 50 cmt. c (Tentative Draft
No. 2 1999) (stating that it is "a contradiction in terms ... to permit the settlor to relieve a
'trustee' of all accountability").
273. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 50 cmt. b, at 294 (Tentative Draft No. 2
1999); see also UNIFORM TRUST CODE § 803 (2000) (stating that, "[i]f a trust has two or
more beneficiaries, the trustee shall act impartially in investing, managing, and distributing
the trust property, giving due regard to the beneficiaries' respective interests).
274. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 50 cmts. b, d (Tentative Draft No. 2 1999).
Whether broadly stated discretionary language, see supra text accompanying note 271
(setting forth examples of such language), may relieve a trustee of the requirement that its
exercise of discretion be reasonable has been the subject of significant debate. Compare
RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) TRUSTS § 187 cmt. j (1959) (stating that words of "'absolute' or
'unlimited' or 'uncontrolled' discretion are not interpreted literally but are ordinarily
construed as merely dispensing with the standard of reasonableness," and that "[i]n such a
case the mere fact that the trustee has acted beyond the bounds of a reasonable judgment
is not a sufficient ground for interposition by the court") with RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TRUSTS § 50 reporter's note on cmt. c (Tentative Draft No. 2 1999) (observing that cases
are difficult to find in which extended discretionary language has been construed to excuse
things, the requirement that a trustee act reasonably means that a
trustee can be held liable for failing to exercise its discretion, as when
a trustee acts arbitrarily or without giving due consideration to all
relevant factors that should affect its decision.2' The point is
illustrated by the following example from the Restatement (Second):
A bequeaths $100,000 to B in trust to apply such part of the income
as B should think proper for the maintenance of C and to pay the
balance of the income to D. B arbitrarily pays the whole income to
D. The court may set aside the payment to D in whole or in part.Y6
This principle is central to understanding self-settled APTs, because it
means that a trustee may not arbitrarily or without good reason pay
income or principal to the settlor to the exclusion of other trust
beneficiaries, nor may a trustee blindly accede to a settlor's demands
for trust distributions.
Consider In re Osborn,2' in which a husband and wife established
a trust, the terms of which directed the trustee to pay the income to
the husband for life, then to the wife for life, and which authorized
the trustee to distribute to the husband or the wife such amounts of
principal as the trustee "in its judgment [determines to] be necessary
for [their] proper support and care."2 8 Over a period of several years,
the trustee permitted the husband to draw checks on a trust account,
apparently never inquiring as to the amounts of such checks or the
purposes for which they were drawn. Following the husband's death,
the remainder beneficiary (later joined by the wife) brought an action
for an accounting, claiming that:
in permitting [the husband] to draw such checks, without
supervision or restraint by the trustee, the latter surrendered the
judgment and discretion confided to it in the trust agreement and
became merely passive. The result of these unauthorized
expenditures, it is claimed, imperiled the integrity of the trust estate
unreasonable conduct) and BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 270, § 560, at 217-18 (stating
that "[t]he authorities do not appear to support the Restatement [Second) position that
there is no requirement or reasonableness in the exercise of a power granted in the
trustee's absolute discretion"). Note that even the Restatement (Second) demands
reasonable conduct of a trustee if the discretionary grant of authority does not include
language such as "absolute" or "unlimited." See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TRUSTS § 187
cmt. e (1959) (stating that, under these circumstance, a court will interfere with a trustee's
exercise of power if the trustee "acts beyond the bounds of a reasonable judgment"); see
also 3 SCOTT ON TRUSTS (4th ed.), supra note 14, § 187, at 14 (same). In light of the fact
that a trustee is a fiduciary, the better view is that the trustee's conduct must always be
reasonable, regardless of the breadth of discretion granted.
275. See 3 SCOTT ON TRUSTS (4th ed.), supra note 14, § 187.3.
276. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TRUSTS § 187 illus. 5 (1959).
277. 299 N.Y.S. 593 (App. Div. 1937).
278. Id. at 597.
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and greatly diminished the amount applicable to the support of the
widow, the surviving life tenant' 9
The court held that the trustee failed properly to exercise its
discretion, because it had not exercised its own judgment in
determining how much principal should be paid to the husband and
had substituted for its judgment that of the husband beneficiary.'
The principle is also illustrated by Dunkley v. Peoples Bank and
Trust Co.2' The terms of the trust in Dunkley authorized the trustee
to distribute as much of the income and principal of the trust to the
settlor's surviving spouse "as the trustee believes desirable... for the
health, support in reasonable comfort, education, best interests, and
welfare of [the surviving spouse].""" Dissatisfied with the trustee's
refusal to comply with his demands for trust principal, the surviving
spouse exercised his power to transfer the trust to a new trustee, one
which apparently was willing to do the spouse's bidding. The
surviving spouse subsequently demanded and eventually received a
distribution of all of the assets of the trust. The remainder
beneficiary sued the trustee, seeking an accounting and damages for
excessive distributions.
The trustee argued that, because the actions of the trustee
involved exercises of discretion, the remainder beneficiary must
establish "that the trustee acted dishonestly, arbitrarily, from an
improper motive, with gross unfaithfulness to the trust or otherwise in
bad faith."" The court disagreed. Relying in substantial part on the
second Restatement, the court indicated that a trustee may be held
liable not just for actions involving dishonesty or an improper motive,
but also if the trustee "fails to use his judgment, or acts beyond the
bounds of reasonable judgment." The court further stated that,
"even where the trustee is exercising discretionary power, his
discretion is not unlimited. He must still act reasonably and as a
reasonably prudent trustee would have acted under the same or
similar circumstances."2 Moreover, the court observed, a trustee "is
under a duty to the successive beneficiaries to act with due regard to
their respective interests.'" Based on these principles, the court
concluded that the trustee acted improperly when it acceded to the
surviving spouse's demands for trust distributions. Most importantly,
279. Id. at 599.
280. See id. at 600-01.
281. 728 F. Supp. 547 (W.D. Ark. 1989).
282. Ia at 551.
283. IM at 556.
284. Id. at 557 (quoting, with emphasis added, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TRUSTS § 187
cmt. e (1959)).
285. Id. at 557.
286. Id. at 559 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TRUSTS § 232 (1959)).
by acceding to the surviving spouse's demands, the trustee failed to
exercise its judgment and instead substituted the judgment of the
surviving spouse.2 This, the court concluded, constituted "a flagrant
breach of the trustee's] duty to the trust estate and the beneficiaries
of the trust." The court surcharged the trustee for the wrongful
payments to the surviving spouse. 9
Other cases similarly hold that a trustee may be held liable for
excessive payments to a current beneficiary, notwithstanding broad
grants of discretionary authority to make distributions. In In re
Davis' Will, for example, the trust instrument authorized the trustee
to distribute such amounts of the principal to the settlor's surviving
spouse "as the trustee may in its absolute and uncontrolled discretion
deem... advisable for [the spouse's]... comfort and happiness.'2"
The surviving spouse demanded a distribution of the entire principal
of the trust, and the trustee sought court approval to comply with the
spouse's demand. In refusing to approve the distribution, the court
indicated that the trustee could not comply with the spouse's demand
without independently investigating whether such a distribution
would be appropriate. Even a broad grant of discretion, according to
the court, "does not connote inconsiderate action."291 The court in In
re Brigg's Estate reached a similar conclusion with respect to a
decision by a trustee to distribute all of the remaining principal to the
life beneficiary.2' The court ruled that the decision constituted an
abuse of discretion, because the trustee apparently failed to
determine whether the distribution was appropriate under the
circumstances. Thus, notwithstanding broadly stated discretionary
authority to make distributions, the trustee acted "outside the bounds
of reasonable judgment."2 93 Many other cases similarly hold that a
trustee may not indiscriminately accede to a beneficiary's demand for
trust assets, both because the trustee must independently exercise its
judgment about the appropriateness of the distribution and because
the trustee must treat beneficiaries impartially.
287. See id. at 562 (explaining that the trustee had a duty to determine separately and
independently each requested distribution).
288. Id.
289. See id. at 563-64.
290. 88 N.Y.S.2d 192, 193 (Sur. Ct. 1949).
291. Id. at 195.
292. 27 A.2d 430 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1942).
293. Id. at 433.
294. See Kemp v. Paterson, 159 N.E.2d 661 (N.Y. 1959) (notwithstanding broad grant of
discretionary authority to make distributions, trustee not permitted to distribute entire
principal to life beneficiary, because to do so would disregard the interests of the
remainder beneficiaries); In re Wilkin, 75 N.E. 1105 (N.Y. 1905) (trustee authorized to
distribute income and principal in such amounts as the trustee "may deem best for the
interests of the [life beneficiary]"; despite broad grant of authority, trustee liable to
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As discussed previously,295 most cases applying the traditional
rule regarding creditors' rights in self-settled trusts fail to recognize
that the trust settlor, as beneficiary, has no right to demand trust
distributions and that a trustee could be held liable for acceding to
such a demand. Only a few cases concerning creditors' rights in trusts
recognize this important principle. Consider, for example, Fewell v.
Republic National Bank.216 In Fewell, a self-settled spendthrift trust
directed the trustee to distribute all income to the settlor and
authorized the trustee to distribute to the settlor such amounts of
principal as may be necessary for the settlor's "reasonable support,
comfort, and health.""' Notwithstanding that the assets of the trust
could be reached by the settlor's creditors, the court refused to honor
the settlor's request that the trust be terminated and all assets
distributed to her without the settlor having obtained the consent of
the other trust beneficiaries. To allow otherwise, the court indicated,
would defeat the interests of the other beneficiaries.' g Although in
one sense the court's reasoning may be suspect,299 the case
nevertheless properly recognizes that the trustee's authority to
distribute trust assets to the settlor must take into account the
interests of other trust beneficiaries.
The foregoing discussion demonstrates that a trustee may not
indiscriminately accede to the demands of the trust settlor (or any
other beneficiary). Several cases in the transfer tax context properly
recognize the important principal that, consistent with its duties as a
fiduciary, a trustee should be treated as independent of the trust
settlor and thus not the settlor's alter ego. Consider, for example,
remainder beneficiaries for distributing entire principal to the life beneficiary); In re
Murray, 45 A.2d 636 (Me. 1946) (by acceding to the life beneficiary's request for a
distribution of principal, the trustees failed to exercise their discretion, instead substituting
their discretion with that of the beneficiary); Corkery v. Dorsey, 111 N.E. 795 (Mass. 1916)
(trustee abused its discretion in agreeing to distribute entire principal to the life
beneficiary); see also Jennings v. Murdock, 553 P.2d 846 (Kan. 1976) (trustee properly
refused to accede to beneficiaries' demand that the trustee vote corporate stock held in
trusts in a manner consistent with the beneficiaries' wishes; "for the best interests of the
beneficiary" does not mean "as the beneficiary wishes," id. at 869).
295. See supra notes 34-53 and accompanying text.
296. 513 S.W.2d 596 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974).
297. See id. at 597.
298. See id. at 598-99 (observing that the trust included other beneficiaries, both during
the settlor's lifetime and at her death).
299. Although the court refused to address the extent of the rights of the settlor's
creditors, the traditional rule would provide that the settlor's creditors could reach the
maximum amount distributable to the settlor, which arguably in this case would be the
entire principal of the trust. Assuming that to be true, refusing to allow the settlor to
terminate the trust is illogical, because the settlor could accomplish indirectly (by incurring
debt and then relegating her creditors to recovery from the trust) what the court would
not allow her to do directly.
Estate of Wall v. Commissioner," involving three irrevocable trusts,
one for the benefit of each of the settlor's children, in which a
corporate trustee was granted the authority to distribute to the child
"so much of the income and principal, at such time or times and in
such amounts and manner, as the Trustee, in its sole discretion, shall
determine.""3 ' At issue was whether the settlor's retained power to
remove the corporate trustee and replace it with another corporate
trustee should cause the trustee's discretionary powers of distribution
to be attributed to the settlor, thus triggering estate tax inclusion
under sections 2036(a)(2) and 2038(a)(1) of the Internal Revenue
Code.' The theory asserted by the Internal Revenue Service was
that, because the settlor could remove and replace trustees at will, the
settlor could install a trustee that would do its bidding; thus, the
Service argued, the discretionary powers of the trustee should be
attributed to the settlor 3" The Tax Court properly rejected this
argument and made the following observations about the relationship
between the settlor and the trustee:
[U]nder established principles of the law governing trusts, a trustee
would violate its fiduciary duties if it acquiesced in the wishes of the
settlor by taking action that the trustee would not otherwise take
regarding the beneficial enjoyment of any interest in the trust, or
agreed with the settlor, prior to appointment, as to how fiduciary
powers should be exercised over the distribution of income and
principal. The trustee has a duty to administer the trust in the sole
interest of the beneficiary, to act impartially if there are multiple
beneficiaries, and to exercise powers exclusively for the benefit of
beneficiaries.3 °
Based on these principles of fiduciary independence, the court
declined "to infer any kind of fraudulent side agreement between [the
settlor] and [the corporate trustee] as to how the administration of
these trusts would be manipulated by [the settlor]." 3°5
A similar conclusion was reached in the context of a gift tax case.
In Estate of Vak v. Commissioner,' the settlor created an irrevocable
trust for the benefit of himself and several members of his family and
300. 101 T.C. 300 (1993).
301. I& at 303.
302. See I.R.C. §§ 2036(a)(2) (1994) (triggering estate tax inclusion of property
transferred by a decedent with respect to which the decedent has retained the "right... to
designate the persons who shall possess or enjoy the property or the income therefrom"),
2038(a)(1) (1994) (triggering estate tax inclusion of property transferred by a decedent
with respect to which at the decedent's death enjoyment thereof was subject to a power
held by the decedent "to alter, amend, revoke, or terminate").
303. See 101 T.C. at 305-06,311.
304. See id. at 312.
305. Id. at 313.
306. 973 F.2d 1409 (8th Cir. 1992).
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transferred to the trust stock in his closely held corporation. The
trustees were granted absolute discretion to distribute income and
principal to the beneficiaries. The settlor retained a power to remove
and replace the trustees, which the settlor relinquished several years
later. At issue was when the settlor's transfer became complete for
gift tax purposes. The IRS argued, as it did in Estate of Wall, that the
settlor's power to remove and replace the trustees gave him absolute
control over trust distributions, with the consequence that the settlor
could direct that all of the income and principal of the trust could be
distributed to him. Thus, the IRS argued, the settlor's transfer to the
trust remained incomplete until the settlor's removal and replacement
power was relinquished. The court rejected the IRS's argument,
indicating that the IRS "overstates its position when it contends that
'Mr. Vak had the power to replace the trustees with individuals who
would do his bidding."' 30 Both Estate of Wall and Estate of Vak
involved powers held by the settlor to remove and replace the trustee.
Notwithstanding that a removal power may afford a settlor some
influence over the actions of a trustee, both cases properly recognize
that a trustee's duties as a fiduciary compel it to act independently of
the settlor and that it is not appropriate to treat the settlor as the
trustee's alter ego. A trustee's independence should be even more
apparent if the settlor does not hold a removal power.
The United States Tax Court has reached a similar conclusion in
the context of the income taxation of trusts. In Estate of Goodwyn v.
Commissioner, at issue was whether the settlor should be taxed on
the income of a trust under Internal Revenue Code section 674(a),
which subjects a settlor to tax on the income of any trust over which
the settlor or any "nonadverse party"3' holds a "power of
disposition" affecting "the beneficial enjoyment of the corpus or the
income therefrom." Section 674(c) establishes an exception from
section 674(a) for a power of disposition held by so-called
independent trustees-"trustees, none of whom is the [settlor], and
no more than half of whom are related or subordinate parties.., of
the [settlor]." At issue in Goodwyn was whether the discretionary
307. Id. at 1414 (quoting the Service's brief). The Service has since retreated from the
arguments it asserted in Estate of Wall and Estate of Vak. See Rev. Rul. 95-58 (discussing
Wall and Vak, and holding that a trustee removal power will not trigger estate tax
inclusion under sections 2036 or 2038 if replacement trustees do not include related or
subordinate parties as described in I.R.C. § 672(c) (1994)).
308. 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 1026 (1976).
309. Defined as any person not having "a substantial beneficial interest in the trust
which would be adversely affected by the exercise or nonexercise of the power which he
possesses respecting the trust." I.R.C. § 672(a) (1994); see id- § 672(b) (1994 & Supp. IV
1998). Thus, generally speaking, a "nonadverse" party is a person who is not a beneficiary
of the trust.
powers to distribute income and invest and manage the principal held
by the trustees, who were admittedly "independent" of the settlor
within the literal meaning of section 674(c), should nevertheless be
attributed to the settlor, thus triggering the general rule under section
674(a). The record indicated that "at all times from the establishment
of the trusts until [the settlor's] last illness, with the acquiescence of
the trustees, the [settlor] made all decisions with respect to the
purchase and sale of trust assets and the investment of any proceeds
and determined the amounts, if any, to be distributed to the
respective beneficiaries.""31  The settlor's actual control over trust
investments and distributions, the IRS argued, should trigger section
674(a), despite the fact that the trustees were technically
"independent" within the meaning of section 674(c). As the Tax
Court described the IRS's position, the IRS argued "that although
[the settlor] does not specifically have [the powers of the trustees], his
relationship to the trust res through its management and to the
administration of the trust generally is such that he should be deemed
to be a trustee, in fact, during his life.
311
Notwithstanding the settlor's apparent control over all important
trust functions, the Tax Court ruled that the trust income was not
taxable to the settlor under section 674(a). In reaching its conclusion,
the court emphasized the legal responsibility and independence of the
trustees as fiduciaries:
[S]ection 674 uses the term "power". . . in the legal sense of having
an enforceable authority or right to perform some action. The use
of this term in this legal sense suggests that the power of a [settlor]
upon which he will be taxed is a power reserved by instrument or
contract creating an ascertainable and legally enforceable right, not
merely the persuasive control which he might exercise over an
independent trustee who is receptive to his wishes....
In this case, the trustees... accepted the rights, duties, and
obligations granted them in the trust instruments. Regardless of
the fact that they had entrusted to the [settlor] the complete
management and control of these trusts, this informal delegation
did not discharge them from the legal responsibility they had as the
trustees. As a matter of law, the trustees were liable and
answerable for the [settlor's] acts on their behalf....
* Whatever power [the settlor] exercised over the trust assets,
administration or distribution, he did so on the trustee's behalf and
not in his own right."'
In other words, because the trustees at all times were legally
accountable for the settlor's decisions on their behalf, it was
310. 35 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1038.
311. Id at 1039.
312. Id. at 1039-40.
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appropriate to treat the trustees as holding the investment and
distribution powers, and not the settlor 31' In our prototypical APT,
involving a corporate fiduciary that presumably delegates few if any
discretionary powers to the settlor, it is even more apparent that the
powers of the trustee are legally insulated from the settlor's control.
Several practical considerations further support the notion that
the settlor and the trustee of a trust should be treated as independent
of one another and that a trustee is unlikely blindly to accede to a
settlor's demands for distributions. First, cases holding fiduciaries
liable for excessive distributions, whether or not decided correctly,
have a chilling effect on fiduciaries (and the lawyers advising them),
thus motivating them to decline requests for distributions if another
beneficiary is likely to object. Fiduciaries, especially ones engaged in
that role as professionals, typically exercise extraordinary caution in
making distributions, whenever those distributions might favor one
beneficiary over another. Students of tort law will recognize this
phenomenon as similar to that associated with judicial expansion of
tort liability, one of the "costs" of which is excessive liability-avoiding
behavior, such as practicing defensive medicine."4 Dean Kenneth B.
Davis, Jr., has also observed a similar phenomenon with respect to
decisions by trustees concerning transactions in which they may have
conflicts of interest. Dean Davis explains that, because of the close
scrutiny to which the law subjects trustees, the law creates a risk that
a trustee may be sanctioned for engaging in certain self-dealing
transactions that are viewed as per se opportunistic by the court,
notwithstanding that the transactions may have been entered into by
the trustee in good faith."' The practical effect of the law's approach
is to cause trustees to forgo self-dealing transactions altogether, even
ones that might have been in the best interests of the trust
beneficiaries. '  In sum, the law governing fiduciaries prompts
cautious behavior on their part, with the result that professional
fiduciaries exhibit a disinclination to comply with beneficiary-settlor
demands for trust distributions.
313. See also Treas. Reg. § 1.674(d)-2(a) (powers of independent trustee not attributed
to the settlor even if the settlor hold a power to remove and replace the trustee).
314. See, e.g., Gary T. Schwartz, Reality in the Economic Analysis of Tort Law: Does
Tort Law Really Deter?, 42 UCLA L. REV. 377, 436-38 (1994) (describing costs associated
with increased physician malpractice liability); see also PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO's
REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM 180-85 (1991) (describing costs of large
personal injury verdicts).
315. See Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., Judicial Review of Fiduciary Decisionmaking-Some
Theoretical Perspectives, 80 NW. U.L. REV. 1, 42-46 (1985) (describing how the law seeks
to avoid all "Type 1" errors-in which fiduciaries' opportunistic transactions are upheld-
at the risk of causing "Type 2" errors-in which good faith transactions are invalidated).
316. See id.
Second, professional trustees tend to be conservative in making
distributions because doing so exposes them to fewer risks. Professor
Edward C. Halbach Jr. has described this phenomenon as follows:
In case of doubt a trustee is apt to be conservative in his decisions
concerning distributions .... This conservatism stems from the fact
that underpayment, in the absence of such serious abuse or bad
faith as to warrant the trustee's removal, would result merely in the
present beneficiary's obtaining a court order directing increased
distributions from the fund remaining in the hands of the trustee.
Overpayment, however, might result in suit by a remainderman
long after the distribution, when the funds paid out are no longer
recoverable or are recoverable only at considerable inconvenience
to the trustee.
Professor Halbach found evidence of this conservatism "by the
preponderance of cases that are brought to rectify an alleged
underpayment." '
Third, professional fiduciaries usually base their fees in
substantial part on the size of the trust. Thus, trustees have a
financial incentive to be conservative in making distributions.
Finally, in the context of an APT, a trustee will have an added
incentive to be conservative in making distributions to the settlor-to
the extent discretionary APTs are respected at all, they presumably
will be respected only in those cases in which the trustee manages the
trust and makes discretionary distributions with clear independence
from the settlor. Conversely, creditors will be more likely to succeed
in recovering from APTs in cases in which the trust appears to be a
sham, that is, when the settlor in effect controls management and
distribution decisions. To preserve the integrity of an APT, a
professional fiduciary will want to exercise utmost caution in making
distributions to the settlor, to avoid any appearance that the trustee
has acceded to the settlor's demands or is otherwise acting as the
settlor's alter ego. Trustees who wish to compete for APT business,
therefore, will wish to establish and preserve their reputations for
conservatism and independence.319
317. Edward C. Halbach Jr., Problems of Discretion in Discretionary Trusts, 61 COLUM.
L. REV. 1425, 1427 (1961).
318. ML
319. Douglas J. Blattmachr, President and CEO of the Alaska Trust Company,
emphasized this point in a telephone conversation with this writer. He indicated that the
Alaska Trust Company is willing to serve as trustee of an Alaska APT only if the settlor
expressly recognizes that distributions to the settlor will be in the discretion of the trustee
and that the settlor will ordinarily be unable to compel distributions to himself or herself.
In the usual case, the Alaska Trust Company will accept contributions to an APT of no
more than 1/2 of the settlor's assets, and it recommends that settlors contribute no more
than 1/4 or 1/3 of their assets. Mr. Blattmachr expressed his concern that, in cases of
greater contributions, settlors may fail to understand the lack of control that they will have
over APT distributions. Telephone Interview with Douglas J. Blattmachr, President and
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As developed in this section of the article, the laws governing
fiduciaries (as well as practical considerations) suggest that, as a
general proposition, the settlor of a discretionary APT cannot compel
distributions to himself or herself and that other trust beneficiaries
under some circumstances may recover from a trustee that makes
excessive or ill-considered distributions to the settlor. As a fiduciary,
the trustee of an APT is obligated to act independently of the settlor's
wishes and to treat all beneficiaries impartially. Thus, in evaluating
APTs, and in particular in deciding whether and in what
circumstances a settlor's creditors should be able to recover from an
APT, one must bear in mind that a settlor who creates an APT gives
up substantial rights to the trust property. The right to receive
discretionary distributions is not the same as absolute ownership of
property. This distinction must inform our consideration of APTs
and creditors' rights.
As discussed in Part I, the traditional rule concerning creditors'
rights in self-settled trusts fails to take this distinction into account-
the traditional rule is based on the erroneous assumptions that a
settlor who transfers property to a discretionary trust gives up few if
any rights to that property and that self-settled trusts involve collusive
arrangements between settlors and trustees. 20 Unfortunately, most
recent scholarship on APTs reflects a similar misunderstanding.
Consider, for example, Professor Karen E. Boxx's excellent article on
this subject." In countering certain arguments supporting the use of
self-settled APTs, Professor Boxx makes the point that, "[a]lthough
the trustor must turn irrevocable control over to the independent
trustee and pay a fee for such services, there are no legal limitations
on the amount the trustee can distribute for the benefit of the
grantor."'3 " But as the discussion in this Part observes, in fact there
are significant theoretical and practical limitations on the trustee's
discretion to make distributions to the settlor, and the trustee risks
liability to the other trust beneficiaries if it makes distributions in
excess of these limitations. Professor Boxx further observes that "the
self-settled trust offers such little risk to the grantor, and allows him
to retain so much control, that it removes the ordinary disincentives to
asset protection that existing law has presumed." 3" While it is
CEO, Alaska Trust Company (July 12,2001).
320. See supra notes 34-53 and accompanying text.
321. Boxx, supra note 3.
322. Id at 1256.
323. Id. (emphasis added; "ordinary disincentives to asset protection" refers to the
limitations inherent in the use of retirement accounts and exemption laws for purposes of
sheltering assets from creditors' claims; those limitations, Professor Boxx asserts, are not
applicable to APTs).
possible for a settlor to reserve substantial control over an APT, 3
settlor-retained controls are by no means an essential characteristic of
APTs. Professor Lynn M. LoPucki similarly describes the domestic
development of APT legislation in the follow terms:
[T]he judgment proofing of individuals appears to be in rapid
acceleration. The Death of Liability [Professor LoPucki's earlier
work]3' describes the decade-old boom in offshore "asset-
protection trusts"-devices sited in offshore havens but widely
promoted here as an effective means for Americans to render
themselves judgment proof. "Asset protection trust" is merely a
euphemism for "self-settled spendthrift trust." Self-settled
spendthrift trusts are, in essence, private declarations by property
owners that they will retain full use and control of their assets, but
that their judgment creditors will not be able to reach them. Not
surprisingly, the law in the United States has long been that self-
settled spendthrift trusts are void as against public policy.2 6
Professor LoPucki's misunderstanding is fairly typical, though
understandable, when one considers the traditional case law analysis
of such trusts. 7
To summarize the observations of this section, a thoughtful
analysis of creditors' rights in APTs requires a proper understanding
of the relative rights and duties of the trust settlor, other
beneficiaries, and the trustee. As discussed, trustees are obligated as
fiduciaries to exercise their discretion independent of the wishes or
demands of the settlor and after considering the competing desires
and needs of the other trust beneficiaries. Contrary to a commonly
held belief, the settlor of an APT cannot compel the trustee to
distribute all amounts that the settlor may desire, and a trustee who
acceded to a settlor's unreasonable demands would be liable to the
other trust beneficiaries. • Thus, a settlor who establishes an APT
gives up substantial control over the settlor's assets. Moreover, as a
practical matter, trustees-especially trustees of APTs-will act
conservatively in making trust distributions.
D. Policy Considerations
Previous sections of this article have offered the following
observations about APTs. First, the traditional rule regarding
creditors' rights in self-settled trusts is analytically flawed, based on a
misunderstanding of the relative rights and duties of the settlor, other
324. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 34.40.110(b)(2) (Lexis 2000) (permitting settlor to retain
a power to veto distributions or a non-general testamentary power of appointment).
325. LoPucki, supra note 67.
326. Lynn M. LoPucki, Virtual Judgment Proofing: A Rejoinder, 107 YALE L.J. 1413,
1415 (1998) (emphasis added).
327. See supra notes 34-53 and accompanying text.
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beneficiaries, and the trustee. Second, United States law already
affords substantial asset-protection alternatives for property owners
who are inclined to judgment-proof their assets. Third, the settlor
who decides to create an APT necessarily gives up substantial rights
in and control over the trust assets. Moreover, the limitations on the
settlor's rights are enforceable by other trust beneficiaries.
Bearing these observations in mind, this section of the article
poses the following related questions. What policy considerations
support the use of APTs? If the law permits APTs, what limitations
should be placed on their use? Are the policy objections to APTs
sufficiently persuasive that we are willing to treat APT assets (for
creditors' rights purposes) as if they were owned by the settlor
directly, even in cases in which the trustee acts with clear
independence from the settlor? Stating the question another way, do
the policy objections persuade us that the rights of the settlor's
creditors should be greater than the rights of the settlor himself or
herself? The object here is not to answer these questions definitively,
but rather to inform our consideration of the questions.
(1) Arguments Favoring APTs
Perhaps the most persuasive argument in favor of APTs is that
they allow persons to do for themselves as the law permits them to do
for others. As described earlier, wealthy heirs and other recipients of
gratuitous transfers are presently afforded the opportunity to opt out
of the liability system with respect to inherited or gifted assets, by
requesting that those assets be placed in spendthrift trusts.'l As aptly
stated over 50 years ago by Dean Erwin N. Griswold, "[w]e may well
question the soundness of a rule which allows a man to hold the
bounty of others free from the claims of his creditors, but denies the
same immunity to his interest in property which he has accumulated
by his own efforts. 3 29 "A man who earns his own way should have
the same opportunity for protection from adversity as the man who
takes his support from others."3" This disparity in treatment is
exacerbated by the fact that spendthrift trusts for descendants and
others can now be set up to last in perpetuity. As a general
proposition, it is the very wealthy who are most able to avail
themselves of this planning option. Allowing self-settled APTs would
extend this planning tool to person of more modest means, whose
assets have been acquired through their own efforts.
An argument advanced by advocates of domestic APTs is that
they serve to prevent a substantial exit of capital to offshore
328. See supra notes 265-268 and accompanying text.
329. ERWIN N. GRISWOLD, SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS § 474, at 542-43 (2d ed. 1947).
330. GRISWOLD, supra note 329, § 557, at 644.
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jurisdictions.331 The domestic developments may also be viewed as a
positive alternative to offshore APT laws, which are arguably more
abusive.332  Moreover, this argument goes, APTs encourage
investment and savings-as fiduciaries, trustees are required to invest
trust assets, and trustees of APTs will naturally be conservative in
making distributions.33
A further argument in favor of APTs is that they allow all
persons to avail themselves of asset protection opportunities available
to others. As discussed earlier in this part, there are a myriad of
devices for protecting assets from creditors' claims, yet these devices
are not available to all persons. For example, not everyone can own
property as tenants by the entirety-this form of ownership is not
available to unmarried persons, and not all jurisdictions recognize
tenancies by the entirety. Not all persons have the opportunity to
place substantial assets in retirement accounts; APTs afford those
persons the opportunity to save assets for the future in a vehicle
sheltered from the claims of creditors.3m Persons whose assets are
331. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text (describing amounts held in offshore
APTs).
332. See supra notes 71-82 and accompanying text.
333. Hirsch, supra note 256, at 14-15 (arguing that "a spendthrift trust enforces a
regimen of saving over.., whatever period of years the benefactor selects .... An
economic by-product of this restriction is that it frees up more investment capital and
hence tends to promote economic growth.").
334. In this respect, an APT could serve as a "nest egg"-property set aside to protect
the settlor against unforeseen financial contingencies. In connection with this point,
consider the argument advanced by Professor George P. Costigan Jr.:
And that brings us, at last, to the problem of the man who realizes that he is a
spendthrift and who tries to protect himself from ultimately becoming dependent
on charity or on the public for support by creating for himself a spendthrift trust.
If there is anything in the argument that the beneficiary's need should affect the
attitude of the court, then such a beneficiary's need should be met, provided that
there is no fraud on his existing creditors, that is, provided that he keeps out of
the trust assets sufficient to discharge his existing debts .... [T]here seems
clearly to be a grave need that society shall protect those persons who are unable
to guard themselves against objectionable importunity and against being thrown
to the wolves that infest our society.
George P. Costigan, Jr., Those Protective Trusts Which Are Miscalled "Spendthrift Trusts"
Reexamined, 22 CAL. L. REV. 471, 492 (1934) (further arguing, at 492-93, that the law
should require the settlor to give public notice of the trust). With less hyperbole,
Professor Adam J. Hirsch has argued convincingly that spendthrift protections available to
gratuitous donees should also be available to donors:
[J]ust as a parent might recognize in her child a propensity to overspend or over
borrow, so might an individual recognize this same propensity in herself. By
creating her own voluntary and involuntary disabling restraints, an individual can
deprive herself of the opportunity to overspend or overborrow, and thereby
shield herself from financially destructive impulses that she anticipates having to
contend with in the future.
Hirsch, supra note 256, at 86; see also id. at 86-92 (arguing that such "self-paternalism"
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substantially invested in closely held businesses can shelter those
assets from the claims of their individual creditors through the use of
limited partnerships. This same opportunity is not available to
owners of passive investment assets. APT laws also afford creditor
protection to persons who reside in jurisdictions with less than
adequate exemption rules. 35 In some respects, APTs are less
objectionable than exempt property rules-with an APT, a settlor
cannot both enjoy the property and shelter the property from
creditors. As explained by Professor Halbach, any spendthrift
protection associated with trusts ends when property is distributed to
the beneficiary."
From a conceptual perspective, respecting APTs is consistent
with the law governing the rights and duties of trust beneficiaries and
fiduciaries. Perhaps most importantly, limiting creditors' rights in
APTs to no more than the rights of the debtor-settlor serves to
protect the rights of other trust beneficiaries. As we have seen, 37 the
traditional rule regarding APTs disregards the interests of other
beneficiaries by granting the settlor's creditors greater rights than has
the settlor himself or herself.
Finally, assuming that a settlor's transfer to an APT is not
fraudulent within the meaning of the fraudulent transfer laws, why
should creditors be granted greater rights in the APT than they would
have in other gratuitously transferred assets, from which the settlor
may also continue to benefit through an exercise of discretion by the
(non-fiduciary) transferee?3" In certain respects, APTs are less
susceptible to abuse than similar informal arrangements involving
trusted family members.339
may be easier to justify than "parental paternalism" and describing other common
examples of self-paternalism in non-trust contexts). For an example of a court approving
the use of such a trust, see Booth v. Chadwick, 154 S.W.2d 268 (Tex. App. 1941) (allowing
prisoner to create self-settled spendthrift trust).
335. But see Boxx, supra note 3, at 1256 (noting the limitations inherent in exemption
rules, such as those governing life insurance and homesteads).
336. Edward C. Halbach, Jr., Uniform Acts, Restatements, and Trends in American
Trust Law at Century's End, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1877,1894 (2000).
337. See supra notes 18-29 and accompanying text.
338. See supra notes 255-268 and accompanying text (describing other trust and non-
trust arrangements similar to APTs).
339. See supra notes 261-262 and accompanying text (explaining how powers retained
by a settlor can be used to influence the donee of a power of appointment); but see supra
text accompanying notes 264-265 (acknowledging the theoretical distinction that, in the
case of an APT, a settlor could sue the trustee for inadequate distributions, while the
transferor in the comparable informal arrangement would have no cause of action against
a non-fiduciary family member).
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(2) Arguments Against APTs
The most persuasive argument against APTs is a moral one:
"[y]ou should keep your promises and pay your debts because it is the
right thing to do.''3" As described by Professor Boxx, "there is
something disturbing about a country that would allow debtors to
leave their debts unpaid and still enjoy an extravagant lifestyle.""
The principal response to this objection is to suggest that limits be
placed on both the amounts that can be sheltered from creditors in a
trust and the categories of creditors against whom spendthrift
protection is effective. 2 Another response is to require settlors to
give public notice when APTs are established, although this might do
little to protect creditors who routinely extend credit without
checking resources (a plumber, for example), and it would do nothing
to protect involuntary creditors, such as tort victims.
Another persuasive argument is both moral and economic:
allowing potential debtors to shelter their assets from creditors
"threatens the system of civil enforcement of obligations" by, among
other things, removing the deterrence element associated with our
liability system.3  Allowing persons to shelter their assets in APTs,
this argument states, creates a "moral hazard," by removing the
deterrence of having one's assets exposed to potential claimants. In
reply to those who might claim that APTs are a reasonable response
to a runaway tort system,' this argument states that the better
response would be remedial tort legislation, not APT legislation.
(3) Possible APT Limitations
Despite legitimate concerns about APTs, the legislative trend
authorizing APTs will likely continue. In an effort to shape future
APT legislation and to prevent abusive APT arrangements, this
section of the article suggests some limitations that might be placed
on the availability of APTs.
One possible limitation would be a ceiling on APT
contributions. 5 The ceiling could take the form of an absolute dollar
340. Boxx, supra note 3, at 1259.
341. Id.
342. See id. at 1259-60. But see Joseph G. Porter, Spendthrift Trusts for Settlors, 68 TR.
& EST. 102, 103 (1939) (arguing that the objections against self-settled spendthrift trusts
are no different from those against spendthrift trusts for the benefit of others).
343. Boxx, supra note 3, at 1260-61.
344. See Roundtable Discussion, The International Trust, 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
779,794 (1999) (comments of Barry Engel).
345. As a practical matter, in many cases the gift tax will function as a ceiling. As a
general rule, a transfer to an APT with respect to which the transferor retains no control
over distributions will be treated as a completed gift for gift tax purposes. See RICHARD
B. STEPHENS ET AL., FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFr TAXATION 10.01[4], [6], [7] (7th ed.
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amount '6 or a percentage of the settlor's assets. 47  The latter
limitation might be implemented under the applicable fraudulent
transfer statute, by creating a presumption that transfers in excess of a
certain percentage of a settlor's assets are fraudulent with respect to
both present and future creditors. The fraudulent transfer statute
could establish a similar presumption in cases of inadequate liability
insurance.
Another limitation could involve the identity of the trustee. It
seems reasonable to require a certain degree of independence
between the settlor and the trustee if the APT arrangement is to be
respected. For example, APT legislation could require all
distribution decisions to be made by a corporate fiduciary in which
the settlor has no ownership or management interest. Even if a
legislature places no limits on the identity of the trustee, creditors
presumably could "pierce the trust veil" in circumstances in which the
trustee has acted as the settlor's alter ego. Legislatures may also wish
to limit the powers that a settlor is permitted to retain, such as
prohibiting the settlor from retaining a power to veto distributions or
prohibiting the retention of a testamentary power of appointment.'
APTs should be respected only in those circumstances in which
there are legitimate limitations on the settlor's access to trust assets.
To curtail excessive distributions to the settlor, one option would be
to place a ceiling on distributions, by reference to a standard-such as
one for the settlor's health, support, and education. Another option
would be to require that the trust have multiple beneficiaries (both
during the settlor's lifetime and after the settlor's death), so that the
trustee is accountable to persons other than the settlor, whose
interests would be financially adverse to the settlor's interest. To take
this concept one step further, APT legislation could require that
distributions to the settlor be made by an independent trustee and
1997). As of 2002, a credit against the gift tax permits tax-free transfers of up to
$1,000,000. See I.R.C. § 2505 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). Completed transfers in excess of
this amount trigger gift tax, imposed under a graduated rate schedule that begins at 41%.
I.R.C. §§ 2001(c) (West 2001), 2502(a) (1994 & Supp IV 1998). To avoid the gift tax for
transfers in excess of this amount, a settlor creating an APT would need to retain a power
of disposition, such as the veto power over distributions or non-general power of
appointment authorized under the Alaska statute. But retaining such powers might make
a court in a non-APT jurisdiction more inclined to disregard the arrangement and allow
the settlor's creditors to reach the trust assets.
346. Determined perhaps by reference to what would produce a reasonable level of
income.
347. GRISWOLD, supra note 329, § 557, at 645-46 (stating that amounts sheltered in self-
settled trusts "should be reasonably limited in amount").
348. One might reasonably surmise that the fewer powers retained by the settlor, the
more likely the arrangement would be respected in a non-APT jurisdiction.
also require the consent of a person with a substantial adverse
beneficial interest."
For purposes of protecting voluntary creditors from ill-advisedly
extending credit to persons whose assets are held in an APT, the law
might impose a public notice requirement for establishing an APT.
Some jurisdictions might place limits on APTs based on the
identity of the creditor. The law already recognizes some limitations
with respect to spendthrift trusts for the benefit of persons other than
settlors. For example, in many jurisdictions, a child seeking
delinquent support payments can recover from a spendthrift trust
established for someone other than the settlor 50 In most cases, these
same limitations would also apply to self-settled trusts. Some
jurisdictions might disregard APTs in cases of certain types of tort
claims, such as those involving intentional misconduct or gross
negligence. This sort of limitation would serve to answer many
objections to the use of APTs, because it would remove the "moral
hazard" associated with the device.
Conclusion
The traditional rule regarding creditors' rights in self-settled
trusts reflects a misunderstanding of how an APT fundamentally
changes the nature of the settlor's relationship with his or her
property: the settlor both gives up substantial rights in the property
and creates rights in others. By permitting the settlor's creditors to
reach the trust assets, the traditional rule disregards the otherwise
enforceable interests of the other trust beneficiaries. In this and other
respects, the traditional rule is theoretically unsound.
Unless Congress acts to prohibit them,351 asset protection trusts
are here to stay. The purpose of this article is not to defend APTs,
but to reshape our conversations about them, and perhaps to direct
further APT developments in a manner that is both consistent with
fiduciary principles and responsive to the legitimate concerns of APT
detractors.
349. See, e.g., Estate of German v. United States, 85-1 U.S.T.C. 13,610 (Ct. CI. 1985)
(finding that, under Maryland law, a self-settled trust could not be reached by the settlor's
creditors if distributions to the settlor required the consent of a beneficiary with a
substantial adverse interest).
350. See Anne S. Emanuel, Spendthrift Trusts: It's Time to Codify the Compromise, 72
NEB. L. REV. 179, 194-95 (1993). This exception applies only to the spendthrift limitation;
a discretionary interest in such a trust may still be sheltered from such a claim under the
general principles applicable to such interests.
351. See Sterk, supra note 3, at 1114-17 (discussing how the law might curtail the use of
APTs).
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